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Abstract
Data mining is an increasingly important technology for extracting useful knowledge hidden
in large collections of data. There are, however, negative social perceptions about data min-
ing, among which potential privacy violation and potential discrimination. The former is an
unintentional or deliberate disclosure of a user profile or activity data as part of the output
of a data mining algorithm or as a result of data sharing. For this reason, privacy preserving
data mining has been introduced to trade off the utility of the resulting data/models for
protecting individual privacy. The latter consists of treating people unfairly on the basis
of their belonging to a specific group. Automated data collection and data mining tech-
niques such as classification have paved the way to making automated decisions, like loan
granting/denial, insurance premium computation, etc. If the training datasets are biased
in what regards discriminatory attributes like gender, race, religion, etc., discriminatory
decisions may ensue. For this reason, anti-discrimination techniques including discrimina-
tion discovery and prevention have been introduced in data mining. Discrimination can be
either direct or indirect. Direct discrimination occurs when decisions are made based on
discriminatory attributes. Indirect discrimination occurs when decisions are made based
on non-discriminatory attributes which are strongly correlated with biased discriminatory
ones.
In the first part of this thesis, we tackle discrimination prevention in data mining and
propose new techniques applicable for direct or indirect discrimination prevention individ-
ually or both at the same time. We discuss how to clean training datasets and outsourced
datasets in such a way that direct and/or indirect discriminatory decision rules are con-
verted to legitimate (non-discriminatory) classification rules. The experimental evaluations
vi
demonstrate that the proposed techniques are effective at removing direct and/or indirect
discrimination biases in the original dataset while preserving data quality.
In the second part of this thesis, by presenting samples of privacy violation and poten-
tial discrimination in data mining, we argue that privacy and discrimination risks should
be tackled together. We explore the relationship between privacy preserving data mining
and discrimination prevention in data mining to design holistic approaches capable of ad-
dressing both threats simultaneously during the knowledge discovery process. As part of
this effort, we have investigated for the first time the problem of discrimination and privacy
aware frequent pattern discovery, i.e. the sanitization of the collection of patterns mined
from a transaction database in such a way that neither privacy-violating nor discriminatory
inferences can be inferred on the released patterns. Moreover, we investigate the problem
of discrimination and privacy aware data publishing, i.e. transforming the data, instead of
patterns, in order to simultaneously fulfill privacy preservation and discrimination preven-
tion. In the above cases, it turns out that the impact of our transformation on the quality
of data or patterns is the same or only slightly higher than the impact of achieving just
privacy preservation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data mining is an increasingly important technology for extracting useful knowledge hidden
in large collections of data, especially human and social data sensed by the ubiquitous
technologies that support most human activities in our age. As a matter of fact, the new
opportunities to extract knowledge and understand human and social complex phenomena
increase hand in hand with the risks of violation of fundamental human rights, such as
privacy and non-discrimination. Privacy refers to the individual right to choose freely what
to do with one’s own personal information, while discrimination refers to unfair or unequal
treatment of people based on membership to a category, group or minority, without regard
to individual merit. Human rights laws not only have concern about data protection [21] but
also prohibit discrimination [6, 22] against protected groups on the grounds of race, color,
religion, nationality, sex, marital status, age and pregnancy; and in a number of settings, like
credit and insurance, personnel selection and wages, and access to public services. Clearly,
preserving the great benefits of data mining within a privacy-aware and discrimination-
aware technical ecosystem would lead to a wider social acceptance of a multitude of new
services and applications based on the knowledge discovery process.
1.1 Privacy Challenges of Data Publishing and Mining
We live in times of unprecedented opportunities of sensing, storing and analyzing micro-
data on human activities at extreme detail and resolution, at society level [67]. Wireless
1
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networks and mobile devices record the traces of our movements. Search engines record the
logs of our queries for finding information on the web. Automated payment systems record
the tracks of our purchases. Social networking services record our connections to friends,
colleagues, collaborators.
Ultimately, these big data of human activity are at the heart of the very idea of a
knowledge society [67]: a society where small or big decisions made by businesses or policy
makers or ordinary citizens can be informed by reliable knowledge, distilled from the
ubiquitous digital traces generated as a side effect of our living. Although increasingly
sophisticated data analysis and data mining techniques support knowledge discovery from
human activity data to improve the quality of on-line and off-line services for users, they
are increasingly raising user privacy concerns on the other side.
From the users’ perspective, insufficient privacy protections on the part of a service they
use and entrust with their activity, personal or sensitive information could lead to significant
emotional, financial, and physical harm. An unintentional or deliberate disclosure of a
user profile or activity data as part of the output of an internal data mining algorithm
or as a result of data sharing may potentially lead to embarrassment, identity theft and
discrimination [48]. It is hard to foresee all the privacy risks that a digital dossier consisting
of detailed profile and activity data could pose in the future, but it is not inconceivable that
it could harm users’ lives. In general, during knowledge discovery, privacy violation is an
unintentional or deliberate intrusion into the personal data of the data subjects, namely, of
the (possibly unaware) people whose data are being collected, analyzed and mined [67].
Thus, although users appreciate the continual innovation and improvement in the quality
of on-line and off-line services using sophisticated data analysis and mining techniques, they
are also becoming increasingly concerned about their privacy, and about the ways their
personal and activity data are compiled, mined, and shared [72]. On the other hand, for
institutions and companies such as banks, insurance companies and search engines that
offer different kinds of online and/or off-line services, the trust of users in their privacy
practices is a strategic product and business advantage. Therefore, it is in the interest of
these organizations to strike a balance between mining and sharing user data in order to
improve their services and protecting user privacy to retain the trust of users [86].
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In order to respond to the above challenges, data protection technology needs to be
developed in tandem with data mining and publishing techniques [87]. The framework to
advance is thinking of privacy by design1. The basic idea is to inscribe privacy protection
into the analytical technology by design and construction, so that the analysis takes the
privacy requirements in consideration from the very start. Privacy by design, in the research
field of privacy preserving data mining (PPDM), is a recent paradigm that promises a quality
leap in the conflict between data protection and data utility. PPDM has become increasingly
popular because it allows sharing and using sensitive data for analysis purposes. Different
PPDM methods have been developed for different purposes, such as data hiding, knowledge
(rule) hiding, distributed PPDM and privacy-aware knowledge sharing in different data
mining tasks.
1.2 Discrimination Challenges of Data Publishing and Min-
ing
Discrimination refers to an unjustified difference in treatment on the basis of any physical
or cultural trait, such as sex, ethnic origin, religion or political opinions. From the legal per-
spective, privacy violation is not the only risk which threatens fundamental human rights;
discrimination risks are also concerned when mining and sharing personal data. In most Eu-
ropean and North-American countries, it is forbidden by law to discriminate against certain
protected groups [11]. The European Union has one of the strongest anti-discrimination leg-
islations (See, e.g., Directive 2000/43/EC, Directive 2000/78/EC/ Directive 2002/73/EC,
Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Protocol 12/Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights), describing discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, re-
ligion, nationality, gender, sexuality, disability, marital status, genetic features, language
and age. It does so in a number of settings, such as employment and training, access to
1The European Data Protection Supervisor Peter Hustinx is a staunch defender of the Privacy
by Design approach and has recommended it as the standard approach to data protection for the
EU, see http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/
Opinions/2010/10-03-19_Trust_Information_Society_EN.pdf Ann Cavoukian Privacy Commissioner
of Ontario, Canada has been one of the early defenders of the Privacy by Design approach.
See the principles that have been formulated http://www.privacybydesign.ca/index.php/about-pbd/
7-foundational-principles/
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housing, public services, education and health care; credit and insurance; and adoption.
European efforts on the non-discrimination front make clear the fundamental importance of
the effective implementation and enforcement of non-discrimination norms [11] for Europe’s
citizens.
From the user’s perspective, many people may not mind other people knowing about
their ethnic origins, but they would strenuously object to be denied a credit or a grant if
their ethnicities were part of that decision. As mentioned above, nowadays socially sensitive
decisions may be taken by automatic systems, e.g., for screening or ranking applicants to
a job position, to a loan, to school admission and so on. For instance, data mining and
machine learning classification models are constructed on the basis of historical data exactly
with the purpose of learning the distinctive elements of different classes or profiles, such
as good/bad debtor in credit/insurance scoring systems. Automatically generated decision
support models may exhibit discriminatory behavior toward certain groups based upon,
e.g. gender or ethnicity. In general, during knowledge discovery, discrimination risk is
the unfair use of the discovered knowledge in making discriminatory decisions about the
(possibly unaware) people who are classified, or profiled [67]. Therefore, it is in the interest
of banks, insurance companies, employment agencies, the police and other institutions that
employ data mining models for decision making upon individuals, to ensure that these
computational models are free from discrimination [11].
Then, data mining and data analytics on data about people need to incorporate many
ethical values by design, not only data protection but also non-discrimination. We need
novel, disruptive technologies for the construction of human knowledge discovery systems
that, by design, offer native technological safeguards against discrimination. Anti-discrimin
ation by design, in the research field of discrimination prevention in data mining (DPDM), is
a more recent paradigm that promises a quality leap in the conflict between non-discrimination
and data/model utility. More specifically, discrimination has been recently considered from
a data mining perspective. Some proposals are oriented to the discovery and measurement
of discrimination, while others deal with preventing data mining from becoming itself a
source of discrimination, due to automated decision making based on discriminatory mod-
els extracted from biased datasets. In fact, DPDM consists of extracting models (typically,
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classifiers) that trade off utility of the resulting data/model with non-discrimination.
1.3 Simultaneous Discrimination Prevention and Privacy Pro-
tection in Data Publishing and Mining
In this thesis, by exploring samples of privacy violation and discrimination risks in contexts
of data and knowledge publishing, we realize that privacy and anti-discrimination are two
intimately intertwined concepts: they share common challenges, common methodological
problems to be solved and, in certain contexts, directly interact with each other. Despite
this striking commonality, there is an evident gap between the large body of research in
data privacy technologies and the recent early results in anti-discrimination technologies.
This thesis aims to answer the following research questions:
• What is the relationship between PPDM and DPDM? Can privacy protection achieve
anti-discrimination (or the other way round)?
• Can we adapt and use some of the existing approaches from the PPDM literature for
DPDM?
• Is it enough to tackle only privacy or discrimination risks to make a truly trustworthy
technology for knowledge discovery? If not, how can we design a holistic method
capable of addressing both threats together in significant data mining processes?
This thesis aims to find ways to mine and share personal data while protecting users’
privacy and preventing discrimination against protected groups of users, and to motivate
companies, institutions and the research community to consider a need for simultaneous
privacy and anti-discrimination by design. This thesis is the first work inscribing simulta-
neously privacy and anti-discrimination with a by design approach in data publishing and
mining. It is a first example of a more comprehensive set of ethical values that is inscribed
into the analytical process.
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1.3.1 Contributions
Specifically, this thesis makes the following concrete contributions to answer the above
questions:
1. A methodology for direct and indirect discrimination prevention in data
mining. We tackle discrimination prevention in data mining and propose new tech-
niques applicable for direct or indirect discrimination prevention individually or both
at the same time. Inspired by the data transformation methods for knowledge (rule)
hiding in PPDM, we devise new data transformation methods (i.e. direct and indirect
rule protection, rule generalization) for converting direct and/or indirect discrimina-
tory decision rules to legitimate (non-discriminatory) classification rules. We also
propose new metrics to evaluate the utility of the proposed approaches and we com-
pare these approaches. The experimental evaluations demonstrate that the proposed
techniques are effective at removing direct and/or indirect discrimination biases in
the original dataset while preserving data quality.
2. Discrimination- and privacy-aware frequent pattern discovery. Consider the
case when a set of patterns extracted from the personal data of a population of indi-
vidual persons is released for a subsequent use into a decision making process, such as
granting or denying credit. First, the set of patterns may reveal sensitive information
about individual persons in the training population and, second, decision rules based
on such patterns may lead to unfair discrimination, depending on what is represented
in the training cases. We argue that privacy and discrimination risks should be tackled
together, and we present a methodology for doing so while publishing frequent pat-
tern mining results. We describe a set of pattern sanitization methods, one for each
discrimination measure used in the legal literature, to achieve a fair publishing of fre-
quent patterns in combination with a privacy transformation based on k-anonymity.
Our proposed pattern sanitization methods yield both privacy- and discrimination-
protected patterns, while introducing reasonable (controlled) pattern distortion. We
also explore the possibility to combine anti-discrimination with differential privacy.
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3. Generalization-based privacy preservation and discrimination prevention
in data publishing. We investigate the problem of discrimination and privacy aware
data publishing, i.e. transforming the data, instead of patterns, in order to simulta-
neously fulfill privacy preservation and discrimination prevention. Our approach falls
into the pre-processing category: it sanitizes the data before they are used in data
mining tasks rather than sanitizing the knowledge patterns extracted by data mining
tasks (post-processing). Very often, knowledge publishing (publishing the sanitized
patterns) is not enough for the users or researchers, who want to be able to mine the
data themselves. This gives researchers greater flexibility in performing the required
data analyses. We observe that published data must be both privacy-preserving and
unbiased regarding discrimination. We present the first generalization-based approach
to simultaneously offer privacy preservation and discrimination prevention. We for-
mally define the problem, give an optimal algorithm to tackle it and evaluate the
algorithm in terms of both general and specific data analysis metrics. It turns out
that the impact of our transformation on the quality of data is the same or only
slightly higher than the impact of achieving just privacy preservation. In addition, we
show how to extend our approach to different privacy models and anti-discrimination
legal concepts.
The presentation of this thesis is divided into eight chapters according to the contribu-
tions.
1.3.2 Structure
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the related works on discrimi-
nation discovery and prevention in data mining (Section 2.1). Moreover, we introduce some
basic definitions and concepts that are used throughout this thesis related to data mining
(Section 2.2.1) and measures of discrimination (Section 2.2.2). In Chapter 3, we first present
a brief review on PPDM in Section 3.1. After that, we introduce some basic definitions and
concepts that are used throughout the thesis related to data privacy (Section 3.2.1), and
we elaborate on models (measures) of privacy (Section 3.2.2) and samples of anonymization
techniques (Section 3.2.3). Finally, we review the approaches and algorithms of PPDM in
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Section 3.3.
In Chapter 4, we propose a methodology for direct and indirect discrimination pre-
vention in data mining. Our contributions on discrimination prevention are presented in
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 introduces direct and indirect discrimination measurement. Sec-
tion 4.3 describes our proposal for direct and indirect discrimination prevention. The pro-
posed data transformation methods for direct and indirect discrimination prevention are
presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, respectively. Section 4.6 introduces the proposed
data transformation methods for simultaneous direct and indirect discrimination preven-
tion. We describe our algorithms and their computational cost based on the proposed direct
and indirect discrimination prevention methods in Section 4.7 and Section 4.8, respectively.
Section 4.9 shows the tests we have performed to assess the validity and quality of our
proposal and we compare different methods. Finally, Section 4.10 summarizes conclusions.
In Chapter 5, we propose the first approach for achieving simultaneous discrimination
and privacy awareness in frequent pattern discovery. Section 5.1 presents the motivation
example (Section 5.1.1) and our contributions (Section 5.1.2) in frequent pattern discov-
ery. Section 5.2 presents the method that we use for obtaining an anonymous version of
an original pattern set. Section 5.3 describes the notion of discrimination protected (Sec-
tion 5.3.1) and unexplainable discrimination protected (Section 5.3.2) frequent patterns.
Then, our proposed methods and algorithms to obtain these pattern sets are presented
in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, respectively. In Section 5.4, we formally define the problem
of simultaneous privacy and anti-discrimination pattern protection, and we introduce our
solution. Section 5.5 reports the evaluation of our sanitization methods. In Section 5.6, we
study and discuss the use of a privacy protection method based on differential privacy and
its implications. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
In Chapter 6, we present a study on the impact of well-known data anonymization
techniques on anti-discrimination. Our proposal for releasing discrimination-free version
of original data is presented in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2, we study the impact of differ-
ent generalization and suppression schemes on discrimination prevention. Finally, Section
6.3 summarizes conclusions. In Chapter 7, we present a generalization-based approach for
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privacy preservation and discrimination prevention in data publishing. Privacy and anti-
discrimination models are presented in Section 7.2 and 7.3, respectively. In Section 7.4,
we formally define the problem of simultaneous privacy and anti-discrimination data pro-
tection. Our proposed approach and an algorithm for discrimination- and privacy-aware
data publishing are presented in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. Section 7.5 reports experimental
work. An extension of the approach to alternative privacy-preserving requirements and anti-
discrimination legal constraints is presented in Section 7.6. Finally, Section 7.7 summarizes
conclusions.
Finally, Chapter 8 is the closing chapter. It briefly recaps the thesis contributions, it
lists the publications that have resulted from our work, it states some conclusions and it
identifies open issues for future work.
Chapter 2
Background on
Discrimination-aware Data Mining
In sociology, discrimination is the prejudicial treatment of an individual based on their
membership in a certain group or category. It involves denying to members of one group
opportunities that are available to other groups. There is a list of anti-discrimination acts,
which are laws designed to prevent discrimination on the basis of a number of attributes (e.g.
race, religion, gender, nationality, disability, marital status and age) in various settings (e.g.
employment and training, access to public services, credit and insurance, etc.). For example,
the European Union implements in [23] the principle of equal treatment between men and
women in the access to and supply of goods and services; also, it implements equal treatment
in matters of employment and occupation in [24]. Although there are some laws against
discrimination, all of them are reactive, not proactive. Technology can add proactivity to
legislation by contributing discrimination discovery and prevention techniques.
2.1 Related Work
The collection and analysis of observational and experimental data are the main tools for
assessing the presence, the extent, the nature, and the trend of discrimination phenom-
ena. Data analysis techniques have been proposed in the last fifty years in the economic,
legal, statistical, and, recently, in data mining literature. This is not surprising, since
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discrimination analysis is a multi-disciplinary problem, involving sociological causes, legal
argumentations, economic models, statistical techniques, and computational issues. For a
multidisciplinary survey on discrimination analysis see [75]. In this thesis, we focus on a
knowledge discovery (or data mining) perspective of discrimination analysis.
Recently, the issue of anti-discrimination has been considered from a data mining per-
spective [68], under the name of discrimination-aware data analysis. A substantial part
of the existing literature on anti-discrimination in data mining is oriented to discovering
and measuring discrimination. Other contributions deal with preventing discrimination.
Summaries of contributions in discrimination-aware data analysis are collected in [14].
2.1.1 Discrimination Discovery from Data
Unfortunately, the actual discovery of discriminatory situations and practices, hidden in a
dataset of historical decision records, is an extremely difficult task. The reason is twofold:
• First, personal data in decision records are typically highly dimensional: as a con-
sequence, a huge number of possible contexts may, or may not, be the theater for
discrimination. To see this point, consider the case of gender discrimination in credit
approval: although an analyst may observe that no discrimination occurs in general,
it may turn out that older women obtain car loans only rarely. Many small or large
niches that conceal discrimination may exist, and therefore all possible specific sit-
uations should be considered as candidates, consisting of all possible combinations
of variables and variable values: personal data, demographics, social, economic and
cultural indicators, etc. The anti-discrimination analyst is thus faced with a combina-
torial explosion of possibilities, which make her work hard: albeit the task of checking
some known suspicious situations can be conducted using available statistical methods
and known stigmatized groups, the task of discovering niches of discrimination in the
data is unsupported.
• The second source of complexity is indirect discrimination: the feature that may be
the object of discrimination, e.g., the race or ethnicity, is not directly recorded in the
data. Nevertheless, racial discrimination may be hidden in the data, for instance in
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the case where a redlining practice is adopted: people living in a certain neighborhood
are frequently denied credit, but from demographic data we can learn that most people
living in that neighborhood belong to the same ethnic minority. Once again, the anti-
discrimination analyst is faced with a large space of possibly discriminatory situations:
all interesting discriminatory situations that emerge from the data, both directly and
in combination with further background knowledge need to be discovered (e.g., census
data).
Pedreschi et al. [68, 69, 77, 70] have introduced the first data mining approaches
for discrimination discovery. The approaches have followed the legal principle of under-
representation to unveil contexts of possible discrimination against protected-by-law groups
(e.g., women). This is done by extracting classification rules from a dataset of historical
decision records (inductive part); then, rules are ranked according to some legally grounded
measures of discrimination (deductive part). The approach has been implemented on top
of an Oracle database [76] by relying on tools for frequent itemset mining. A GUI for visual
exploratory analysis has been developed by Gao and Berendt in [30].
This discrimination discovery approach opens a promising avenue for research, based
on an apparently paradoxical idea: data mining, that has a clear potential to create dis-
criminatory profiles and classifications, can also be used the other way round, as a powerful
aid to the anti-discrimination analyst, capable of automatically discovering the patterns of
discrimination that emerge from the available data with strongest evidence.
The result of the above knowledge discovery process is a (possibly large) set of classifi-
cation rules, which provide local and overlapping niches of possible discrimination: a global
description is lacking of who is and is not discriminated against. Luong et al. [60] exploit
the idea of situation-testing. For each member of the protected group with a negative deci-
sion outcome, testers with similar characteristics are searched for in a dataset of historical
decision records. If there are significantly different decision outcomes between the testers of
the protected group and the testers of the unprotected group, the negative decision can be
ascribed to a bias against the protected group, thus labeling the individual as discriminated
against. Similarity is modeled via a distance function. Testers are searched for among the
k-nearest neighbors, and the difference is measured by some legally grounded measures of
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discrimination calculated over the two sets of testers. After this kind of labeling, a global
description of those labeled as discriminated against can be extracted as a standard clas-
sification task. A real case study in the context of the evaluation of scientific projects for
funding is presented by Romei et al. [74].
The approaches described so far assume that the dataset under analysis contains at-
tributes that denote protected groups (i.e., case of direct discrimination). This may not be
the case when such attributes are not available, or not even collectable at a micro-data level
(i.e., case of indirect discrimination), as in the case of the loan applicant’s race. Ruggieri
et al. [70, 77] adopt a form of rule inference to cope with the indirect discovery of discrim-
ination. The correlation information is called background knowledge, and is itself coded as
an association rule.
The above results do not yet explain how to build a discrimination-free knowledge
discovery and deployment (KDD) technology for decision making. This is crucial as we
are increasingly surrounded by automatic decision making software that makes decisions
on people based on profiles and categorizations. We need novel, disruptive technologies
for the construction of human knowledge discovery systems that, by design, offer native
technological safeguards against discrimination. Here we evoke the concept of Privacy by
Design coined in the 90s by Ann Cavoukian, the Information and Privacy Commissioner
of Ontario, Canada. In brief, Privacy by Design refers to the philosophy and approach of
embedding privacy into the design, operation and management of information processing
technologies and systems.
In different contexts, adopting different techniques for inscribing discrimination protec-
tion within the KDD process will be needed, in order to go beyond the discovery of unfair
discrimination, and achieve the much more challenging goal of preventing discrimination,
before it takes place.
2.1.2 Discrimination Prevention in Data Mining
With the advent of data mining, decision support systems become increasingly intelligent
and versatile, since effective decision models can be constructed on the basis of historical
decision records by means of machine learning and data mining methods, up to the point
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that decision making is sometimes fully automated, e.g., in credit scoring procedures and in
credit card fraud detection systems. However, there is no guarantee that the deployment of
the extracted knowledge does not incur discrimination against minorities and disadvantaged
groups, e.g., because the data from which the knowledge is extracted contain patterns with
implicit discriminatory bias. Such patterns will then be replicated in the decision rules
derived from the data by mining and learning algorithms. Hence, learning from historical
data may lead to the discovery of traditional prejudices that are endemic in reality, and to
assigning the status of general rules to such practices (maybe unconsciously, as these rules
can end up deeply hidden within a piece of software).
Thus, beyond discrimination discovery, preventing knowledge-based decision support
systems from making discriminatory decisions is a more challenging issue. A straight-
forward approach to avoid that the classifier’s prediction be based on the discriminatory
attribute would be to remove that attribute from the training dataset. This approach,
however, does not work [43, 11]. The reason is that there may be other attributes that
are highly correlated with the discriminatory one. In such a situation the classifier will use
these correlated attributes to indirectly discriminate. In the banking example, e.g., postal
code may be highly correlated with ethnicity. Removing ethnicity would not solve much,
as postal code is an excellent predictor for this attribute. Obviously, one could decide to
also remove the highly correlated attributes from the dataset as well. Although this would
resolve the discrimination problem, in this process much useful information will get lost,
leading to suboptimal predictors [43, 11]. Hence, there are two important challenges re-
garding discrimination prevention: one challenge is to consider both direct and indirect
discrimination instead of only direct discrimination; the other challenge is to find a good
trade off between discrimination removal and the utility of the data/models for data min-
ing. In such a context, the challenging problem of discrimination prevention consists of
re-designing existing data publishing and knowledge discovery techniques in order to incor-
porate a legally grounded notion of non-discrimination in the extracted knowledge, with
the objective that the deployment phase leads to non-discriminatory decisions. Up to now,
four non mutually-exclusive strategies have been proposed to prevent discrimination in the
data mining and knowledge discovery process.
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The first strategy consists of a controlled distortion of the training set (a pre-processing
approach). Kamiran and Calders [43] compare sanitization techniques such as changing
class labels based on prediction confidence, instance re-weighting, and sampling. Zliobaitye
et al. [97] prevent excessive sanitization by taking into account legitimate explanatory
variables that are correlated with grounds of discrimination, i.e., genuine occupational re-
quirement. The approach of Luong et al. [60] extends to discrimination prevention by
changing the class label of individuals that are labeled as discriminated. The advantage of
the pre-processing approach is that it does not require changing the standard data mining
algorithms, unlike the in-processing approach, and it allows data publishing (rather than
just knowledge publishing), unlike the post-processing approach.
The second strategy is to modify the classification learning algorithm (an in-processing
approach), by integrating it with anti-discrimination criteria. Calders and Verwer [12]
consider three approaches to deal with naive Bayes models, two of which consist in modifying
the learning algorithm: training a separate model for each protected group; and adding a
latent variable to model the class value in the absence of discrimination. Kamiran et al.
[44] modify the entropy-based splitting criterion in decision tree induction to account for
attributes denoting protected groups. Kamishima et al. [46] measure the indirect causal
effect of variables modeling grounds of discrimination on the independent variable in a
classification model by their mutual information. Then, they apply a regularization (i.e., a
change in the objective minimization function) to probabilistic discriminative models, such
as logistic regression.
The third strategy is to post-process the classification model once it has been extracted.
Pedreschi et al. [69] alter the confidence of classification rules inferred by the CPAR algo-
rithm. Calders and Verwer [12] act on the probabilities of a naive Bayes model. Kamiran et
al. [44] re-label the class predicted at the leaves of a decision tree induced by C4.5. Finally,
the fourth strategy assumes no change in the construction of a classifier. At the time of
application, instead, predictions are corrected to keep proportionality of decisions among
protected and unprotected groups. Kamiran et al. [45] propose correcting predictions of
probabilistic classifiers that are close to the decision boundary, given that (statistical) dis-
crimination may occur when there is no clear feature supporting a positive or a negative
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decision.
Moreover, on the relationship between privacy and anti-discrimination from legal per-
spective, the chapter by Gellert et al. [32] reports a comparative analysis of data protection
and anti-discrimination legislations. And from the technology perspective, Dwork et al. [20]
propose a model of fairness of classifiers and relate it to differential privacy in databases.
The model imposes that the predictions over two similar cases be also similar. The similarity
of cases is formalized by a distance measure between tuples. The similarity of predictions is
formalized by the distance between the distributions of probability assigned to class values.
2.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the background knowledge required in the remainder of
this thesis. First, we recall some basic definitions related to data mining [84]. After that,
we elaborate on measuring and discovering discrimination.
2.2.1 Basic Definitions
Let I = {i1, . . . , in} be a set of items, where each item ij has the form attribute=value (e.g.,
Sex=female). An itemset X ⊆ I is a collection of one or more items, e.g. {Sex=female,
Credit history=no-taken}. A database is a collection of data objects (records) and their at-
tributes; more formally, a (transaction) database D = {r1, . . . , rm} is a set of data records or
transactions where each ri ⊆ I. Civil rights laws [6, 22] explicitly identify the groups to be
protected against discrimination, such as minorities and disadvantaged people, e.g., women.
In our context, these groups can be represented as items, e.g., Sex=female, which we call
potentially discriminatory (PD) items; a collection of PD items can be represented as an
itemset, e.g., {Sex=female, Foreign worker=yes}, which we call PD itemset or protected-
by-law (or protected for short) groups, denoted by DIb. An itemset X is potentially non-
discriminatory (PND) if X ∩ DIb = ∅, e.g., {credit history=no-taken} is a PND itemset
where DIb:{Sex=female}. PD attributes are those that can take PD items as values; for
instance, Race and Gender where DIb:{Sex=female, Race=black}. A decision (class) at-
tribute is one taking as values yes or no to report the outcome of a decision made on an
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individual; an example is the attribute credit approved, which can be yes or no. A class
item is an item of class attribute, e.g., Credit approved=no. The support of an itemset X in
a database D is the number of records that contain X, i.e. suppD(X) = |{ri ∈ D|X ⊆ ri}|,
where | . | is the cardinality operator. From patterns, it is possible to derive association
rules. An association rule is an expression X → Y , where X and Y are itemsets. We say
that X → Y is a classification rule if Y is a class item and X is an itemset containing no
class item, e.g. Sex=female, Cedit history=no-taken → Credit approved=no. The itemset
X is called the premise of the rule. We say that a rule X → C is completely supported
by a record if both X and C appear in the record. The confidence of a classification rule,
confD(X → C), measures how often the class item C appears in records that contain X.
Hence, if suppD(X) > 0 then
confD(X → C) = suppD(X,C)
suppD(X)
(2.1)
Confidence ranges over [0, 1]. We omit the subscripts in suppD(·) and confD(·) when there
is no ambiguity. A frequent classification rule is a classification rule with support and
confidence greater than respective specified lower bounds. The negated itemset, i.e. ¬X
is an itemset with the same attributes as X, but the attributes in ¬X take any value
except those taken by attributes in X. In this chapter, we use the ¬ notation for itemsets
with binary or non-binary categorical attributes. For a binary attribute, e.g. {Foreign
worker=Yes/No}, if X is {Foreign worker=Yes}, then ¬X is {Foreign worker=No}. If X
is binary, it can be converted to ¬X and vice versa, that is, the negation works in both
senses. In the previous example, we can select the records in DB so that the value of the
Foreign worker attribute is “Yes” and change that attribute’s value to “No”, and conversely.
However, for a non-binary categorical attribute, e.g. {Race=Black/White/Indian}, if X
is {Race=Black}, then ¬X is {Race=White} or {Race=Indian}. In this case, ¬X can be
converted to X without ambiguity, but the conversion of X into ¬X is not uniquely defined.
In the previous example, we can select the records in DB such that the Race attribute is
“White” or “Indian” and change that attribute’s value to “Black”; but if we want to negate
{Race=Black}, we do not know whether to change it to {Race=White} or {Race=Indian}.
In this thesis, we use only non-ambiguous negations.
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2.2.2 Measures of Discrimination
The legal principle of under-representation has inspired existing approaches for discrimina-
tion discovery based on rule/pattern mining.
Given DIb and starting from a dataset D of historical decision records, the authors
of [68] propose to extract frequent classification rules of the form A,B → C, called PD
rules, to unveil contexts B of possible discrimination, where the non-empty protected group
A ⊆ DIb suffers from over-representation with respect to the negative decision C (C is a
class item reporting a negative decision, such as credit denial, application rejection, job
firing, and so on). In other words, A is under-represented w.r.t. the corresponding positive
decision ¬C. As an example, rule Sex=female, Job=veterinarian → Credit approved=no is
a PD rule about denying credit (the decision C) to women (the protected group A) among
those who are veterinarians (the context B), where DIb:{Sex=female}. And a classification
rule of the form X → C is called PND rule if X is a PND itemset. As an example, rule
Credit history=paid-delay, Job=veterinarian → Credit approved=no is a PND rule, where
DIb:{Sex=female}.
Then, the degree of under-representation should be measured over each PD rule by one
of the legally grounded measures introduced in Pedreschi et al. [69].
Definition 1. Let A,B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D with conf(¬A,B →
C) > 0. The selection lift1 (slift) of the rule is
slift(A,B → C) = conf(A,B → C)
conf(¬A,B → C) (2.2)
In fact, slift is the ratio of the proportions of benefit denial, e.g., credit denial, between
the protected and unprotected groups, e.g. women and men resp., in the given context, e.g.
new applicants. A special case of slift occurs when we deal with non-binary attributes, for
instance, when comparing the credit denial ratio of blacks with the ratio for other groups
of the population. This yields a third measure called contrasted lift (clift) which, given A
as a single item a = v1 (e.g. black race), compares it with the most favored item a = v2
(e.g. white race).
1Discrimination on the basis of an attribute happens if a person with an attribute is treated less favorably
than a person without the attribute.
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Definition 2. Let a = v1, B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D, and v2 ∈
dom(a) with conf(a = v2, B → C) minimal and non-zero. The contrasted lift (clift) of the
rule is
clift(a = v1, B → C) = conf(a = v1, B → C)
conf(a = v2, B → C) (2.3)
Definition 3. Let A,B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D with conf(B →
C) > 0. The extended lift 2 (elift) of the rule is
elift(A,B → C) = conf(A,B → C)
conf(B → C) (2.4)
In fact, elift is the ratio of the proportions of benefit denial, e.g. credit denial, between
the protected groups and all people who were not granted the benefit in the given context,
e.g. women versus all men and women who were denied credit, in the given context, e.g.
those who live in NYC.
The last ratio measure is the odds lift (olift), the ratio between the odds of the propor-
tions of benefit denial between the protected and unprotected groups.
Definition 4. Let A,B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D with conf(¬A,B →
C) > 0 and conf(A,B → C) < 1. The odds lift (olift) of the rule is
olift(A,B → C) = odds(A,B → C)
odds(¬A,B → C) (2.5)
where
odds(A,B → C) = conf(A,B → C)
conf(A,B → ¬C) (2.6)
Although the measures introduced so far are defined in terms of ratios, measures based
on the difference of confidences have been considered on the legal side as well.
Definition 5. Let A,B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D. The difference
measures are defined as
sliftd(A,B → C) = conf(A,B → C)− conf(¬A,B → C) (2.7)
2Discrimination occurs when a higher proportion of people not in the group is able to comply.
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eliftd(A,B → C) = conf(A,B → C)− conf(B → C) (2.8)
Difference-based measures range over [−1, 1]. Lastly, the following measures are also
defined in terms of ratios and known as chance measures.
Definition 6. Let A,B → C be a PD classification rule extracted from D.The chance
measures are defined as
sliftc(A,B → C) = 1− conf(A,B → C)
1− conf(¬A,B → C) (2.9)
eliftc(A,B → C) = 1− conf(A,B → C)
1− conf(B → C) (2.10)
For slift, elift and olift, the values of interest (potentially indicating discrimination)
are those greater than 1; for sliftd and eliftd, they are those greater than 0; and for sliftc
and eliftc, they are those less than 1. On the legal side, different measures are adopted
worldwide. For example, UK law mentions mostly sliftd. The EU court of justice has made
more emphasis in slift, and US laws courts mainly refer to sliftc.
Classification rule: c = A,B → C
B C ¬C
A a1 n1 − a1 n1
¬A a2 n2 − a2 n2
p1 = a1/n1 p2 = a2/n2 p = (a1 + a2)/(n1 + n2)
elift(c) =
p1
p
, slift(c) =
p1
p2
, olift(c) =
p1(1− p2)
p2(1− p1)
eliftd(c) = p1 − p, sliftd(c) = p1 − p2
eliftc(c) =
1− p1
1− p , sliftc(c) =
1− p1
1− p2
Figure 2.1: Discrimination measures
An alternative view of the measures introduced so far can be given starting from the
contingency table of c : A,B → C shown in Fig. 2.1. Each cell in the table is filled
in with the number of records in the data table D satisfying B and the coordinates (i.e.,
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their absolute support). Using the notation of the figure, confidence of c : A,B → C is
p1 = a1/n1. Similarly, other measures can be defined as shown in Fig. 2.1. Confidence
intervals and tests of statistical significant of the above measures are discussed in [69].
Here, we only mention that statistical tests will rank the rules according to how unlikely it
is that they would be observed if there was equal treatment, not according to the severity
of discrimination. The rankings imposed by the discrimination measures in Fig. 2.1 are
investigated by Pedreschi et al. [71]: the choice of the reference measure critically affects
the rankings of PD rules, with the sliftc and the slift measures exhibiting the largest
differences.
Chapter 3
Background on Privacy-aware Data
Mining
Privacy protection is a basic right, stated in Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. It is also an important concern in today’s digital world. Data security and
privacy are two concepts that are often used in conjunction; however, they represent two
different facets of data protection and various techniques have been developed for them
[33]. Privacy is not just a goal or service like security, but it is the people’s expectation to
reach a protected and controllable situation, possibly without having to actively look for it
by themselves. Therefore, privacy is defined as ”the rights of individuals to determine for
themselves when, how, and what information about them is used for different purposes”
[4]. In information technology, the protection of sensitive data is a crucial issue, which
has attracted many researchers. In knowledge discovery, efforts at guaranteeing privacy
when mining and sharing personal data have led to developing privacy preserving data
mining (PPDM) techniques. PPDM have become increasingly popular because they allow
publishing and sharing sensitive data for secondary analysis. Different PPDM methods and
models (measures) have been proposed to trade off the utility of the resulting data/models
for protecting individual privacy against different kinds of privacy attacks.
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3.1 Brief Review
The problem of protecting privacy within data mining has been extensively studied since
the 1970s, when Dalenius was the first to formulate the statistical disclosure control prob-
lem [15]. Research on data anonymization has carried on ever since in the official statis-
tics community, and several computational procedures were proposed during the 1980s and
1990s, based on random noise addition, generalization, suppression, microaggregation, buck-
etization, etc. (see [40, 28] for a compendium). In that literature, the approach was first to
anonymize and then measure how much anonymity had been achieved, by either computing
the probability of re-identification or performing record linkage experiments. In the late
1990s, researchers in the database community stated the k-anonymity model [78, 81]: a
data set is k-anonymous if its records are indistinguishable by an intruder within groups
of k. The novelty of this approach was that the anonymity target was established ex
ante and then computational procedures were used to reach that target. The computa-
tional procedures initially proposed for k-anonymity were generalization and suppression;
microaggregation was proposed later as a natural alternative [16]. In 2000, the database
community re-discovered anonymization via random noise addition, proposed in the statis-
tical community as far back as 1986 [50], and coined the new term privacy-preserving data
mining (PPDM,[3, 59]). Differential privacy [17] is a more recent anonymity model that
holds much promise: it seeks to render the influence of the presence/absence of any individ-
ual on the released outcome negligible. The computational approach initially proposed to
achieve differential privacy was Laplace noise addition, although other approaches have re-
cently been proposed [80]. SDC and PPDM have become increasingly popular because they
allow publishing and sharing sensitive data for secondary analysis. Detailed descriptions of
different PPDM models and methods can be found in [1, 28, 33].
3.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the background knowledge required in the remainder of
this thesis from data privacy technologies. First, we recall some basic definitions. After
that, we elaborate on privacy measures (models) and samples of anonymization techniques.
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3.2.1 Basic Definitions
Given the data tableD(A1, · · · , An), a set of attributesA = {A1, · · · , An}, and a record/tuple
t ∈ D, t[Ai, · · · , Aj ] denotes the sequence of the values ofAi, · · · , Aj in t, where {Ai, · · · , Aj} ⊆
{A1, · · · , An}. Let D[Ai, · · · , Aj ] be the projection, maintaining duplicate records, of at-
tributes Ai, · · · , Aj in D. Let |D| be the cardinality of D, that is, the number of records
it contains. The attributes A in a database D can be classified into several categories.
Identifiers are attributes that uniquely identify individuals in the database, like Passport
number. A quasi-identifier (QI) is a set of attributes that, in combination, can be linked to
external identified information for re-identifying an individual; for example, Zipcode, Birth-
date and Gender. Sensitive attributes (S) are those that contain sensitive information, such
as Disease or Salary. Let S be a set of sensitive attributes in D.
3.2.2 Models of Privacy
As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, in the last fifteen years plenty of privacy
models have been proposed to trade off the utility of the resulting data/models for protecting
individual privacy against different kinds of privacy attacks. Defining privacy is a difficult
task. One of the key challenges is how to model the background knowledge of an adversary.
Simply removing explicit identifiers (e.g., name, passport number) does not preserve privacy,
given that the adversary has some background knowledge about the victim. Sweeney [81]
illustrates that 87% of the U.S. population can be uniquely identified based on 5-digit zip
code, gender, and date of birth. These attributes are QI and the adversary may know these
values from publicly available sources such as a voter list. An individual can be identified
from published data by simply joining the QI attributes with an external data source (i.e.,
record linkage).
In order to prevent record linkage attacks between the released data and external iden-
tified data sources through quasi-identifiers, Samarati and Sweeney [79, 83] proposed the
notion of k-anonymity.
Definition 7 (k-anonymity). Let D(A1, · · · , An) be a data table and QI = {Q1, · · · ,Qm} ⊆
{A1, · · · , An} be a quasi-identifier. D is said to satisfy k-anonymity w.r.t. QI if each
combination of values of attributes in QI is shared by at least k tuples (records) in D.
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Consequently, the probability of linking a victim to a specific record through QI is at
most 1/k. A data table satisfying this requirement is called k-anonymous. Other privacy
measures to prevent record linkage include (X,Y )-anonymity [89] and multi-relational k-
anonymity [66].
k-Anonymity can protect the original data against record linkage attacks, but it cannot
protect the data against attribute linkage (disclosure). In the attack of attribute linkage,
the attacker may not precisely identify the record of the specific individual, but could infer
his/her sensitive values (e.g., salary, disease) from the published data table D. Some models
have been proposed to address this type of threat. The most popular ones are l-diversity
[61] and t-closeness [56]. The general idea of these models is to diminish the correlation
between QI and sensitive attributes.
l-Diversity requires at least l distinct values for the sensitive attribute in each group of
QI. Let q∗-block be the set of records in D whose QI attribute values generalize to q.
Definition 8 (l-diversity). A q∗-block is l-diverse if it contains at least l well-represented
values for the sensitive attribute S. A data table D is l-diverse if every q∗-block is l-diverse.
t-Closeness requires the distribution of a sensitive attribute in any group on QI to be
close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table.
Definition 9 (t-closeness). A q∗-block is said to have t-closeness if the distance between
the distribution of a sensitive attribute in this q∗-block and the distribution of the attribute
in the whole table is no more than a threshold t. A data table D is said to have t-closeness
if all q∗-blocks have t-closeness.
Other privacy models for attribute disclosure protection include (α, k)-anonymity [93],
(k, e)-anonymity [49], (c, k)-safety [63], privacy skyline [13], m-confidentiality [94] and (,m)-
anonymity [58].
Differential privacy is a privacy model that provides a worst-case privacy guarantee in
the presence of arbitrary external information. It protects against any privacy breaches
resulting from joining different databases. It guarantees that an adversary learns nothing
about an individual, regardless of whether the individual’s record is present or absent in
the data. Informally, differential privacy [17] requires that the output of a data analysis
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mechanism be approximately the same, even if any single record in the input database is
arbitrarily added or removed.
Definition 10 (Differential privacy). A randomized algorithm ALG is -differentially pri-
vate if for all datasets D, D′ that differ in one individual (i.e. data of one person), and for
all S ⊆ Range(ALG), it holds that Pr[ALG(D) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[ALG(D′) ∈ S].
There are alternative privacy measures which are extensions of -differentially privacy
including (, δ)-differentially privacy [19] and the crowd-blending privacy model [31].
3.2.3 Sanitization Mechanisms
Typically, the original data or data mining results do not satisfy a specified privacy model
and, before being published, they must be modified through an anonymization method, also
called sanitization mechanism in the literature.
3.2.3.1 Generalization and Suppression
Samarati and Sweeney [79, 78, 81] gave methods for k-anonymization based on gener-
alization and suppression. Computational procedures alternative to generalization have
thereafter been proposed to attain k-anonymity, like microaggregation [16]. Nonetheless,
generalization remains not only the main method for k-anonymity, but it can also be used
to satisfy other privacy models (e.g., l-diversity in [61], t-closeness in [56] and differential
privacy in [65]).
A generalization replaces QI attribute values with a generalized version of them using the
generalization taxonomy tree of QI attributes, e.g. Figure 3.1. Five possible generalization
schemes [28] are summarized below.
In full-domain generalization, all values in an attribute are generalized to the same
level of the taxonomy tree. For example, consider Figure 3.1; if Lawyer and Engineer are
generalized to Professional, then it also requires generalizing Dancer and Writer to Artist.
In subtree generalization, at a nonleaf node, either all child values or none are generalized.
For example, consider Figure 3.1; if Engineer is generalized to Professional, it also requires
generalizing Lawyer to Professional, but Dancer and Writer can remain ungeneralized.
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Any-job
Professional
Engineer Lawyer
Any-sex
Female Male
Any-age [30, 40)
[30, 35)
[30, 33) [33, 35)
[35− 40)
Figure 3.1: Generalization taxonomy tree for Sex, Job and Age attributes
Sibling generalization is similar to the subtree generalization, except for the fact that
some siblings may remain ungeneralized. For example, consider Figure 3.1; if Engineer is
generalized to Professional, Lawyer can remain ungeneralized. In all of the above schemes,
if a value is generalized, all its instances are generalized. Such schemes are called global
recoding. In cell generalization, also known as local recoding, some instances of a value
may remain ungeneralized while other instances are generalized. For example, consider
Figure 3.1; Female in one record in a data table is generalized to Any-sex, while Female in
another record can remain ungeneralized. Multidimensional generalization flexibly allows
two QI groups, even having the same value, to be independently generalized into different
parent groups. For example, consider Figure 3.1; 〈Engineer, Male〉 can be generalized to
〈Engineer, Any-sex〉 while 〈Engineer, Female〉 can be generalized to 〈Professional, Female〉.
Although algorithms using multi-dimensional or cell generalizations cause less information
loss than algorithms using full-domain generalization, the former suffer from the problem of
data exploration [28]. This problem is caused by the co-existence of specific and generalized
values in the generalized data set, which make data exploration and interpretation difficult
for the data analyst.
A suppression consists in suppressing some values of the QI attributes for some (or
all) records. Three possible suppression schemes are record suppression, value suppression
and cell suppression. Record suppression refers to suppressing an entire record. Value
suppression refers to suppressing every instance of a given value in a table. Cell suppression
refers to suppressing some instances of a given value in a table.
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3.2.3.2 Laplacian and Exponential Mechanisms
To satisfy -differential privacy, several randomized mechanisms have been proposed. Here,
we mention the ones which are mostly used in literature. The first approach is the Laplacian
mechanism. It computes a function F on the dataset D in a differentially private way, by
adding to F (D) Laplace-distributed random noise. The magnitude of the noise depends on
the sensitivity SF of F :
SF = max
(D,D′)
|F (D)− F (D′)|
where (D,D′) is any pair of datasets that differ in one individual and belong to the domain
of F . Formally, the Laplacian mechanism ALGF can be written as
ALGF (D) = F (D) + Lap(SF

)
where Lap(β) denotes a random variable sampled from the Laplace distribution with scale
parameter β. The second approach is the exponential mechanism proposed by McSherry
and Talwar in [64], which can work on any kind of data. It computes a function F on
a dataset D by sampling from the set of all possible outputs in the range of F according
to an exponential distribution, with outputs that are “more accurate” being sampled with
higher probability. This approach requires specifying a utility function u : D × R → R,
where the real valued score u(D, t) indicates how accurate it is to return t when the input
dataset is D. Higher scores mean better utility outputs which should be returned with
higher probabilities. For any function u, an algorithm ALGF that chooses an output t
with probability proportional to exp( u(D,t)2Su ) satisfies -differential privacy, where Su is the
sensitivity of utility function.
3.3 Approaches and Algorithms
As mentioned in Chapter 2, privacy by design refers to the philosophy and approach of
embedding privacy into the design, operation and management of information processing
technologies and systems. Privacy by design, in the research field of privacy preserving data
mining and publishing, is a recent paradigm that promises a quality leap in the conflict
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between data protection and data utility.
The development of a theory for privacy by design will be needed to adopt different
techniques for inscribing privacy protection within the KDD process. As in the case of
anti-discrimination, there are three non mutually-exclusive strategies to protect privacy in
the KDD process, according to the phase of the data mining process in which they operate.
The first strategy is a pre-processing approach. It sanitizes the original data before
they are used in data mining tasks. The goal of this strategy can be the safe disclosure of
transformed data under suitable formal safeguards (e.g., k-anonymity) to protect sensitive
information in the original data set, or the safe disclosure of transformed data to protect
certain specified secret patterns, hidden in the original data. The PPDM methods which
aim to achieve the first goal are known as privacy preserving data publishing (PPDP) and
the ones which aim to achieve the second goal are known as knowledge hiding [88]. It is
clear that these methods allow the execution of data mining algorithms by parties other
than the data holder.
The second strategy is an in-processing approach. It modifies the data mining algorithms
by integrating them with privacy protection constraints. The goal of this strategy is the safe
disclosure of mined models under suitable formal safeguards (e.g., k-anonymity). It is due to
the fact that the disclosure of data mining results themselves can violate individual privacy
[47]. The PPDM methods which aim to achieve this goal are known as privacy preserving
knowledge publishing or privacy-aware data analysis. It is clear that these methods require
the execution of data mining algorithms only by the data holder.
The third strategy is a post-processing approach. It takes into consideration the privacy
model constraints after data mining is complete by sanitizing (transforming) data mining
results. Similar to the second strategy, the goal is the disclosure of mined models while pro-
tecting individual privacy. These methods are also known as privacy preserving knowledge
publishing methods and require the execution of data mining algorithms only by the data
holder. The difference between post-processing and in-processing is that the former does
not require any modification of the mining process and therefore it can use any data mining
tool available. However, the latter requires instead to redesign data mining algorithms and
tools to directly enforce privacy protection criteria.
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In this thesis, we concentrate on privacy preserving data publishing and privacy pre-
serving knowledge publishing.
3.3.1 Privacy Preserving Data Publishing
There are many works available on this problem that focus on the privacy of the individuals
whose data is collected in the database. They study the problem of how to transform the
original data while satisfying the requirement of a particular privacy model. Almost all
privacy models have been studied in PPDP. Note that measuring data quality loss as a side
effect of data distortion can be general or tailored to specific data mining tasks.
3.3.1.1 k-Anonymity and its Extensions
The following algorithms adopt k-anonymity or its extensions as the underlying privacy
principle to prevent record linkage attacks. These algorithms are minimal or optimal [28].
A data table is optimally anonymous if it satisfies the given privacy requirement and con-
tains most information according to the chosen information metric among all satisfying
tables. Sweeney’s [81] MinGen algorithm exhaustively examines all potential full-domain
generalizations to identify the optimal generalization measured by a general information
metric (e.g., similarity between the original data and the anonymous data). Samarati [78]
proposed a binary search algorithm that first identifies all minimal generalizations, and
then finds the optimal generalization measured by a general metric. Enumerating all min-
imal generalizations is an expensive operation, and hence not scalable for large data sets.
LeFevre et al. [51] presented a suite of optimal bottom-up generalization algorithms, called
Incognito, to generate all possible k-anonymous full-domain generalizations. Another algo-
rithm called K-Optimize [8] effectively prunes non-optimal anonymous tables by modeling
the search space using a set enumeration tree.
The second family of algorithms produces a minimal k-anonymous table by employing
a greedy search guided by a search metric. A data table is minimally anonymous if it sat-
isfies the given privacy requirement and its sequence of anonymization operations cannot
be reduced without violating the requirement. Being heuristic in nature, these algorithms
find a minimally anonymous solution, but are more scalable than optimal algorithms. The
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µ-Argus algorithm [41] computes the frequency of all 3-value combinations of domain values,
then greedily applies subtree generalizations and cell suppressions to achieve k-anonymity.
Since the method limits the size of attribute combination, the resulting data may not be k-
anonymous when more than 3 attributes are considered. Sweeney’s [83] Datafly system was
the first k-anonymization algorithm scalable to handle real-life large data sets. It achieves
k-anonymization by generating an array of QI group sizes and greedily generalizing those
combinations with less than k occurrences based on a heuristic search metric that selects the
attribute with the largest number of distinct values. Datafly employs full-domain generaliza-
tion and record suppression schemes. Iyengar [42] was among the first to aim at preserving
classification information in k-anonymous data by employing a genetic algorithm with an
incomplete stochastic search based on a classification metric and a subtree generalization
scheme. To address the efficiency issue in k-anonymization, a Bottom-Up Generalization
algorithm was proposed in Wang et al. [90] to find a minimal k-anonymization for classifi-
cation. The algorithm starts from the original data that violate k-anonymity and greedily
selects a generalization operation at each step according to a search metric. The general-
ization process is terminated as soon as all groups have the minimum size k. Wang et al.
[90] showed that this heuristic significantly reduces the search space. Instead of bottom-up,
the Top-Down Specialization (TDS) method [29] generalizes a table by specializing it from
the most general state in which all values are generalized to the most general values of
their taxonomy trees. At each step, TDS selects the specialization according to a search
metric. The specialization process terminates if no specialization can be performed without
violating k-anonymity. LeFevre et al. [52] presented a greedy top-down specialization algo-
rithm Mondrian for finding a minimal k-anonymization in the case of the multidimensional
generalization scheme. This algorithm is very similar to TDS. Xu et al. [96] showed that
employing cell generalization could further improve the data quality. Although the multidi-
mensional and cell generalization schemes cause less information loss, they suffer from the
data exploration problem discussed in Section 3.2.3.
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3.3.1.2 l-Diversity and its Extensions
The following algorithms adopt l-diversity or its extensions as the underlying privacy prin-
ciple to prevent attribute disclosure. Though their privacy models are different from those
of record linkage, many algorithms for attribute linkage are simple extensions from algo-
rithms for record linkage. Machanavajjhala et al. [61] modified the bottom-up Incognito
[51] to identify optimal l-diverse full-domain generalizations with which original data are
l-diverse; the modified algorithm is called l-Diversity Incognito. In other words, gener-
alizations help to achieve l-diversity, just as generalizations help to achieve k-anonymity.
Therefore, k-anonymization algorithms that employ full-domain and subtree generalization
can also be extended into l-diversity algorithms. LeFevre et al. [53] proposed a suite of
greedy algorithms InfoGain Mondrian to identify a minimally anonymous table satisfying
k-anonymity and/or entropy l-diversity with the consideration of a specific data analysis
task such as classification modeling multiple target attributes and query answering with
minimal imprecision.
3.3.1.3 -Differential privacy and its Extensions
Differential privacy has recently received much attention in data privacy, especially for in-
teractive databases [18]. There are also some works available in literature studying the
problem of differentially private data release. Rastogi et al. [73] design the αβ algorithm
for data perturbation that satisfies differential privacy. Machanavajjhala et al. [62] apply
the notion of differential privacy for synthetic data generation. Barak et al. [7] address the
problem of releasing a set of consistent marginals of a contingency table. Their method en-
sures that each count of the marginals is non-negative and their sum is consistent for a set of
marginals. Xiao et al. [95] propose Privelet, a wavelet-transformation-based approach that
lowers the magnitude of noise needed to ensure differential privacy to publish a multidimen-
sional frequency matrix. Hay et al. [39] propose a method to publish differentially private
histograms for a one-dimensional data set. Although Privelet and Hay et al.’s approach
can achieve differential privacy by adding polylogarithmic noise variance, the latter is only
limited to a one-dimensional data set. In [65], a generalization-based algorithm for differ-
entially private data release is presented. They show that differentially private data can
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be released by adding uncertainty in the generalization procedure. It first probabilistically
generates a generalized contingency table and then adds noise to the counts.
3.3.2 Privacy Preserving Knowledge Publishing
One key challenge in PPDM originates from the following privacy question [47]: do the data
mining results themselves violate privacy? In other words, may the disclosure of extracted
patterns reveal sensitive information? Some works on this problem are available, under the
name of privacy-aware data analysis, that focus on the privacy of the individuals whose
data is collected in the database [26, 5, 10, 27, 55, 54]. They study the problem of how to
run a particular data mining algorithm on databases while satisfying the requirement of a
particular privacy model. Among the above-mentioned privacy models, k-anonymity and
differential privacy have been studied in privacy-aware data analysis. In [26] the problem of
sanitizing decision trees is studied and a method is given for directly building a k-anonymous
decision tree from a private data set. The proposed algorithm is basically an improvement
of the classical decision tree building algorithm, combining mining and anonymization in a
single process (in-processing approach). In [5] the anonymity problem is addressed in the
setting of frequent patterns. The authors define the notion of k-anonymous patterns and
propose a methodology to guarantee the k-anonymity property in a collection of published
frequent patterns (post-processing approach). In [27], an algorithm is proposed for building
a classifier while guaranteeing differential privacy (in-processing approach). In [10] and [55],
post-processing and in-processing approaches, respectively, are used to perform frequent
pattern mining in a transactional database while satisfying differential privacy.
Chapter 4
A Methodology for Direct and
Indirect Discrimination Prevention
in Data Mining
Automated data collection and data mining techniques such as classification rule mining
have paved the way to making automated decisions, like loan granting/denial, insurance pre-
mium computation, etc. If the training datasets are biased in what regards discriminatory
attributes like gender, race, religion, etc., discriminatory decisions may ensue. Discrimina-
tion can be either direct or indirect. Direct discrimination occurs when decisions are made
based on discriminatory attributes. Indirect discrimination occurs when decisions are made
based on non-discriminatory attributes which are strongly correlated with biased sensitive
ones. In this chapter, we tackle discrimination prevention in data mining and propose new
techniques applicable for direct or indirect discrimination prevention individually or both
at the same time. We discuss how to clean training datasets and outsourced datasets in
such a way that direct and/or indirect discriminatory decision rules are converted to legit-
imate (non-discriminatory) classification rules. We also propose new metrics to evaluate
the utility of the proposed approaches and we compare these approaches. The experimen-
tal evaluations demonstrate that the proposed techniques are effective at removing direct
and/or indirect discrimination biases in the original dataset while preserving data quality.
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4.1 Contributions
Discrimination prevention methods based on pre-processing published so far [43] present
some limitations, which we next highlight:
• They attempt to detect discrimination in the original data only for one discriminatory
item and based on a single measure. This approach cannot guarantee that the trans-
formed dataset is really discrimination-free, because it is known that discriminatory
behaviors can often be hidden behind several discriminatory items, and even behind
combinations of them.
• They only consider direct discrimination.
• They do not include any measure to evaluate how much discrimination has been
removed and how much information loss has been incurred.
In this chapter, we propose pre-processing methods which overcome the above limita-
tions. Our new data transformation methods (i.e. rule protection and rule generalization)
are based on measures for both direct and indirect discrimination and can deal with several
discriminatory items. Also, we provide utility measures. Hence, our approach to discrimi-
nation prevention is broader than in previous work.
In our earlier work [34], we introduced the initial idea of using rule protection and rule
generalization for direct discrimination prevention, but we gave no experimental results. In
[35], we introduced the use of rule protection in a different way for indirect discrimination
prevention and we gave some preliminary experimental results. In this thesis, we present a
unified approach to direct and indirect discrimination prevention, with finalized algorithms
and all possible data transformation methods based on rule protection and/or rule gener-
alization that could be applied for direct or indirect discrimination prevention. We specify
the different features of each method.
As part of this effort, we have developed metrics that specify which records should be
changed, how many records should be changed and how those records should be changed
during data transformation. In addition, we propose new utility measures to evaluate the
different proposed discrimination prevention methods in terms of data quality and discrimi-
nation removal for both direct and indirect discrimination. Based on the proposed measures,
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we present extensive experimental results for two well-known datasets and compare the dif-
ferent possible methods for direct or indirect discrimination prevention to find out which
methods could be more successful in terms of low information loss and high discrimination
removal.
4.2 Direct and Indirect Discrimination Measurement
Let FR be the database of frequent classification rules extracted from D. Whether a PD
rule in FR has to be considered discriminatory or not can be assessed by thresholding one
of the measures in Fig. 2.1.
Definition 11. Let f be one of the measures in Fig. 2.1. Given protected groups DIb and
α ∈ R, a fixed threshold1, a PD classification rule r : A,B → C, where C denies some
benefit and A ⊆ DIb, is α-protective w.r.t. f if f(r) < α. Otherwise, c is α-discriminatory.
The purpose of direct discrimination discovery is to identify α-discriminatory rules. In
fact, α-discriminatory rules indicate biased rules that are directly inferred from discrim-
inatory items (e.g. Foreign worker = Yes). We call these rules direct α-discriminatory
rules.
The purpose of indirect discrimination discovery is to identify redlining rules. In fact,
redlining rules indicate biased rules that are indirectly inferred from non-discriminatory
items (e.g. Zip = 10451) because of their correlation with discriminatory ones. To determine
the redlining rules, Pedreschi et al. in [68] stated the theorem below which gives a lower
bound for α-discrimination of PD classification rules, given information available in PND
rules (γ, δ) and information available from background rules (β1, β2). They assume that
background knowledge takes the form of association rules relating a PND itemset D to a
PD itemset A within the context B.
1α states an acceptable level of discrimination according to laws and regulations. For example, the U.S.
Equal Pay Act [85] states that ”a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths
of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse impact”.
This amounts to using clift with α = 1.25.
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Theorem 1. Let r : D,B → C be a PND classification rule, and let
γ = conf(r : D,B → C) δ = conf(B → C) > 0.
Let A be a PD itemset, and let β1, β2 such that
conf(rb1 : A,B → D) ≥ β1
conf(rb2 : D,B → A) ≥ β2 > 0.
Call
f(x) =
β1
β2
(β2 + x− 1)
elb(x, y) =
 f(x)/y if f(x) >00 otherwise
It holds that, for α ≥ 0, if elb(γ, δ) ≥ α, the PD classification rule r′ : A,B → C is
α-discriminatory.
Based on the above theorem, the following formal definitions of redlining and non-
redlining rules are presented:
Definition 12. A PND classification rule r : D,B → C is a redlining rule if it could yield
an α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C in combination with currently available background
knowledge rules of the form rb1 : A,B → D and rb2 : D,B → A, where A is a PD itemset.
For example {Zip=10451,City=NYC} → Hire=No.
Definition 13. A PND classification rule r : D,B → C is a non-redlining or legitimate
rule if it cannot yield any α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C in combination with currently
available background knowledge rules of the form rb1 : A,B → D and rb2 : D,B → A, where
A is a PD itemset. For example {Experience=Low,City=NYC} → Hire=No.
We call α-discriminatory rules that ensue from redlining rules indirect α-discriminatory
rules.
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4.3 The Approach
In this section, we present our approach, including the data transformation methods that
can be used for direct and/or indirect discrimination prevention. For each method, its
algorithm and its computational cost are specified. Our approach for direct and indirect
discrimination prevention can be described in terms of two phases:
• Discrimination Measurement.
Direct and indirect discrimination discovery includes identifying α-discriminatory
rules and redlining rules. To this end, first, based on predetermined discriminatory
items in D, frequent classification rules in FR are divided in two groups: PD and
PND rules. Second, direct discrimination is measured by identifying α-discriminatory
rules among the PD rules using a direct discrimination measure (e.g., elift) and a dis-
criminatory threshold (α). Third, indirect discrimination is measured by identifying
redlining rules among the PND rules combined with background knowledge, using an
indirect discriminatory measure (elb) and a discriminatory threshold (α). Let MR
be the database of direct α-discriminatory rules obtained with the above process.
In addition, let RR be the database of redlining rules and their respective indirect
α-discriminatory rules obtained with the above process.
• Data Transformation. Transform the original data D in such a way to remove
direct and/or indirect discriminatory biases, with minimum impact on the data and
on legitimate decision rules, so that no unfair decision rule can be mined from the
transformed data. In the following subsections, we present the data transformation
methods that can be used for this purpose.
Figure 4.1 illustrates that if the original biased datasetD goes through an anti-discrimination
process including discrimination measurement and data transformation, the rules extracted
from transformed dataset D′ could lead to automated unfair decisions.
As mentioned before, background knowledge might be obtained from the original dataset
itself because of the existence of PND attributes that are highly correlated with the PD
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Fig. 13.1. The process of extracting biased and unbiased decision rules.  
Despite the wide deployment of information systems based on data mining tech-
nology in decision making, the issue of anti-discrimination in data mining did not 
receive much attention until 2008 (Pedreschi et al. 2008). After that, some pro-
posals have addressed the discovery and measure of discrimination. Others deal 
with the prevention of discrimination. The discovery of discriminatory decisions 
was first proposed by Pedreschi et al. (2008) and Ruggieri et al. (2010). The ap-
proach is based on mining classification rules (the inductive part) and reasoning 
on them (the deductive part) on the basis of quantitative measures of discrimina-
tion that formalize legal definitions of discrimination. For instance, the U.S. Equal 
Pay Act (United States Congress 1963) states that: “a selection rate for any race, 
sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths of the rate for the group with the 
highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse impact”. 
 
Discrimination can be either direct or indirect (also called systematic, see 
Pedreschi et al. (2008)). Direct discriminatory rules indicate biased rules that are 
directly inferred from discriminatory items (e.g. Foreign worker = Yes). Indirect 
discriminatory rules (redlining rules) indicate biased rules that are indirectly in-
ferred from non-discriminatory items (e.g. Zip = 10451) because of their correla-
tion with discriminatory ones. Indirect discrimination could happen because of the 
availability of some background knowledge (rules), for example, indicating that a 
certain zipcode corresponds to a deteriorating area or an area with a mostly black 
population. The background knowledge might be accessible from publicly availa-
ble data (e.g. census data) or might be obtained from the original dataset itself be-
cause of the existence of non-discriminatory attributes that are highly correlated 
with the sensitive ones in the original dataset. 
 
Figure 4.1: The process of extracting biased and unbiased decision rules
ones in the ri inal dataset. Let BK be a database of b ckground rules that is defined as
BK = {rb2 : D,B → A|A i i inatory itemset and supp(D,B → A) ≥ m }
In fact, BK is the set of classifica i rules D,B → A with a giv n minimum support ms
that shows the correlation between the PD itemset A and the PND itemset D with context
B. Although rules of the form rb1 : A,B → D (in Theorem 1) are not included in BK,
conf(rb1 : A,B → D) could be obtained as supp(rb2 : D,B → A)/supp(B → A).
4.4 Data Transformation for Direct Discrimination
The proposed solution to prevent direct discrimination is based on the fact that the dataset
of decision rules would be free of direct discrimin tion if it only contained PD rules that
are α-protective or are instances of at least one non-redlining PND rule. Therefore, a
suitable data transformation with minimum information loss should be applied in such a
way that each α-discriminatory rule either becomes α-protective or an instance of a non-
redlining PND rule. We call the first procedure direct rule protection and the second one
rule generalization.
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4.4.1 Direct Rule Protection (DRP)
In order to convert each α-discriminatory rule into an α-protective rule, based on the direct
discriminatory measure elift (i.e. Definition 3), we should enforce the following inequality
for each α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C in MR, where A is a PD itemset:
elift(r′) < α (4.1)
By using the statement of the elift Definition, Inequality (4.1) can be rewritten as
conf(r′ : A,B → C)
conf(B → C) < α (4.2)
Let us rewrite Inequality (4.2) in the following way
conf(r′ : A,B → C) < α · conf(B → C) (4.3)
So, it is clear that Inequality (4.1) can be satisfied by decreasing the confidence of the α-
discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C to a value less than the right-hand side of Inequality (4.3),
without affecting the confidence of its base rule B → C. A possible solution for decreasing
conf(r′ : A,B → C) = supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
(4.4)
is to perturb the discriminatory itemset from ¬A to A in the subset Dc of all records of
the original dataset which completely support the rule ¬A,B → ¬C and have minimum
impact on other rules; doing so increases the denominator of Expression (4.4) while keeping
the numerator and conf(B → C) unaltered.
There is also another way to provide direct rule protection. Let us rewrite Inequality
(4.2) in the following different way
conf(B → C) > conf(r
′ : A,B → C)
α
(4.5)
It is clear that Inequality (4.1) can be satisfied by increasing the confidence of the base rule
(B → C) of the α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C to a value higher than the right-hand
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Table 4.1: Data transformation methods (DTMs) for different measures
Measures DTMs for DRP Transformation requirement
elift
¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ A,B → ¬C
elift(A,B → C) < α¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ ¬A,B → C
slift
A,B → C ⇒ A,B → ¬C
slift(A,B → C) < α¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ ¬A,B → C
olift
¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ A,B → ¬C
olift(A,B → C) < α¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ ¬A,B → C
A,B → C ⇒ A,B → ¬C
A,B → C ⇒ ¬A,B → C
side of Inequality (4.5), without affecting the value of conf(r′ : A,B → C). A possible
solution for increasing Expression
conf(B → C) = supp(B,C)
supp(B)
(4.6)
is to perturb the class item from ¬C to C in the subset DBc of all records of the original
dataset which completely support the rule ¬A,B → ¬C and have minimum impact on other
rules; doing so increases the numerator of Expression (4.6) while keeping the denominator
and conf(r′ : A,B → C) unaltered.
Therefore, there are two methods that could be applied for direct rule protection. One
method (Method 1) changes the PD itemset in some records (e.g. gender changed from male
to female in the records with granted credits) and the other method (Method 2) changes the
class item in some records (e.g. from grant credit to deny credit in the records with male
gender). Thus, a suitable data transformation with minimum information loss should be
applied in such a way that each α-discriminatory rule r becomes α-protective by ensuring
that f(r) < α, where f(r) could be one of the measures in Fig. 2.1. Then the general idea
of our proposed method DRP for all these measures is the same. However, in the details
(i.e. which records should be changed, how many records should be changed and how those
records should be changed during data transformation), there could be some differences
because of the different definition of these measures. For instance, in Table 4.1 we present
all the possible data transformation methods for measures elift, slift and olift based on
our proposed direct rule protection method.
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As shown in Table 4.1, two possible data transformation methods for elift are the same
as two possible ones for olift and one of them is the same as the possible ones for slift.
Another point is that there is a method (the second one for each measure) that is the same
for all three measures. Then we can conclude that for DRP not only the general idea is the
same for different measures, but also in the details, there is a data transformation method
applicable for all the measures.
4.4.2 Rule Generalization (RG)
Rule generalization is another data transformation method for direct discrimination pre-
vention. It is based on the fact that if each α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C in the
database of decision rules was an instance of at least one non-redlining (legitimate) PND
rule r : D,B → C, the dataset would be free of direct discrimination.
In rule generalization, we consider the relation between rules instead of discrimination
measures. The following example illustrates this principle. Assume that a complainant
claims discrimination against foreign workers among applicants for a job position. A clas-
sification rule {Foreign worker=Yes,City=NYC} → Hire=No with high elift supports the
complainant’s claim. However, the decision maker could argue that this rule is an instance
of a more general rule {Experience=Low,City=NYC} → Hire=No. In other words, foreign
workers are rejected because of their low experience, not just because they are foreign. The
general rule rejecting low-experienced applicants is a legitimate one, because experience can
be considered a genuine/legitimate requirement for some jobs. To formalize this dependency
among rules (i.e. r′ is an instance of r), Pedreschi et al. in [70] say that a PD classification
rule r′ : A,B → C is an instance of a PND rule r : D,B → C if rule r holds with the
same or higher confidence, namely conf(r : D,B → C) ≥ conf(r′ : A,B → C), and a case
(record) satisfying discriminatory itemset A in context B satisfies legitimate itemset D as
well, namely conf(A,B → D) = 1. The two conditions can be relaxed as follows:
Definition 14. Let d ∈ [0, 1]. A classification rule r′ : A,B → C is a d-instance of
r : D,B → C if both conditions below are true:
• Condition 1: conf(r) ≥ d · conf(r′)
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• Condition 2: conf(r′′ : A,B → D) ≥ d.
Then, if r′ is a d-instance of r (where d is 1 or a value near 1), r′ is free of direct
discrimination. Based on this concept, we propose a data transformation method (i.e.
rule generalization) to transform each α-discriminatory r′ in MR into a d-instance of a
legitimate rule. An important issue to perform rule generalization is to find a suitable
PND rule (r : D,B → C) or, equivalently, to find a suitable D (e.g. Experience=Low).
Although choosing non-redlining rules, as done in this chapter, is a way to obtain legitimate
PND rules, sometimes it is not enough and a semantic hierarchy is needed to find the most
suitable legitimate itemset.
At any rate, rule generalization can be attempted for α-discriminatory rules r′ for which
there is at least one non-redlining PND rule r satisfying at least one of the two conditions
of Definition 14. If any of the two conditions does not hold, the original data should be
transformed for it to hold. Let us assume that Condition (2) is satisfied but Condition (1) is
not. Based on the definition of d-instance, to satisfy the first condition of Definition 14, we
should enforce for each α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C inMR the following inequality,
with respect to its PND rule r : D,B → C:
conf(r : D,B → C) ≥ d · conf(r′ : A,B → C) (4.7)
Let us rewrite Inequality (4.7) in the following way
conf(r′ : A,B → C) ≤ conf(r : D,B → C)
d
(4.8)
So, it is clear that Inequality (4.7) can be satisfied by decreasing the confidence of the α-
discriminatory rule (r′ : A,B → C) to values less than the right-hand side of Inequality (4.8),
without affecting the confidence of rule r : D,B → C or the satisfaction of Condition (2) of
Definition 14. The confidence of r′ was previously specified in Expression (4.4). A possible
solution to decrease this confidence is to perturb the class item from C to ¬C in the subset
Dc of all records in the original dataset which completely support the rule A,B,¬D → C
and have minimum impact on other rules; doing so decreases the numerator of Expression
(4.4) while keeping its denominator, conf(r : D,B → C) and also conf(r” : A,B → D)
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(Condition (2) for rule generalization) unaltered.
Let us see what happens if if Condition (1) of Definition 14 is satisfied but Condition
(2) is not. In this case, based on the definition of d-instance, to satisfy Condition (2) we
should enforce the following inequality for each α-discriminatory rule r′ : A,B → C inMR
with respect to its PND rule r : D,B → C:
conf(r” : A,B → D) ≥ d (4.9)
Inequality (4.9) must be satisfied by increasing the confidence of rule r” : A,B → D to a
value higher than d, without affecting the satisfaction of Condition (1). However, any effort
at increasing the confidence of r” impacts on the confidence of the r or r′ rules and might
threaten the satisfaction of Condition (1) of Definition 14; indeed, in order to increase the
confidence of r” we must either decrease supp(A,B) (which increases conf(r′)) or change
¬D to D for those records satisfying A and B (which decreases conf(r)). Hence, rule gener-
alization can only be applied if Condition (2) is satisfied without any data transformation.
To recap, we see that rule generalization can be achieved provided that Condition (2) is
satisfied, because Condition (1) can be reached by changing the class item in some records
(e.g. from “Hire no” to “Hire yes” in the records of foreign and high-experienced people in
NYC city).
4.4.3 Direct Rule Protection and Rule Generalization
Since rule generalization might not be applicable for all α-discriminatory rules in MR,
rule generalization cannot be used alone for direct discrimination prevention and must be
combined with direct rule protection. When applying both rule generalization and direct
rule protection, α-discriminatory rules are divided into two groups:
• α-discriminatory rules r′ for which there is at least one non-redlining PND rule r sat-
isfying Condition (2) of Definition 14. For these rules, rule generalization is performed
unless direct rule protection requires less data transformation (in which case direct
rule protection is used).
• α-discriminatory rules such that there is no such PND rule. For these rules, direct
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rule protection is performed.
We propose Algorithm 1 to select the most appropriate discrimination prevention ap-
proach for each α-discriminatory rule. First, for each α-discriminatory rule inMR of type
r′ : A,B → C, a collection Dpn of non-redlining PND rules of type r : D,B → C is found
(Step 2). Then, the conditions of Definition 14 are checked for each rule in Dpn, for d ≥ 0.8
(Steps 4-18). Three cases arise depending on whether Conditions (1) and (2) hold:
• Case 1: There is at least one rule r ∈ Dpn such that both Conditions (1)
and (2) of Definition 14 hold. In this case r′ is a d-instance of r for d ≥ 0.8 and
no transformation is required (Steps 19-20).
• Case 2: There is no rule in Dpn satisfying both Conditions (1) and (2) of
Definition 14, but there is at least one rule satisfying Condition (2). In this
case (Step 23), the PND rule rb in Dpn should be selected (Step 24) which requires the
minimum data transformation to fulfill Condition (1). A smaller difference between
the values of the two sides of Condition (1) for each r in Dpn indicates a smaller
required data transformation. In this case the α-discriminatory rule is transformed
by rule generalization (Step 25).
• Case 3: No rule in Dpn satisfies Condition (2) of Definition 14. In this
case (Step 21), rule generalization is not possible and direct rule protection should be
performed (Step 22).
For the α-discriminatory rules to which rule generalization can be applied, it is possible
that direct rule protection can be achieved with a smaller data transformation. For these
rules the algorithm should select the approach with minimum transformation (Steps 31-36).
The algorithm yields as output a database T R with all r′ ∈ MR, their respective rule rb
and their respective discrimination prevention approaches (TRr′).
4.5 Data Transformation for Indirect Discrimination
The proposed solution to prevent indirect discrimination is based on the fact that the dataset
of decision rules would be free of indirect discrimination if it contained no redlining rules.
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Algorithm 1 Determining Discrimination Prevention Approaches
Input: DB, MR, FR, d ≥ 0.8, α
1: for each r′ : A,B → C ∈MR do
2: Dpn ← Collection of non-redlining PND rules r : D,B → C from FR
3: if |Dpn| 6= 0 then
4: for each r ∈ Dpn do
5: // Assess conditions of p-instance
6: Compute conf(r”), where r” : A,B ∈ D
7: if conf(r) ≥ d · conf(r′) then
8: C1r ← true
9: else
10: C1r ← false
11: dif1r ← d · conf(r′)− conf(r)
12: end if
13: if conf(r”) ≥ d then
14: C2r ← true
15: else
16: C2r ← false
17: end if
18: end for
19: if ∃r ∈ Dpn s.t. C1r = true ∧ C2r = true then
20: TRr′ ← Nt // No transformation needed
21: else if for all r ∈ Dpn, C2r = false then
22: TRr′ ← DRP // Direct Rule Protection
23: else if ∃r ∈ Dpn s.t. C2r = true then
24: rb ← r ∈ Dpn with minimum dif1r
25: TRr′ ← RG // Rule Generalization
26: end if
27: else
28: // |Dpn| = 0
29: TRr′ ← DRP // Direct Rule Protection
30: end if
31: if TRr′ = RG then
32: dif ′r ← conf(r′)− α · conf(B → C)
33: if dif ′r < dif1r then
34: TRr′ ← DRP
35: end if
36: end if
37: end for
Output: T R containing all r′ ∈MR and their respective TRr′ and rb
To achieve this, a suitable data transformation with minimum information loss should be
applied in such a way that redlining rules are converted to non-redlining rules. We call this
procedure indirect rule protection.
4.5.1 Indirect Rule Protection (IRP)
In order to turn a redlining rule into an non-redlining rule, based on the indirect discrimi-
natory measure (i.e. elb in Theorem 1), we should enforce the following inequality for each
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redlining rule r : D,B → C in RR:
elb(γ, δ) < α (4.10)
By using the definitions stated when introducing elb in Theorem 12, Inequality (4.10) can
be rewritten as
conf(rb1)
conf(rb2)
(conf(rb2) + conf(r : D,B → C)− 1)
conf(B → C) < α (4.11)
Note that the discriminatory itemset (i.e. A) is not removed from the original database
D and the rules rb1 : A,B → D and rb2 : D,B → A are obtained from D, so that their
confidences might change as a result of data transformation for indirect discrimination
prevention. Let us rewrite Inequality (4.11) in the following way
conf(rb1 : A,B → D) < α · conf(B → C) · conf(rb2)
conf(rb2) + conf(r : D,B → C)− 1 (4.12)
Clearly, in this case Inequality (4.10) can be satisfied by decreasing the confidence of rule
rb1 : A,B → D to values less than the right-hand side of Inequality (4.12) without affecting
either the confidence of the redlining rule or the confidence of the B → C and rb2 rules.
Since the values of both inequality sides are dependent, a transformation is required that
decreases the left-hand side of the inequality without any impact on the right-hand side. A
possible solution for decreasing
conf(A,B → D) = supp(A,B,D)
supp(A,B)
(4.13)
in Inequality (4.12) to the target value is to perturb the discriminatory itemset from ¬A to
A in the subset Dc of all records of the original dataset which completely support the rule
¬A,B,¬D → ¬C and have minimum impact on other rules; this increases the denominator
of Expression (4.13) while keeping the numerator and conf(B → C), conf(rb2 : D,B → A),
and conf(r : D,B → C) unaltered.
2It is worth noting that β1 and β2 are lower bounds for conf(rb1) and conf(rb2), respectively, so it is
correct if we replace β1 and β2 with conf(rb1) and conf(rb2) in the elb formulation.
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There is another way to provide indirect rule protection. Let us rewrite Inequality (4.11)
as Inequality (4.14), where the confidences of rb1 and rb2 rules are not constant.
conf(B → C) >
conf(rb1)
conf(rb2)
(conf(rb2) + conf(r : D,B → C)− 1)
α
(4.14)
Clearly, in this case Inequality (4.10) can be satisfied by increasing the confidence of the
base rule (B → C) of the redlining rule r : D,B → C to values greater than the right-hand
side of Inequality (4.14) without affecting either the confidence of the redlining rule or the
confidence of the rb1 and rb2 rules. A possible solution for increasing Expression (4.6) in
Inequality (4.14) to the target value is to perturb the class item from ¬C to C in the subset
Dc of all records of the original dataset which completely support the rule ¬A,B,¬D → ¬C
and have minimum impact on other rules; this increases the numerator of Expression (4.6)
while keeping the denominator and conf(rb1 : A,B → D), conf(rb2 : D,B → A), and
conf(r : D,B → C) unaltered.
Hence, like in direct rule protection, there are also two methods that could be applied
for indirect rule protection. One method (Method 1) changes the discriminatory itemset in
some records (e.g. from non-foreign worker to foreign worker in the records of hired people
in NYC city with Zip6=10451) and the other method (Method 2) changes the class item in
some records (e.g. from “Hire yes” to “Hire no” in the records of non-foreign worker of
people in NYC city with Zip6=10451).
4.6 Data Transformation for Both Direct and Indirect Dis-
crimination
We deal here with the key problem of transforming data with minimum information loss
to prevent at the same time both direct and indirect discrimination. We will give a pre-
processing solution to simultaneous direct and indirect discrimination prevention. First, we
explain when direct and indirect discrimination could simultaneously occur. This depends
on whether the original dataset (D) contains discriminatory itemsets or not. Two cases
arise:
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Table 4.2: Direct and indirect rule protection methods
Method 1 Method 2
Direct Rule Protection ¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ A,B → ¬C ¬A,B → ¬C ⇒ ¬A,B → C
Indirect Rule Protection ¬A,B,¬D → ¬C ⇒ A,B,¬D → ¬C ¬A,B,¬D → ¬C ⇒ ¬A,B,¬D → C
• PD itemsets (i.e. A) did not exist in the original database D or have previously been
removed from it due to privacy constraints or for preventing discrimination. However,
if background knowledge from publicly available data (e.g. census data) is available,
indirect discrimination remains possible. In fact, in this case, only PND rules are
extracted from D so only indirect discrimination could happen.
• At least one PD itemset (i.e. A) is not removed from the original database (D). So
it is clear that PD rules could be extracted from D and direct discrimination could
happen. However, in addition to direct discrimination, indirect discrimination might
occur because of background knowledge obtained from D itself due to the existence of
PND items that are highly correlated with the sensitive (discriminatory) ones. Hence,
in this case both direct and indirect discrimination could happen.
To provide both direct rule protection (DRP) and indirect rule protection (IRP) at the
same time, an important point is the relation between the data transformation methods.
Any data transformation to eliminate direct α-discriminatory rules should not produce new
redlining rules or prevent the existing ones from being removed. Also any data transforma-
tion to eliminate redlining rules should not produce new direct α-discriminatory rules or
prevent the existing ones from being removed.
For subsequent use in this section, we summarize in Table 4.2 the methods for DRP
and IRP described in Sections 4.4.1 and 4.5.1 above. We can see in Table 4.2 that DRP
and IRP operate the same kind of data transformation: in both cases Method 1 changes
the PD itemset, whereas Method 2 changes the class item. Therefore, in principle any data
transformation for DRP (resp. IRP) not only does not need to have a negative impact on
IRP (resp. DRP), but both kinds of protection could even be beneficial to each other.
However, there is a difference between DRP and IRP: the set of records chosen for
transformation. As shown in Table 4.2, in IRP the chosen records should not satisfy the
D itemset (chosen records are those with ¬A,B,¬D → ¬C), whereas DRP does not care
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about D at all (chosen records are those with ¬A,B → ¬C). The following interactions
between direct and indirect rule protection become apparent.
Lemma 1. Method 1 for DRP cannot be used if simultaneous DRP and IRP are desired.
Proof: Method 1 for DRP might undo the protection provided by Method 1 for IRP,
as we next justify. Method 1 for DRP decreases conf(A,B → C) until the direct rule
protection requirement (Inequality (4.3)) is met and Method 1 for IRP needs to decrease
conf(A,B → D) until the indirect rule protection requirement is met (Inequality (4.12)).
Assume that decreasing conf(A,B → C) to meet the direct rule protection requirement
is achieved by changing y (how y is obtained will be discussed in Section 4.8) number of
records with ¬A,B,¬C to records with A,B,¬C (as done by Method 1 for DRP). This
actually could increase conf(A,B → D) if z among the changed records, with z ≤ y, turn
out to satisfy D. This increase can undo the protection provided by Method 1 for IRP (i.e.
conf(A,B → D) < IRPreq1, where IRPreq1 = α·conf(B→C)·conf(rb2)conf(rb2)+conf(r:D,B→C)−1) if the new value
conf(A,B → D) = supp(A,B,D)+zsupp(A,B)+y is greater than or equal to IRPreq1, which happens if
z ≥ IRPreq1 · (supp(A,B) + Y )− supp(A,B,D). 
Lemma 2. Method 2 for IRP is beneficial for Method 2 for DRP. On the other hand,
Method 2 for DRP is at worst neutral for Method 2 for IRP.
Proof: Method 2 for DRP and Method 2 for IRP are both aimed at increasing conf(B →
C). In fact, Method 2 for IRP changes a subset of the records changed by Method 2 for
DRP. This proves that Method 2 for IRP is beneficial for Method 2 for DRP. On the other
hand, let us check that, in the worst case, Method 2 for DRP is neutral for Method 2
for IRP: such a worst case is the one in which all changed records satisfy D, which could
result in increasing both sides of Inequality (4.14) by an equal amount (due to increasing
conf(B → C) and conf(D,B → C)); even in this case, there is no change in whatever
protection is achieved by Method 2 for IRP. 
Thus, we conclude that Method 2 for DRP and Method 2 for IRP are the only methods
among those described that can be applied to achieve simultaneous direct and indirect dis-
crimination prevention. In addition, in the cases where either only direct or only indirect
discrimination exist, there is no interference between the described methods: Method 1
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for DRP, Method 2 for DRP and Rule Generalization can be used to prevent direct dis-
crimination; Method 1 for IRP and Method 2 for IRP can be used to prevent indirect
discrimination. In what follows, we propose algorithms based on the described methods
that cover direct and/or indirect discrimination prevention.
4.7 The Algorithms
We describe in this section our algorithms based on the direct and indirect discrimination
prevention methods proposed in Sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. There are some assumptions
common to all algorithms in this section. First, we assume the class attribute in the original
dataset D to be binary (e.g. denying or granting credit). Second, we consider classification
rules with negative decision (e.g. denying credit) to be in FR. Third, we assume the PD
itemsets (i.e. A) and the PND itemsets (i.e. D) to be binary or non-binary categorical.
4.7.1 Direct Discrimination Prevention Algorithms
We start with direct rule protection. Algorithm 2 details Method 1 for DRP. For each direct
α-discriminatory rule r′ in MR (Step 3), after finding the subset Dc (Step 5), records in
Dc should be changed until the direct rule protection requirement (Step 10) is met for each
respective rule (Steps 10-14).
Among the records of Dc, one should change those with lowest impact on the other
(α-protective or non-redlining) rules. Hence, for each record dbc ∈ Dc, the number of rules
whose premise is supported by dbc is taken as the impact of dbc (Step 7), that is impact(dbc);
the rationale is that changing dbc impacts on the confidence of those rules. Then the records
dbc with minimum impact(dbc) are selected for change (Step 9), with the aim of scoring well
in terms of the utility measures proposed in the next section. We call this procedure (Steps
6-9) impact minimization and we re-use it in the pseudocodes of the rest of algorithms
specified in this chapter.
Algorithm 3 details Method 2 for DRP. The parts of Algorithm 3 to find subset Dc
and perform impact minimization (Step 4) are the same as in Algorithm 2. However, the
transformation requirement that should be met for each α-discriminatory rule inMR (Step
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Algorithm 2 Direct Rule Protection (Method 1)
1: Inputs: D, FR, MR, α, DIb
2: Output: D′ (transformed dataset)
3: for each r′ : A,B → C ∈MR do
4: FR ← FR− {r′}
5: Dc ← All records completely supporting ¬A,B → ¬C
6: for each dbc ∈ Dc do
7: Compute impact(dbc) = |{ra ∈ FR|dbc supports the premise of ra}|
8: end for
9: Sort Dc by ascending impact
10: while conf(r′) ≥ α · conf(B → C) do
11: Select first record in Dc
12: Modify PD itemset of dbc from ¬A to A in D
13: Recompute conf(r′)
14: end while
15: end for
16: Output: D′ = D
5) and the kind of data transformation are different (Steps 5-9).
Algorithm 3 Direct Rule Protection (Method 2)
1: Inputs: D, FR, MR, α, DIb
2: Output: D′ (transformed dataset)
3: for each r′ : A,B → C ∈MR do
4: Steps 4-9 Algorithm 2
5: while conf(B → C) ≤ conf(r′)α do
6: Select first record in Dc
7: Modify the class item of dbc from ¬C to C in D
8: Recompute conf(B → C)
9: end while
10: end for
11: Output: D′ = D
As mentioned in Section 4.4.3, rule generalization cannot be applied alone for solving
direct discrimination prevention, but it can be used in combination with Method 1 or
Method 2 for DRP. In this case, after specifying the discrimination prevention method
(i.e. direct rule protection or rule generalization) to be applied for each α-discriminatory
rule based on the algorithm in Section 4.4.3, Algorithm 4 should be run to combine rule
generalization and one of the two direct rule protection methods.
Algorithm 4 takes as input T R, which is the output of the algorithm in Section 4.4.3,
containing all r′ ∈MR and their respective TRr′ and rb. For each α-discriminatory rule r′
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Algorithm 4 Direct Rule Protection and Rule Generalization
1: Inputs: D, FR, T R, p ≥ 0.8, α, DIb
2: Output: D′ (transformed dataset)
3: for each r′ : A,B → C ∈ T R do
4: FR ← FR− {r′}
5: if TRr′ = RG then
6: // Rule Generalization
7: Dc ← All records completely supporting A,B,¬D → C
8: Steps 6-9 Algorithm 2
9: while conf(r′) > conf(rb:D,B→C)p do
10: Select first record in Dc
11: Modify class item of dbc from C to ¬C in D
12: Recompute conf(r′)
13: end while
14: end if
15: if TRr′ = DRP then
16: // Direct Rule Protection
17: Steps 5-14 Algorithm 2 or Steps 4-9 Algorithm 3
18: end if
19: end for
20: Output: D′ = D
in T R, if TRr′ shows that rule generalization should be performed (Step 5), after determin-
ing the records that should be changed for impact minimization (Steps 7-8), these records
should be changed until the rule generalization requirement is met (Steps 9-13). Also, if
TRr′ shows that direct rule protection should be performed (Step 15), based on either
Method 1 or Method 2, the relevant sections of Algorithm 2 or 3 are called, respectively
(Step 17).
4.7.2 Indirect Discrimination Prevention Algorithms
A detailed algorithm implementing Method 2 for IRP is provided in [35], from which an
algorithm implementing Method 1 for IRP can be easily derived. Due to similarity with
the previous algorithms, we do not recall those two algorithms for IRP here.
4.7.3 Direct and Indirect Discrimination Prevention Algorithms
Algorithm 5 details our proposed data transformation method for simultaneous direct and
indirect discrimination prevention. The algorithm starts with redlining rules. From each
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redlining rule (r : X → C), more than one indirect α-discriminatory rule (r′ : A,B → C)
might be generated because of two reasons: 1) existence of different ways to group the items
in X into a context itemset B and a PND itemset D correlated to some PD itemset A;
and 2) existence of more than one item in DIb. Hence, as shown in Algorithm 5 (Step 5),
given a redlining rule r, proper data transformation should be conducted for all indirect
α-discriminatory rules r′ : (A ⊆ DIb), (B ⊆ X)→ C ensuing from r.
Algorithm 5 Direct and Indirect Discrimination Prevention
1: Inputs: D, FR, RR, MR, α, DIb
2: Output: D′ (transformed dataset)
3: for each r : X → C ∈ RR, where D,B ⊆ X do
4: γ = conf(r)
5: for each r′ : (A ⊆ DIb), (B ⊆ X)→ C ∈ RR do
6: β2 = conf(rb2 : X → A)
7: ∆1 = supp(rb2 : X → A)
8: δ = conf(B → C)
9: ∆2 = supp(B → A)
10: β1 =
∆1
∆2
//conf(rb1 : A,B → D)
11: Find Dc: all records in D that completely support ¬A,B,¬D → ¬C
12: Steps 6-9 Algorithm 2
13: if r′ ∈MR then
14: while (δ ≤ β1(β2+γ−1)
β2·α ) and (δ ≤
conf(r′)
α
) do
15: Select first record dbc in Dc
16: Modify the class item of dbc from ¬C to C in D
17: Recompute δ = conf(B → C)
18: end while
19: else
20: while δ ≤ β1(β2+γ−1)
β2·α do
21: Steps 15-17 Algorithm 5
22: end while
23: end if
24: end for
25: end for
26: for each r′ : (A,B → C) ∈MR \RR do
27: δ = conf(B → C)
28: Find Dc: all records in D that completely support ¬A,B → ¬C
29: Step 12
30: while (δ ≤ conf(r′)
α
) do
31: Steps 15-17 Algorithm 5
32: end while
33: end for
34: Output: D′ = D
If some rules can be extracted from D as both direct and indirect α-discriminatory rules,
it means that there is overlap between MR and RR; in such case, data transformation is
performed until both the direct and the indirect rule protection requirements are satisfied
(Steps 13-18). This is possible because, as we showed in Section 4.6, the same data trans-
formation method (Method 2 consisting of changing the class item) can provide both DRP
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and IRP. However, if there is no overlap between MR and RR, the data transformation
is performed according to Method 2 for IRP, until the indirect discrimination prevention
requirement is satisfied (Steps 19-23) for each indirect α-discriminatory rule ensuing from
each redlining rule in RR; this can be done without any negative impact on direct discrim-
ination prevention, as justified in Section 4.6. Then, for each direct α-discriminatory rule
r′ ∈ MR \ RR (that is only directly extracted from D), data transformation for satisfy-
ing the direct discrimination prevention requirement is performed (Steps 26-33), based on
Method 2 for DRP; this can be done without any negative impact on indirect discrimination
prevention, as justified in Section 4.6. Performing rule protection or generalization for each
rule in MR by each of Algorithms 2- 5 has no adverse effect on protection for other rules
(i.e. rule protection at Step i + x to make r′ protective cannot turn into discriminatory a
rule r made protective at Step i) because of the two following reasons: the kind of data
transformation for each rule is the same (change the PD itemset or the class item of records)
and there are no two α-discriminatory rules r and r′ in MR such that r = r′.
4.8 Computational Cost
The computational cost of Algorithm 2 can be broken down as follows:
• Let m be the number of records in D. The cost of finding subset Dc (Step 5) is O(m).
• Let k be the number of rules in FR and h the number of records in subset Dc. The
cost of computing impact(dbc) for all records in Dc (Steps 6-8) is O(hk).
• The cost of sorting Dc by ascending impact (Step 9) is O(h log h). Then, the cost of
the impact minimization procedure (Steps 6-9) in all algorithms is O(hk + h log h).
• During each iteration of the inner loop (Step 10), the number of records supporting
the premise of rule r′ : A,B → C is increased by one. After i iterations, the confidence
of r′ : A,B → C will be conf(r′ : A,B → C)(i) = NABCNAB+i , where NABC is the number
of records supporting rule r′ and NAB is the number of records supporting the premise
of rule r′. If we let DRPreq1 = α · conf(B → C), the inner loop (Step 10) is iterated
until conf(r′ : A,B → C)(i) < DRPreq1 or equivalently NABCNAB+i < DRPreq1. This
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inequality can be rewritten as i > ( NABCDRPreq1 − NBC). From this last inequality we
can derive that i = d NABCDRPreq1 − NBCe. Hence, iterations in the inner loop (Step 10)
will stop as soon as the first integer value greater than (or equal) NABCDRPreq1 − NBC is
reached. Then, the cost spent on the inner loop to satisfy the direct rule protection
requirement (Steps 10-14) will be O(m ∗ d NABCDRPreq1 −NBCe).
Therefore, assuming n is the number of α-discriminatory rules in MR (Step 3), the
total computational time of Algorithm 2 is bounded by O(n ∗ {m + hk + h log h + im}),
where i = d NABCDRPreq1 −NBCe.
The impact minimization procedure substantially increases the complexity. Without
computing the impact, the time complexity of Algorithm 2 decreases to O(n ∗ {m+ im}).
In addition, it is clear that the execution time of Algorithm 2 increases linearly with the
number m of original data records as well as the number k of frequent classification rules
and the number n of α-discriminatory rules.
The computational cost of the other algorithms can be computed similarly, with some
small differences. In summary, the total computational time of Algorithm 3 is also bounded
by O(n ∗ {m+hk+h log h+ im}), where i = d(NB ∗DRPreq2)−NBCe, NBC is the number
of records supporting rule B → C, NB is the number of records supporting itemset B
and DRPreq2 =
conf(r′)
α . The computational cost of Algorithm 4 is the same as the last
ones with the difference that i = dNABC − (RGreq ∗NAB)e, where RGreq = conf(rb)d , or
i = d(NB ∗ DRPreq2) − NBCe, depending on whether rule generalization or direct rule
protection is performed.
Finally, assuming f is the number of indirect α-discriminatory rules in RR and n is
the number of direct α-discriminatory rules in MR that no longer exist in RR, the total
computational time of Algorithm 5 is bounded by O((f + n) ∗ {m + hk + h log h + im}),
where i = d(NB ∗maxreq)−NBCe and maxreq = max(β1(β2+γ−1)β2·α ,
conf(r′)
α ).
4.9 Experiments
This section presents the experimental evaluation of the proposed direct and/or indirect
discrimination prevention approaches and algorithms. To obtain FR and BK we used the
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Apriori algorithm [2], which is a common algorithm to extract frequent rules. All algorithms
and utility measures were implemented using the C# programming language. The tests were
performed on an 2.27 GHz Intel R© CoreTMi3 machine, equipped with 4 GB of RAM, and
running under Windows 7 Professional.
First, we describe the datasets used in our experiments. Then, we introduce the new
utility measures we propose to evaluate direct and indirect discrimination prevention meth-
ods in terms of their success at discrimination removal and impact on data quality. Finally,
we present the evaluation results of the different methods and also the comparison between
them.
4.9.1 Datasets
Adult dataset: We used the Adult dataset from [25], also known as Census Income, in our
experiments. This dataset consists of 48,842 records, split into a “train” part with 32,561
records and a “test” part with 16,281 records. The dataset has 14 attributes (without class
attribute). We used the “train” part in our experiments. The prediction task associated to
the Adult dataset is to determine whether a person makes more than 50K$ a year based on
census and demographic information about people. The dataset contains both categorical
and numerical attributes.
For our experiments with the Adult dataset, we set DIb={Sex=Female, Age=Young}.
Although the Age attribute in the Adult dataset is numerical, we converted it to categorical
by partitioning its domain into two fixed intervals: Age ≤ 30 was renamed as Young and
Age > 30 was renamed as old.
German Credit dataset: We also used the German Credit dataset from [25]. This dataset
consists of 1,000 records and 20 attributes (without class attribute) of bank account holders.
This is a well-known real-life dataset, containing both numerical and categorical attributes.
It has been frequently used in the anti-discrimination literature [68, 43]. The class attribute
in the German Credit dataset takes values representing good or bad classification of the bank
account holders. For our experiments with this dataset, we set DIb= {Foreign worker=Yes,
Personal Status=Female and not Single, Age=Old} (cut-off for Age=Old: 50 years old).
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4.9.2 Utility Measures
Our proposed techniques should be evaluated based on two aspects. On the one hand,
we need to measure the success of the method in removing all evidence of direct and/or
indirect discrimination from the original dataset; on the other hand, we need to measure
the impact of the method in terms of information loss (i.e. data quality loss). To measure
discrimination removal, four metrics were used:
• Direct Discrimination Prevention Degree (DDPD). This measure quantifies
the percentage of α-discriminatory rules that are no longer α-discriminatory in the
transformed dataset. We define DDPD as
DDPD =
|MR| − |MR′|
|MR|
where MR is the database of α-discriminatory rules extracted from D and MR′ is
the database of α-discriminatory rules extracted from the transformed dataset D′.
Note that | · | is the cardinality operator.
• Direct Discrimination Protection Preservation (DDPP). This measure quan-
tifies the percentage of the α-protective rules in the original dataset that remain
α-protective in the transformed dataset. It is defined as
DDPP =
|PR⋂PR′|
|PR|
where PR is the database of α-protective rules extracted from the original dataset D
and PR′ is the database of α-protective rules extracted from the transformed dataset
D′.
• Indirect Discrimination Prevention Degree (IDPD) This measure quantifies
the percentage of redlining rules that are no longer redlining in the transformed
dataset. It is defined like DDPD but substituting MR and MR′ with the database
of redlining rules extracted from D and D′, respectively.
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• Indirect Discrimination Protection Preservation (IDPP) This measure quan-
tifies the percentage of non-redlining rules in the original dataset that remain non-
redlining in the transformed dataset. It is defined like DDPP but substituting PR
and PR′ with the database of non-redlining extracted from D and D′, respectively.
Since the above measures are used to evaluate the success of the proposed method
in direct and indirect discrimination prevention, ideally their value should be 100%. To
measure data quality, we use two metrics proposed in the literature as information loss
measures in the context of rule hiding for privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) [88].
• Misses Cost (MC). This measure quantifies the percentage of rules among those
extractable from the original dataset that cannot be extracted from the transformed
dataset (side-effect of the transformation process).
• Ghost Cost (GC). This measure quantifies the percentage of the rules among those
extractable from the transformed dataset that were not extractable from the original
dataset (side-effect of the transformation process).
MC and GC should ideally be 0%. However, MC and GC may not be 0% as a side-effect
of the transformation process.
4.9.3 Empirical Evaluation
We implemented the algorithms for all proposed methods for direct and/or indirect dis-
crimination prevention, and we evaluated them in terms of the proposed utility measures.
We report the performance results in this section.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the utility scores obtained by our methods on the Adult
dataset and the German Credit dataset, respectively. Within each table, the first row
relates to the simple approach of deleting discriminatory attributes, the next four rows
relate to direct discrimination prevention methods, the next two ones relate to indirect
discrimination prevention methods and the last one relates to the combination of direct and
indirect discrimination.
Table 4.3 shows the results for minimum support 2% and minimum confidence 10%.
Table 4.4 shows the results for minimum support 5% and minimum confidence 10%. In
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Table 4.3: Adult dataset: Utility measures for minimum support 2% and confidence 10%
for all the methods. Value “n.a.” denotes that the respective measure is not applicable.
Methods α p No. No. Indirect No. Direct Disc. Removal Data Quality
Redlining α-Disc. α-Disc. Direct Indirect
Rules Rules Rules DDPD DDPP IDPD IDPP MC GC
Removing. Disc. Attributes n.a. n.a n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 66.08 0
DRP (Method 1) 1.2 n.a n.a. n.a 274 100 100 n.a. n.a. 4.16 4.13
DRP (Method 2) 1.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 274 100 100 n.a. n.a. 0 0
DRP (Method 1) + RG 1.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. 274 100 100 n.a. n.a. 4.1 4.1
DRP (Method 2) + RG 1.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. 274 91.58 100 n.a. n.a. 0 0
IRP (Method 1) 1.1 n.a. 21 30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 0.54 0.38
IRP (Method 2) 1.1 n.a. 21 30 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 0 0
DRP(Method 2) + IRP(Method 2) 1.1 n.a. 21 30 280 100 100 100 100 0 0
No of Freq. Class. Rules: 5,092 No. of Back. Know. Rules: 2089
Table 4.4: German Credit dataset: Utility measures for minimum support 5% and con-
fidence 10% for all methods. Value “n.a.” denotes that the respective measure is not
applicable.
Methods α p No. No. Indirect No. Direct Discrimination Removal Data Quality
Redlining α-Disc. α-Disc. Direct Indirect
Rules Rules Rules DDPD DDPP IDPD IDPP MC GC
Removing. Disc. Attributes n.a. n.a n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 64.35 0
DRP (Method 1) 1.2 n.a n.a. n.a 991 100 100 n.a. n.a. 15.44 13.52
DRP (Method 2) 1.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 991 100 100 n.a. n.a. 0 4.06
DRP (Method 1) + RG 1.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. 991 100 100 n.a. n.a. 13.34 12.01
DRP (Method 2) + RG 1.2 0.9 n.a. n.a. 991 100 100 n.a. n.a. 0.01 4.06
IRP (Method 1) 1 n.a. 37 42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 1.62 1.47
IRP (Method 2) 1 n.a. 37 42 n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 0 0.96
DRP(Method 2) + IRP(Method 2) 1 n.a. 37 42 499 99.97 100 100 100 0 2.07
No of Freq. Class. Rules: 32,340 No. of Back. Know. Rules: 22,763
Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the results of direct discrimination prevention methods are reported
for discriminatory threshold α = 1.2 and, in the cases where direct rule protection is ap-
plied in combination with rule generalization, we used d = 0.9, and DIb={Sex=Female,
Age=Young} in the Adult dataset, andDIb= {Foreign worker=Yes, Personal Status=Female
and not Single, Age=Old} in the German Credit dataset. In addition, in Table 4.3,
the results of the indirect discrimination prevention methods and both direct and in-
direct discrimination prevention are reported for discriminatory threshold α = 1.1 and
DIb={Sex=Female, Age=Young}; in Table 4.4, these results are reported for α = 1 and
DIb= {Foreign worker=Yes}).
We selected the discriminatory threshold values and DIb for each dataset in such a way
that the number of redlining rules and α-discriminatory rules extracted from D could be
suitable to test all our methods. In addition to the scores of utility measures, the number
of redlining rules, the number of indirect α-discriminatory rules and the number of direct
α-discriminatory rules are also reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. These tables also show
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the number of frequent classification rules found, as well as the number of background
knowledge rules related to this experiment.
As shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we get very good results for all methods in terms of
discrimination removal: DDPD, DDPP, IDPD, IDPP are near 100% for both datasets. In
terms of data quality, the best results for direct discrimination prevention are obtained with
Method 2 for DRP or Method 2 for DRP combined with Rule Generalization. The best
results for indirect discrimination prevention are obtained with Method 2 for IRP. This
shows that lower information loss is obtained with the methods changing the class item
(i.e. Method 2) than with those changing the discriminatory itemset (i.e. Method 1). As
mentioned above, in direct discrimination prevention, rule generalization cannot be applied
alone and must be applied in combination with direct rule protection; however, direct rule
protection can be applied alone. The results in the last row of the above tables (i.e. Method
2 for DRP + Method 2 for IRP) based on Algorithm 5 for the case of simultaneous direct
and indirect discrimination demonstrate that the proposed solution achieves a high degree
of simultaneous direct and indirect discrimination removal with very little information loss.
For all methods, Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show that we obtained lower information loss in
terms of MC and GC in the Adult dataset than in the German Credit dataset. In terms
of discrimination removal, results on both datasets were almost the same. In addition, the
highest value of information loss is obtained by the simple approach of removing discrim-
inatory attributes (first row of each table): as it could be expected, entirely suppressing
the PD attributes is much more information-damaging than modifying the values of these
attributes in a few records.
After the above general results and comparison between methods, we now present more
specific results on each method for different parameters α and d. Figure 4.2 shows on
the left the degree of information loss (as average of MC and GC) and on the right the
degree of discrimination removal (as average of DDPD and DDPP) of direct discrimination
prevention methods for the German Credit dataset when the value of the discriminatory
threshold α varies from 1.2 to 1.7, d is 0.9, the minimum support is 5% and the minimum
confidence is 10%. The number of direct α-discriminatory rules extracted from the dataset
is 991 for α = 1.2, 415 for α = 1.3, 207 for α = 1.4, 120 for α = 1.5, 63 for α = 1.6 and
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Figure 4.2: Information loss (left) and discrimination removal degree (right) for direct
discrimination prevention methods for α ∈ [1.2, 1.7]. DRP(Method i): Method i for DRP;
RG: Rule Generalization.
30 for α = 1.7, respectively. As shown in Figure 4.2, the degree of discrimination removal
provided by all methods for different values of α is also 100%. However, the degree of
information loss decreases substantially as α increases; the reason is that, as α increases,
the number of α-discriminatory rules to be dealt with decreases. In addition, as shown in
Figure 4.2, the lowest information loss for most values of α is obtained by Method 2 for
DRP.
In addition, to demonstrate the impact of varying d on the utility measures in the
methods using Rule Generalization, Figure 4.3 (left) shows the degree of information loss
and Figure 4.3 (right) shows the degree of discrimination removal for different values of d
(0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95) and α=1.2 for the German Credit dataset. Although the values of
DDPD and DDPP achieved for different values of p remain almost the same, increasing the
value of d leads to an increase of MC and GC because, to cope with the rule generalization
requirements, more data records must be changed.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the utility measures obtained by running Algorithm 5 to
achieve simultaneous direct and indirect discrimination prevention (i.e. Method 2 for DRP+
Method 2 for IRP) on the Adult and German credit datasets, respectively. In Table 4.5
the results are reported for different values of α ∈ [1, 1.5]; in Table 4.6 different values of
α ∈ [1, 1.4] are considered. We selected these α intervals in such a way that, with respect
to the predetermined discriminatory items in this experiment for the Adult dataset (i.e.
DIb={Sex=Female, Age=Young}) and the German Credit dataset (i.e. DIb= {Foreign
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Figure 4.3: Information loss (left) and discrimination removal (right) degree for direct
discrimination prevention methods for d ∈ [0.8, 0.95]. DRP(Methodi): Method i for DRP;
RG: Rule Generalization.
Table 4.5: Adult dataset: Utility measures for minimum support 2% and confidence 10%
for direct and indirect rule protection; columns show the results for different values of α.
Value “n.a.” denotes that the respective measure is not applicable.
α No. of No. of Indirect No. of Direct Discrimination Removal Data Quality
redlining α-Disc. α-Disc. Direct Indirect
rules Rules rules DDPD DDPP IDPD IDPP MC GC
α=1 43 71 804 89.45 100 95.35 100 0 0.03
α=1.1 21 30 280 100 100 100 100 0 0
α=1.2 9 14 140 100 100 100 100 0 0
α=1.3 0 0 67 100 100 n.a. 100 0 0.01
α=1.4 0 0 32 100 100 n.a. 100 0 0
α=1.5 0 0 7 100 100 n.a. 100 0 0
No of Freq. Class. Rules: 5,092 No. of Back. Know. Rules: 2,089
worker=Yes}), both direct α-discriminatory and redlining rules could be extracted. The
reason is that we need to detect some cases with both direct and indirect discrimination to
be able to test our method. Moreover, we restricted the lower bound to limit the number
of direct α-discriminatory and redlining rules. In addition to utility measures, the number
of redlining rules, the number of indirect α-discriminatory rules and the number of direct
α-discriminatory rules are also reported for different values of α.
The values of both direct discrimination removal measures (i.e. DDPD and DDPP)
and indirect discrimination removal measures (i.e. IDPD and IDPP) shown in Tables 4.5
and 4.6 demonstrate that the proposed solution achieves a high degree of both direct and
indirect discrimination prevention for different values of the discriminatory threshold. The
important point is that, by applying the proposed method, we get good results for both
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Table 4.6: German Credit dataset: Utility measures for minimum support 5% and confi-
dence 10% for direct and indirect rule protection; columns show the results for different
values of α. Value “n.a.” denotes that the respective measure is not applicable.
α No. of No. of Indirect No. of Direct Discrimination Removal Data Quality
redlining α-Disc. α-Disc. Direct Indirect
rules Rules rules DDPD DDPP IDPD IDPP MC GC
α=1 37 42 499 99.97 100 100 100 0 2.07
α=1.1 0 0 312 100 100 n.a. 100 0 2.07
α=1.2 0 0 26 100 100 n.a. 100 0 1.01
α=1.3 0 0 14 100 100 n.a. 100 0 1.01
α=1.4 0 0 9 100 100 n.a. 100 0 0.69
No of Freq. Class. Rules: 32,340 No. of Back. Know. Rules: 22,763
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Figure 4.4: Execution times (left) and Information loss degree (right) of Method 1 for DRP
for α ∈ [1.2, 1.7] with and without impact minimization.
direct and indirect discrimination prevention at the same time. In addition, the values of
MC and GC demonstrate that the proposed solution incurs low information loss.
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that we obtained lower information loss in terms of the GC
measure in the Adult dataset than in the German Credit dataset. Another remark on these
tables is that, although no redlining rules are detected in the Adult dataset for α ≥ 1.3 and
in the German Credit dataset for α ≥ 1.1, the IDPP measure is computed and reported
to show that in the cases where only direct discrimination exists, the elimination of direct
discrimination by Algorithm 5 does not have a negative impact on indirect discrimination
(i.e. non-redlining rules do not become redlining rules).
Figure 4.4 illustrates the effect of the impact minimization procedure, described in Sec-
tion 4.7.1, on execution times and information loss of Method 1 for DRP, respectively. As
shown in this figure (right) impact minimization has a noticeable effect on information loss
(decreasing MC and GC). However, as discussed in Section 4.8 and shown in Figure 4.4
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Table 4.7: Adult dataset: number of frequent classification rules and α−discriminatory
rules found during the tests, for minimum confidence 10% and different values of minimum
support (2%, 5% and 10%)
No. of α-disc. rules
α 2% 5% 10%
1.2 274 46 27
No. of Freq. Class. Rules 5,092 1,646 545
Table 4.8: Adult dataset: utility measures for minimum confidence 10%, α=1.2 and d = 0.9;
columns show the results for different values of minimum support (2%, 5% and 10%) and
different methods.
MC GC DDPD DDPP
Methods 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10% 2% 5% 10%
DRP (Method 1) 4.16 2.91 1.61 4.13 3.21 0.39 100 100 100 100 100 100
DRP (Method 2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 100
DRP (Method 1) + RG 4.1 2.67 1.61 4.1 3.26 0.39 100 100 100 100 100 100
DRP (Method 2) + RG 0 0 0 0 0 0 91.58 100 100 100 100 100
(left), impact minimization substantially increases the execution time of the algorithm. For
other methods, the same happens. Figure 4.4 (left) also shows that, by increasing α, the
number of α-discriminatory rules and hence the execution time are decreased. Additional
experiments are presented in the Appendix to show the effect of varying the minimum
support and the minimum confidence on the proposed techniques.
As shown in Table 4.7, different values of the minimum support have an impact on the
number of frequent rules and hence on the number of α-discriminatory rules. As shown in
Table 4.8, by increasing the value of the minimum support the information loss degrees (MC
and GC) achieved by the different techniques decrease. Meanwhile, as shown in Table 4.8,
the discrimination removal degrees (DDPD and DDPP) achieved by the different techniques
remain the same (discrimination removal is maximum) for different values of the minimum
support.
As shown in the left-hand side graph of Figure 4.5, different values of minimum confi-
dence have a non-uniform impact on the information loss degree (average of MC and MC):
sometimes increasing the minimum confidence can decrease the information loss degree and
sometimes it can increase the information loss degree. On the other hand, the right-hand
side graph of Figure 4.5 shows that the average of the discrimination removal degrees DDPD
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Figure 4.5: Adult dataset: Information loss (left) and discrimination removal degree (right)
for discrimination prevention methods for minimum support=2%, α = 1.2, p = 0.9 and
minimum confidence in [10, 90]. DRP(Method i): Method i for DRP; RG: Rule General-
ization.
and DDPP achieved by different techniques remains the same (discrimination removal is
maximum) for different values of the minimum confidence.
4.10 Conclusions
Along with privacy, discrimination is a very important issue when considering the legal and
ethical aspects of data mining. It is more than obvious that most people do not want to
be discriminated because of their gender, religion, nationality, age and so on, especially
when those attributes are used for making decisions about them like giving them a job,
loan, insurance, etc. The perception of discrimination, just like the perception of privacy,
strongly depends on the legal and cultural conventions of a society.
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a new pre-processing discrimination preven-
tion methodology including different data transformation methods that can prevent direct
discrimination, indirect discrimination or both of them at the same time. To attain this
objective, the first step is to measure discrimination and identify categories and groups of
individuals that have been directly and/or indirectly discriminated in the decision-making
processes; the second step is to transform data in the proper way to remove all those
discriminatory biases. Finally, discrimination-free data models can be produced from the
transformed dataset without seriously damaging data quality. The experimental results
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reported demonstrate that the proposed techniques are quite successful in both goals of
removing discrimination and preserving data quality. We show that indirect discrimination
removal can help direct discrimination removal.
Chapter 5
Discrimination- and Privacy-aware
Frequent Pattern Discovery
Although methods independently addressing privacy or discrimination in data mining have
been proposed in the literature, in this thesis we argue that privacy and discrimination risks
should be tackled together, and we present a methodology for doing so while publishing
frequent pattern mining results. We describe a set of pattern sanitization methods, one
for each discrimination measure used in the legal literature, to achieve a fair publishing
of frequent patterns in combination with a privacy transformation based on k-anonymity.
Our proposed pattern sanitization methods yield both privacy- and discrimination-protected
patterns, while introducing reasonable (controlled) pattern distortion. We also explore the
possibility to combine anti-discrimination with differential privacy instead of k-anonymity.
Finally, the effectiveness of our proposals is assessed by extensive experiments.
5.1 Introduction
Up to now, PPDM and DPDM have been studied in isolation. We argue in this thesis
that, in significant data mining processes, privacy and anti-discrimination protection should
be addressed together. Consider the case in which a set of patterns extracted (mined)
from the personal data of a population of individual persons is released for subsequent
use in a decision making process, such as, e.g., granting or denying credit. First, the
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set of patterns may reveal sensitive information about individual persons in the training
population. Second, decision rules based on such patterns may lead to unfair discrimination,
depending on what is represented in the training cases. The following example illustrates
this point.
5.1.1 Motivating Example
Assume a credit institution, e.g., a bank, wants to release among its employees the rules to
grant/deny credit, for the purpose of supporting future decision making. Assume that such
rules have been mined from decision records accumulated during the past year in a certain
city, such as those illustrated in Table 5.1. Consider two options:
• Protection against the privacy threat only. Only rules used in at least k different
credit applications are published, in order to protect applicants’ privacy accord-
ing to k-anonymity. This would allow releasing a rule such that Sex = female →
Credit approved = no if k or more female applicants have been denied credit. Clearly,
using such a rule for credit scoring is discriminatory against women.
• Protection against the discrimination threat only. Discriminatory rules are sanitized,
in order to prevent discrimination against female applicants. However, one could
publish high-support high-confidence rules such as Job = veterinarian, salary > 15000
→ Credit approved = yes and Job = veterinarian→ Credit approved = yes. Assuming
that the first rule holds for 40 people and the second one for 41, their release would
reveal that there is only one veterinarian in the city that has been granted credit even
if s/he makes no more than e15000 a year. This is a potential privacy violation, that
is, a probable disclosure of the applicant’s identity, and therefore of his/her income
level.
This simple example shows that protecting both privacy and non-discrimination is needed
when disclosing a set of patterns. The next question is: why not simply apply known
techniques for PPDM and DPDM one after the other? We show in this chapter that this
straightforward sequential approach does not work in general: we have no guarantee that
applying a DPDM method after a PPDM one preserves the desired privacy guarantee,
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Table 5.1: A data table of personal decision records
Sex Job Credit history Salary Credit approved
Male Writer No-taken ... e Yes
Female Lawyer Paid-duly ... e No
Male Veterinary Paid-delay ...e Yes
... ... ... ... ...
because the DPDM sanitization of a set of patterns may destroy the effect of the earlier
PPDM sanitization (and the other way round). We therefore need a combined, holistic
method capable of addressing the two goals together, so that we can safely publish the
patterns resulting from a data mining process over a dataset of personal information, while
keeping the distortion of the extracted patterns as low as possible. A truly trustworthy
technology for knowledge discovery should face both privacy and discrimination threats as
two sides of the same coin. This line of reasoning also permeates the comprehensive reform
of the data protection law proposed in 2012 by the European Commission, currently under
approval by the European Parliament, which introduces measures based on profiling and
discrimination within a broader concept of privacy and personal data1.
5.1.2 Contributions
The contributions of this chapter, towards the above stated aim, are summarized as follows.
First, we define a natural scenario of pattern mining from personal data records contain-
ing sensitive attributes, potentially discriminatory attributes and decision attributes, and
characterize the problem statement of publishing a collection of patterns which is at the
same time both privacy-protected and discrimination-free. Second, we propose new pat-
tern sanitization methods for discrimination prevention when publishing frequent patterns.
Moreover, we take into consideration the so-called genuine occupational requirement, i.e.,
the fact that some apparent discriminatory rule may be actually explained by other admis-
sible factors that are not specified explicitly in the rule. We propose an algorithm to make
the frequent pattern protected against unexplainable discrimination only. Third, we pro-
pose the notion of α-protective k-anonymous (i.e., discrimination- and privacy-protected)
1http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm
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patterns to thwart both privacy and discrimination threats in a collection of published fre-
quent patterns. Fourth, we present a combined pattern sanitization algorithm to obtain an
α-protective k-anonymous version of the original pattern sets. In addition, we show how
simultaneous anti-discrimination and privacy can be achieved in frequent pattern discovery
while satisfying differential privacy, as an alternative. Fifth, we theoretically and empiri-
cally show that the proposed algorithm is effective at protecting against both privacy and
discrimination threats while introducing reasonable (controlled) pattern distortion.
5.2 Privacy-aware Frequent Pattern Discovery
In this section, we first describe the notion of k-anonymous frequent patterns and then we
present a method to obtain a k-anonymous version of an original pattern set.
5.2.1 Anonymous Frequent Pattern Set
Given a support threshold σ, an itemsetX is called σ-frequent in a databaseD if suppD(X) ≥
σ. A σ-frequent itemset is also called σ-frequent pattern. The collection of all σ-frequent
patterns in D is denoted by F(D, σ). The frequent pattern mining problem is formulated
as follows: given a database D and a support threshold σ, find all σ-frequent patterns, i.e.
the collection F(D, σ). Several algorithms have been proposed for finding F(D, σ). In this
chapter we use the Apriori algorithm [2], which is a very common choice.
In [5], the notion of k-anonymous patterns is defined as follows: a collection of patterns
is k-anonymous if each pattern p in it is k-anonymous (i.e. supp(p) = 0 or supp(p) ≥ k) as
well as any further pattern whose support can be inferred from the collection. The authors
introduce a possible attack that exploits non k-anonymous patterns whose support can be
inferred from the collection. Then they propose a framework for sanitizing patterns and
block this kind of attacks.
Example 1. Consider again the motivating example and take k = 8. The two patterns
p1:{Job=veterinarian, Credit approved=yes} and p2: {Job=veterinarian, Salary > 15000,
Credit approved=yes} are 8-anonymous because supp(p2) = 40 > 8 and supp(p1) = 41 > 8.
However, an attacker can exploit a non-8-anonymous pattern {Job = veterinarian, ¬ (Salary
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> 15000), Credit approved=yes}, whose support he infers from supp(p1) − supp(p2) =
41− 40 = 1. 
In order to check whether a collection of patterns is k-anonymous, in [5] the inference
channel concept is introduced. Informally, an inference channel is any collection of patterns
(with their respective supports) from which it is possible to infer non-k-anonymous patterns.
Definition 15. Given a database D and two patterns I and J , with I = {i1, . . . , im} and
J = I ∪ {a1, . . . , an}, the set CJI ={〈X, suppD(X)〉|I ⊆ X ⊆ J} constitutes an inference
channel for the non k-anonymous pattern p = I ∪ {¬a1, . . . ,¬an} if 0 < suppD(CJI ) < k
where
suppD(CJI ) =
∑
I⊆X⊆J
(−1)|X\I|suppD(X). (5.1)
See [5] for details. An example of inference channel is given by any pattern such as
p : {b} which has a superset ps : {b, d, e} such that 0 < Cpsp < k. In this case the
pair 〈p, supp(p)〉, 〈ps, supp(ps)〉 constitutes an inference channel for the non-k-anonymous
pattern {a,¬b,¬c}, whose support is given by supp(b)−supp(b, d)−supp(b, e)+supp(b, d, e).
Then, we can formally define the collection of k-anonymous pattern set as follows.
Definition 16 (k-Anonymous pattern set). Given a collection of frequent patterns F(D, σ)
and an anonymity threshold k, F(D, σ) is k-anonymous if (1) @p ∈ F(D, σ) s.t. 0 <
supp(p) < k, and (2) @p1 and p2 ∈ F(D, σ) s.t. 0 < suppD(Cp2p1 ) < k, where p1 ⊂ p2.
5.2.2 Achieving an Anonymous Frequent Pattern Set
To generate a k-anonymous version of F(D, σ), Atzori et al. [5] proposed to first detect
inference channels violating k-anonymity in F(D, σ) (Definition 15) and then block them
in a second step. The pattern sanitization method blocks an inference channel CJI due to a
pair of patterns I = {i1, . . . , im} and J = {i1, . . . , im, a1, . . . , an} in F(D, σ) by increasing
the support of I by k to achieve supp(CIJ) ≥ k. In addition, to avoid contradictions among
the released patterns, the support of all subsets of I is also increased by k.
Example 2. Let us resume Example 1 and take k = 8. An inference channel due to
patterns p1 and p2 can be blocked by increasing the support of pattern p1:{Job=veterinarian,
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Credit approved=yes} and all its subsets by 8. In this way, the non-8-anonymous pattern
{Job=veterinarian, ¬(Salary > 15000), Credit approved=yes} is 8-anonymous. 
The privacy pattern sanitization method can avoid generating new inference channels as
a result of its transformation. In this way, we can obtain a k-anonymous version of F(D, σ).
5.3 Discrimination-aware Frequent Pattern Discovery
In this section, we first describe the notion of discrimination protected and unexplainable
discrimination protected frequent patterns. Then, we present our proposed methods and
algorithms to obtain these pattern sets, respectively.
5.3.1 Discrimination Protected Frequent Pattern Set
Starting from the definition of PD and PND classification rule in Section 2.2.2, we define
when a frequent pattern is PD.
Definition 17. Given protected groups DIb, a frequent pattern p ∈ F(D, σ) is said to be a
PD if: (1) p contains a class item C denying some benefit, i.e., C ⊂ p, and (2) ∃p′ ⊂ p s.t.
p′ ⊆ DIb.
In other words, a frequent pattern p : {A,B,C} is a PD pattern if a PD classification rule
A,B → C can be derived from it. As an example, pattern {Sex=female, Job=veterinarian,
Credit approved=no} is a PD pattern, where DIb :{Sex=female}.
Example 3. Let f = slift, α = 1.25 and DIb :{Sex=female}. Assume that, in the data
set of Table 5.1, the total number of veterinarian women applicants and the number of
veterinarian women applicants who are denied credit are 34 and 20, respectively, and the
total number of veterinarian men applicants and the number of veterinarian men applicants
who are denied credit are 47 and 19, respectively. The PD classification rule r :Sex=female,
Job=veterinarian → Credit approved=no extracted from Table 5.1 is 1.25-discriminatory,
because slift(r) = 20/3419/47 = 1.45. 
Based on Definitions 17 and 11, we introduce the notions of α-protective and α-discriminatory
patterns.
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Definition 18. Let f be one of the measures in Fig. 2.1. Given protected groups DIb and
α ∈ R a fixed threshold, a PD pattern p : {A,B,C}, where C denies some benefit and
A ⊆ DIb, is α-protective w.r.t. f if the classification rule r : A,B → C is α-protective.
Otherwise, p is α-discriminatory.
Example 4. Continuing Example 3, a PD pattern p :{Sex = female, Job = veterinarian,
Credit approved = no} extracted from Table 5.1, is 1.25-discriminatory because rule r is
1.25-discriminatory, where r is Sex = female, Job = veterinarian→ Credit approved = no.

Based on Definition 18, we introduce the notion of discrimination protected pattern set.
Definition 19 (α-protective pattern set). Given a collection of frequent patterns F(D, σ),
discrimination measure f , a discrimination threshold α, and protected groups DIb, F(D, σ)
is α-protective w.r.t. DIb and f if @p ∈ F(D, σ) s.t. p is an α-discriminatory pattern.
5.3.2 Unexplainable Discrimination Protected Frequent Pattern Set
Another legal concept we take into account in this chapter is the genuine occupational
requirement. This requirement refers to discrimination that may be partly explained by
attributes not in DIb ([97]), e.g., denying credit to women may be explainable by the fact
that most of them have low salary or delay in returning previous credits. Whether low
salary or delay in returning previous credits is an acceptable (legitimate) argument to deny
credit is for lawyers (law) to be determined. We define them as legally-grounded groups,
denoted by DIe. In our context, DIe is a PND itemset which is legally admissible in a
discrimination litigation, e.g., {Credit history=paid-delay}. Given DIe and DIb, discrim-
ination against protected groups is explained if there is a high correlation between DIb
and DIe and also between DIe and class item C. As an example, discrimination against
women in a given context is explainable by their delay in paying previous credits, first,
if the majority of women in the given context have delay in paying previous credits and,
second, if the delay in paying previous credit gives some objective information about the
credit rejection. To determine which α-discriminatory patters are explainable and which
ones are not we use the notion of d-instance (see Definition 14). For high values of d (i.e. 1
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or near 1) Condition 1 of Definition 14 shows high correlation between the class item (i.e.
credit denial) and the legally-grounded group (i.e. delay in paying previous credits) and
Condition 2 of Definition 14 shows high correlation between the legally-grounded group (i.e.
delay in paying previous credits) and the protected group (i.e. women) in a given context.
Example 5. Continuing Examples 3 and 4, let DIe : { Credit history = paid-delay} and
d = 0.9. Assume that in the dataset of Table 5.1, the total number of veterinarian ap-
plicants who are delayed in paying previous credits and the total number of veterinarian
applicants who are delayed in paying previous credits and are denied credit are 64 and 52,
respectively, and the total number of women applicants who are veterinarian and are delayed
in paying previous credits is 31. A PD classification rule r′ :Sex=female, Job=veterinarian
→ Credit approved=no extracted from Table 5.1 is 0.9-instance of a PND classification
rule r :Credit history=paid-delay, Job=veterinarian → Credit approved=no because (1)
52
64 ≥ 0.9 · 2034 and (2) 3134 ≥ 0.9. Thus, both conditions of Definition 14 are satisfied. 
Based on Definitions 14 and 17, we introduce the notions of d-explainable and d-
unexplainable frequent patterns.
Definition 20 (d-(un)explainable pattern). Let d ∈ [0, 1]. An α-discriminatory pattern
p′ : {A,B,C}, where C denies some benefit and A ⊆ DIb, is a d-explainable pattern if a PD
classification rule r′ : A,B → C is a d-instance of a PND classification rule r : D,B → C,
where D ⊆ DIe. Otherwise p′ is a d-unexplainable pattern.
Example 6. Continuing Examples 3-5, the 1.25-discriminatory pattern p : {Sex = female,
Job = veterinarian, Credit approved = no} extracted from Table 5.1 is a 0.9-explainable
pattern because rule r′ is 0.9-instance of rule r where r is Credit history = paid-delay, Job
= veterinarian → Credit approved = no and r′ is Sex = female, Job = veterinarian →
Credit approved = no. 
From Definition 20, we introduce the notion of unexplainable discrimination protected
pattern set.
Definition 21 (d-explainable α-protective pattern set). Given a collection of frequent pat-
terns F(D, σ), a discrimination measure f , a discrimination threshold α, an explainable
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discrimination threshold d, protected groups DIb and legally-grounded groups DIe, F(D, σ)
is d-explainable α-protective w.r.t. DIb, DIe and f if there is no α-discriminatory pattern
p ∈ F(D, σ) s.t. p is a d-unexplainable pattern.
5.3.3 Achieving a Discrimination Protected Frequent Pattern Set
In order to generate a discrimination protected (i.e. an α-protective) version of F(D, σ),
we propose an approach including two steps. First, detecting α-discriminatory patterns
in F(D, σ) w.r.t. discriminatory measure f , DIb and α as discussed in Section 5.3.1. We
propose Algorithm 6 for detecting α-discriminatory patterns in F(D, σ). The algorithm
starts by obtaining the subset DPD which contains the PD patterns in F(D, σ) found
according to C andDIb (Line 4). For each pattern p : {A,B,C} inDPD, where A ⊆ DIb, the
value of f (one of the measures in Definitions 3-5) regarding its PD rule r : X → C, where
X = A,B, is computed to determine the subset DD which contains the α-discriminatory
patterns in F(D, σ) (Lines 5-13). After obtaining DD, the second step of our approach is
sanitization for each pattern in DD, in order to make it α-protective. In the sequel, we study
Algorithm 6 Detecting α-discriminatory patterns
1: Inputs: Database D, FP := F(D,σ), DIb, discrimination measure f , α, C =class item with a
negative decision value
2: Output: DD: α-discriminatory patterns in FP
3: Function DetDiscPatt(FP, D, DIb, f , α, C)
4: DPD ← All patterns 〈p : A,B,C, supp(p)〉 ∈ FP with p ∩ C 6= ∅ and p ∩DIb 6= ∅
5: for all p ∈ DPD do
6: X = p\C
7: r = X → C
8: Compute f(r) using FP and D where f is one of the measures from Fig. 2.1
9: if f(r) ≥ α then
10: Add p in DD
11: end if
12: end for
13: return DD
14: End Function
and propose a pattern sanitization solution for each possible measure of discrimination f .
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5.3.3.1 Anti-discrimination Pattern Sanitization for slift and its Variants
According to Definition 18, to make an α-discriminatory pattern p : {A,B,C} α-protective
where f = slift, we should enforce the following inequality
slift(A,B → C) < α (5.2)
where A ⊆ DIb and C denies some benefit. By using the definitions of confidence and slift
(Expressions (2.1) and (2.2), resp.), Inequality (5.2) can be rewritten as
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(¬A,B,C)
supp(¬A,B)
< α. (5.3)
Then, it is clear that Inequality (5.2) can be satisfied by decreasing the left-hand side of
Inequality (5.3) to a value less than the discriminatory threshold α, which can be done in
the following way:
• Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization where f = slift. Increase the support of the
pattern {A,B} and all its subsets by a specific value ∆slift to satisfy Inequality (5.3).
This increment decreases the numerator of equation
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(¬A,B,C)
supp(¬A,B)
while keeping the
denominator unaltered.
Modifying the support of the subsets of respective patterns accordingly is needed to avoid
contradictions (maintain compatibility) among the released patterns. In fact, anti-discrimination
pattern sanitization makes pattern p α-protective by decreasing the proportion of people in
the protected group and given context who were not granted the benefit (e.g. decreasing
the proportion of veterinarian women applicants who were denied credit). Let us compute
the value ∆slift to be used in anti-discrimination pattern sanitization where f = slift. The
support of the pattern {A,B} should be increased to satisfy Inequality (5.3):
slift(A,B → C) =
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)+∆slift
supp(¬A,B,C)
supp(¬A,B)
< α.
CHAPTER 5. DISCRIMINATION- AND PRIVACY-AWARE FP DISCOVERY 78
The above equality can be rewritten as
∆slift >
supp(A,B,C)× supp(¬A,B)
supp(¬A,B,C)× α − supp(A,B). (5.4)
Hence, taking ∆slift equal to the ceiling of the right-hand side of Equation (5.4) suffices to
make p : {A,B,C} α-protective w.r.t. f = slift. Considering the definitions of sliftd and
sliftc (Expressions (2.7) and (2.9), resp.), a similar method can make pattern p α-protective
w.r.t. f = sliftd and f = sliftc. The value of ∆sliftd and ∆sliftc can be computed in the
same way as we compute ∆slift.
Example 7. Continuing Examples 3 and 4, pattern p : {Sex = female, Job = veterinarian,
Credit approved = no} can be made 1.25-protective by increasing the support of pattern
{Sex=female, Job=veterinarian} and all its subsets by ∆slift = 6, which is the value result-
ing from Inequality (5.4). 
As we define in Section 5.3.1, clift is a special case of slift and it has the same formula
(see Definitions 1 and 2). Then, a similar anti-discrimination pattern sanitization can make
an α-discriminatory p : {a = v1, B,C} α-protective where f = clift. The value of ∆clift is
computed in the following way
∆clift = dsupp(a = v1, B, C)× supp(a = v2, B)
supp(a = v2, B, C)× α − supp(a = v1, B)e. (5.5)
5.3.3.2 Anti-discrimination Pattern Sanitization for elift and its Variants
According to Definition 18, to make an α-discriminatory pattern p : {A,B,C} α-protective
where f = elift, we should enforce the following inequality
elift(A,B → C) < α (5.6)
where A ⊆ DIb and C denies some benefit. By using the definitions of confidence and elift
(Expressions (2.1) and (2.4), resp.), Inequality (5.6) can be rewritten as
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(B,C)
supp(B)
< α. (5.7)
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Then, it is clear that Inequality (5.6) can be satisfied by decreasing the left-hand side
of Inequality (5.7) to a value less than the discriminatory threshold α. A similar anti-
discrimination pattern sanitization proposed for f = slift cannot make pattern p α-
protective w.r.t. f = elift because increasing the support of pattern {A,B} and all its
subsets by a specific value can decrease the numerator of equation
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(B,C)
supp(B)
and decrease
the denominator of it as well. Then, making pattern p : {A,B,C} α-protective w.r.t.
f = elift is possible using an alternative pattern sanitization method:
• Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization where f = elift. Increase the support of the
pattern {B,C} and all its subsets by a specific value ∆elift to satisfy Inequality (5.7).
This increment increases the denominator of equation
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(B,C)
supp(B)
while keeping the
numerator unaltered.
In fact, the above method makes pattern p α-protective w.r.t. elift by increasing the
proportion of people in the given context who were not granted the benefit (e.g. increasing
the proportion of veterinarian applicants who were denied credit while the proportion of
veterinarian women applicants who were denied credit is unaltered). Let us compute the
value ∆elift to be used in anti-discrimination pattern sanitization where f = elift. The
support of the pattern {B,C} should be increased to satisfy Inequality (5.7):
elift(A,B → C) =
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(B,C)+∆elift
supp(B)+∆elift
< α.
Since the value of α is higher than 1 and supp(A,B,C)supp(A,B) ≤ α, from the above equality we obtain
∆elift >
α× supp(A,B)× supp(B,C)− supp(A,B,C)× supp(B)
supp(A,B,C)− α× supp(A,B) . (5.8)
Hence, taking ∆elift equal to the ceiling of the right-hand side of Equation (5.8) suffices to
make p : {A,B,C} α-protective w.r.t. f = elift. Considering the definitions of eliftd and
eliftc (Expressions (2.7) and (2.9), resp.), a similar method can make pattern p α-protective
w.r.t. f = eliftd and f = eliftc. The values of ∆eliftd and ∆eliftc can be computed in the
same way as ∆elift.
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5.3.3.3 Discrimination Analysis
An essential property of a valid anti-discrimination pattern sanitization method is not to
produce new discrimination as a result of the transformations it performs. The following
theorem shows that all the methods described above satisfy this property.
Theorem 2. Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods for making F(D, σ) α-protective
w.r.t. f do not generate new discrimination as a result of their transformations, where f
is one of the measures from Fig. 2.1.
Proof. It is enough to show that anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods to make
each α-discriminatory pattern in F(D, σ) α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make α-protective
patterns in F(D, σ) α-discriminatory. Consider two PD patterns p1 : {A,B,C} and p2 :
{A′, B′, C}, where A,A′ ⊆ DIb and p1 6= p2. The following possible relations between p1
and p2 are conceivable:
• A = A′ and B 6= B′, special case: B′ ⊂ B
• A 6= A′ and B = B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A
• A 6= A′ and B 6= B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A and B′ ⊂ B
In all the above special cases (i.e. p2 ⊂ p1), making p1 α-protective w.r.t. f involves
increasing supp(A′, B′) by ∆slift, ∆clift or ∆sliftd where f = slift, f = clift or f = sliftd,
resp., and involves increasing supp(B′, C) and supp(B′) by ∆elift, ∆eliftd where f = elift or
f = eliftd, respectively. This cannot make p2 less α-protective w.r.t. f ; actually, it can even
make p2 more protective because increasing supp(A
′, B′) can decrease slift(A′, B′ → C) and
sliftd(A
′, B′ → C) and increasing supp(B′, C) and supp(B′) can decrease elift(A′, B′ → C)
and eliftd(A
′, B′ → C). On the other hand, making p2 α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make
p1 less or more protective since there is no overlap between the modified patterns to make p2
α-protective and the patterns whose changing support can change f(A,B → C). Otherwise
(no special cases), making p1 (resp. p2) α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make p2 (resp. p1)
less or more protective since there is no overlap between the modified patterns to make
p1 (resp. p2) α-protective w.r.t. f and the patterns whose changing support can change
f(A′, B′ → C) (resp. f(A,B → C)). Hence, the theorem holds.
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Therefore, using the proposed anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods, we can
obtain an α-protecti ve version of F(D, σ) w.r.t. f . We propose Algorithm 7 for do-
ing so. The algorithm performs anti-discrimination pattern sanitization to make each α-
discriminatory pattern p in F(D,σ) α-protective w.r.t. f . The value of ∆f is computed for
each α-discriminatory pattern w.r.t. the value of f .
Algorithm 7 Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization
1: Inputs: Database D, FP := F(D,σ), DD, DIb, discrimination measure f , α, C = class item
with negative decision value
2: Output: FP∗: α-protective version of FP
3: Function AntiDiscPattSanit(FP, D, DD, DIb, f , α, C)
4: for all p : {A,B,C} ∈ DD do
5: X = p\C
6: Compute ∆f for pattern p w.r.t. the value of f using D, FP and α
7: if ∆f ≥ 1 then
8: if f = slift or f = clift or f = sliftd then
9: pt = X
10: else if f = elift or eliftd then
11: Y = p ∩DIb
12: pt = p\Y
13: end if
14: end if
15: Ds = {ps ∈ FP|ps ⊆ pt}
16: for all 〈ps, supp(ps)〉 ∈ Ds do
17: supp(ps) = supp(ps) + ∆f
18: end for
19: end for
20: return FP∗ = FP
21: End Function
5.3.4 Achieving an Unexplainable Discrimination Protected Pattern Set
In order to make F(D,σ) protected against only unexplainable discrimination (i.e. generat-
ing a d-explainable α-protective version of F(D, σ)), we propose an approach including three
steps. First, detecting α-discriminatory patterns in F(D, σ) w.r.t. discriminatory measure
f , DIb and α. Second, detecting d-unexplainable patterns among α-discriminatory pat-
terns obtained in the first step. Third, sanitizing each d-unexplainable pattern to make it
α-protective. We propose Algorithm 8 for detecting d-unexplainable patterns in F(D, σ).
The algorithm starts by obtaining the subset DPND containing the PND patterns in F(D, σ)
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found according to C and DIb (Line 4). Then, the algorithm computes the subset Dinstance
containing the PND patterns which are legally-grounded according to DIe (Line 5). Then,
the algorithm uses the DetDiscPatt function in Algorithm 6 to determine the subset
DD which contains α-discriminatory patterns in F(D, σ) (Line 6). Finally, the algorithm
computes the subset Dbad containing patterns in DD which are d-unexplainable according
to Dinstance and d (Lines 7-19). After obtaining Dbad, the third step is sanitizing each d-
Algorithm 8 Detecting d-unexplainable patterns
1: Inputs: Database D,FP := F(D,σ), DIb, DIe, explainable discrimination threshold d, discrim-
ination measure f , α, C =class item with negative decision value
2: Output: Dbad: d-unexplainable patterns in FP
3: Function DetUnExplainPatt(FP, D, DIe, DIb, f , α, d, C)
4: DPND ← All patterns 〈p : A,B,C, supp(p)〉 ∈ FP with p ∩ C 6= ∅ and p ∩DIb = ∅
5: Dinstance ← All patterns 〈p : D,B,C, supp(p)〉 ∈ DPND with p ∩DIe 6= ∅
6: DD ← Function DetDiscPatt(FP, D, DIb, f , α, C)
7: for all p : {A,B,C} ∈ DD do
8: X = p\C
9: r = X → C
10: for each pd ∈ Dinstance do
11: Xd = pd\C
12: rd = Xd → C
13: if r is a d-instance of rd then
14: Add p in Dlegal
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: Dbad = DD\Dlegal
19: return Dbad
20: End Function
unexplainable pattern to make it α-protective. In order to do this, we need to examine the
impact of this transformation on d-explainable patterns in F(D, σ).
Theorem 3. Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods for making F(D, σ) d-explainable
α-protective w.r.t. f do not generate any new d-unexplainable pattern as a result of their
transformations, where f = elift, f = eliftd, and f = eliftc.
Proof. It is enough to show that anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods to make
each d-unexplainable pattern in F(D, σ) α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make d-explainable
patterns in F(D, σ) d-unexplainable , where f = elift, f = eliftd and f = eliftc. Consider
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two PD patterns p1 : {A,B,C} and p2 : {A′, B′, C}, where A,A′ ⊆ DIb and p1 6= p2. The
following possible relations between p1 and p2 are conceivable:
• A = A′ and B 6= B′, special case: B′ ⊂ B
• A 6= A′ and B = B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A
• A 6= A′ and B 6= B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A and B′ ⊂ B
In all the above cases (i.e. special and non-special cases), making d-unexplainable pattern
p1 α-protective w.r.t. f involves increasing supp(B
′, C) and supp(B′) by ∆elift, ∆eliftd ,
or ∆eliftc where f = elift, f = eliftd or f = eliftc, respectively. This cannot make
d-explainable pattern p2 d-unexplainable w.r.t. f because there is no overlap between
the modified patterns to make p1 α-protective and the patterns whose changing support
can make p2 d-unexplainable. On the other hand, making d-unexplainable pattern p2 α-
protective cannot make d-explainable pattern p1 d-unexplainable for the same reason above.
Hence, the theorem holds.
Theorem 4. Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods for making F(D, σ) d-explainable
α-protective w.r.t. f might generate new d-unexplainable patterns as a result of their trans-
formations, where f = slift, f = sliftd, f = clift and f = sliftc.
Proof. It is enough to show that anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods to make
each d-unexplainable pattern in F(D, σ) α-protective w.r.t. f can make a d-explainable in
F(D, σ) d-unexplainable, where f = slift, f = sliftd, f = sliftc and f = elift. Consider
two PD patterns p1 : {A,B,C} and p2 : {A′, B′, C}, where A,A′ ⊆ DIb and p1 6= p2. The
following possible relations between p1 and p2 are conceivable:
• A = A′ and B 6= B′, special case: B′ ⊂ B
• A 6= A′ and B = B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A
• A 6= A′ and B 6= B′, special case: A′ ⊂ A and B′ ⊂ B
In all the above special cases (i.e. p2 ⊂ p1), making d-unexplainable pattern p1 α-protective
w.r.t. f involves increasing the support of pattern {A′, B′} and all its subsets by ∆slift,
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∆clift, ∆sliftd , or ∆sliftc where f = slift, f = clift f = sliftd or f = cliftc, respectively.
This can make d-explainable pattern p2 d-unexplainable because this transformation can
cause Condition 2 of Definition 14 to be non-satisfied. This is because there is overlap
between the modified patterns to make p1 α-protective and the patterns whose changing
support can change the satisfaction of Condition 2 of Definition 14 w.r.t. pattern p2. On
the other hand, making d-unexplainable pattern p2 α-protective cannot make d-explainable
pattern p1 d-unexplainable since there is no overlap between the modified patterns to make
p2 α-protective and the patterns whose changing support can change the satisfaction of
Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 14 w.r.t. pattern p1. Otherwise (no special cases), making
p1 (resp. p2) α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make p2 (resp. p1) d-unexplainable since there is
no overlap between the modified patterns to make p1 (resp. p2) α-protective w.r.t. f and
the patterns whose changing support can make p2 (resp. p1) d-unexplainable by changing
the satisfaction of Conditions (1) and (2) in Definition 14. Hence, the theorem holds.
Thus, according to the above theorems, Algorithm 7 cannot make F(D, σ) d-explainable
α-protective w.r.t all possible values of f . To attain this desirable goal, we propose Al-
gorithm 9. Algorithm 9 performs anti-discrimination pattern sanitization to make each
d-unexplainable pattern p in Dbad α-protective by calling function AntiDiscPattSanit in
Algorithm 7, where f = elift, f = eliftd or f = eliftc (Line 6). As shown in Theorem
4, given d-unexplainable pattern p : {A,B,C} and d-explainable pattern px : {A′, B′, C},
where px ⊂ p, making p α-protective w.r.t. f might make px d-unexplainable, where f
is slift, sliftd, f = clift or f = sliftc. For this reason and because pattern p becomes
α-protective first (see Algorithm 10 in Section 5.4.1), the algorithm checks whether making
pattern p α-protective makes px d-unexplainable. If yes, algorithm adds px to Dbad (Lines
7-14).
5.4 Simultaneous Discrimination-Privacy Awareness in Fre-
quent Pattern Discovery
In this section, we present how simultaneous anti-discrimination and privacy can be achieved
in frequent pattern discovery while satisfying k-anonymity and α-protection. We first
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Algorithm 9 Unexplainable anti-discrimination pattern sanitization
1: Inputs: Database D, FP := F(D,σ), Dbad, DIb, d, α, discrimination measure f , C =class item
with negative decision value
2: Output: FP∗: d-explainable α-protective version of FP
3: Function UnExplainAntiDiscPattSanit(FP, D, Dbad, DIb, f , α, C)
4: if Dbad 6= ∅ then
5: if f = elift or f = eliftd or f = eliftc then
6: FP∗ ← Function AntiDiscPattSanit(FP, D, Dbad, DIb, f , α, C)
7: else if f = slift or f = sliftd or f = clift or f = sliftc then
8: for all p : {A,B,C} ∈ Dbad do
9: Lines 5-18 of Algorithm 7
10: if ∃px ⊂ p in FP s.t. px /∈ Dbad and px is d-unexplainable then
11: Add px in Dbad
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end if
16: return FP∗ = FP
17: End Function
present our approach to obtain a discrimination-privacy protected version of an original
pattern set. Then, we present our approach to obtain an unexplainable discrimination and
privacy protected version of an original pattern set.
5.4.1 Achieving a Discrimination and Privacy Protected Frequent Pat-
tern Set
In order to simultaneously achieve anti-discrimination and privacy in F(D, σ), we need to
generate discrimination and privacy protected version of F(D, σ):
Definition 22 (α-protective k-anonymous pattern set). Given a collection of frequent pat-
terns F(D, σ), anonymity threshold k, discrimination threshold α, protected groups DIb, and
discrimination measure f , F(D, σ) is α-protective k-anonymous if it is both k-anonymous
and α-protective w.r.t. DIb and f .
We focus on the problem of producing a version of F(D, σ) that is α-protective k-
anonymous w.r.t. DIb and f . Like most works in k-anonymity [28], we consider a single
QI containing all attributes that can be potentially used in the quasi-identifier. The more
attributes included in QI, the more protection k-anonymity provides (and usually the more
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information loss). Moreover, each QI attribute (unless it is the class/decision attribute) can
be a PD attribute or not depend on DIb. To obtain α-protective k-anonymous version of
F(D, σ), we should first examine the following issues: (1) how making F(D, σ) k-anonymous
impacts the α-protectiveness of F(D, σ) w.r.t. f ; (2) how making F(D, σ) α-protective w.r.t
f impacts the k-anonymity of F(D, σ). Regarding the first issue, by presenting two scenarios
we will show that privacy pattern sanitization to achieve k-anonymity in F(D, σ) can lead
to different situations regarding the α-protectiveness of F(D, σ).
Table 5.2: Scenario 1: Examples of frequent patterns extracted from Table 5.1
Patterns Support
ps:{female, veterinarian} 45
p2 :{female, veterinarian, salary > 15000} 42
p1 :{female, veterinarian, No} 32
pn :{male, veterinarian, No} 16
pns :{male, veterinarian} 58
Scenario 1. Table 5.2 illustrates an example of frequent patterns that come from the data
set in Table 5.1 with σ = 15. Let DIb :{Sex=female}, α = 1.25, k = 8 and f = slift. The
PD pattern p1 in Table 5.2 is 1.25-discriminatory since the value of slift w.r.t. its PD rule
is 32/4516/58 = 2.58 (i.e. this is inferred discrimination against veterinarian women applicants).
On the other hand, although the support of each pattern in the collection is higher than k,
there is an inference channel between patterns ps and p2; note that supp(ps)−supp(p2) = 3
is smaller than 8 (i.e. one can infer the existence of only three veterinarian women in the
city with salary no more than 15000 e). To block the inference channel between ps and p2,
the following privacy pattern sanitization is performed:
supp(ps) + k, ∀p ⊆ ps (5.9)
After this transformation, the new support of pattern ps is 53. However, the supports
of pns and pn remain unaltered since there is no inference channels between pns and pn
(supp(pns) − supp(pn) = 42). Hence, the new value of slift for the PD rule of pattern
p1 is
supp(p1)
supp(ps)+k
supp(pn)
supp(pns)
which in this example is 32/(45+8)16/58 = 2.19. That is, the overall value of
slift is decreased. Thus, in this scenario, making the collection of patterns in Table 5.2
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k-anonymous can decrease discrimination; if the value of slift became less than α, pattern
p1 would even become α-protective. 
Table 5.3: Scenario 2: Examples of frequent patterns extracted from Table 5.1
Patterns Support
ps :{male, veterinarian} 58
p2 :{male, veterinarian, salary > 15000} 56
p1 :{female, veterinarian, No} 23
pn :{male, veterinarian, No} 26
pns :{female, veterinarian} 45
Scenario 2. Table 5.3 illustrates an example of frequent patterns that could come from
the data set in Table 5.1 with σ = 20. Let DIs:{Sex=female}, α = 1.25, k = 8, f =
slift. A PD pattern p1 in Table 5.3 is not 1.25-discriminatory since the value of slift
w.r.t. its PD rule is 23/4526/58 = 1.14. On the other hand, although the support of each
pattern in the collection is higher than k, there is an inference channel between ps and
p2; note that supp(ps) − supp(p2) = 2 is less than 8 (i.e. one can infer the existence
of only two veterinarian men in the city with salary no more than 15000 e). To block
the inference channel between ps and p2, pattern sanitization is performed according to
Expression (5.9). After this transformation, the new support of pattern ps is 66 and the
supports of p1 and pns stay unaltered since there is no inference channel between p1 and
pns (supp(pns)− supp(p1) = 22). Hence, the new value of slift for the PD rule of pattern
p1 is
supp(p1)
supp(pns)
supp(pn)
supp(ps)+k
which is in this example 23/4526/(58+8) = 1.3. That is, the overall value of
slift is increased. Thus, in this scenario, making the collection of patterns in Table 5.3
k-anonymous can increase discrimination; in fact, with the numerical values we have used,
p1 stops being 1.25-protective and becomes 1.25-discriminatory. 
To summarize, using privacy pattern sanitization for making F(D, σ) k-anonymous can
make F(D, σ) more or less α-protective w.r.t. slift. We also observe a similar behavior for
alternative discrimination measures. Then, achieving k-anonymity in frequent pattern dis-
covery can achieve anti-discrimination or work against anti-discrimination. Hence, detecting
α-discriminatory patterns in a k-anonymous version of F(D, σ) makes sense. Regarding the
second issue mentioned at the beginning of this section, we will prove that if F(D, σ) is
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k-anonymous, anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods proposed in Section 5.3.3
to make it α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make F(D, σ) non-k-anonymous, i.e. they cannot
violate k-anonymity. Since the proposed anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods
are based on adding support, they cannot make a k-anonymous pattern non-k-anonymous;
hence, we only need to prove that they cannot generate new inference channels.
Theorem 5. Anti-discrimination pattern sanitization for making F(D, σ) α-protective w.r.t.
f does not generate inference channels, where f is one of the measures from Fig. 2.1.
Proof. For any α-discriminatory pattern pa : {A,B,C}, where A ⊆ DIb and C denies some
benefit, anti-discrimination pattern sanitization is performed in one of the following ways
w.r.t. the value of f :
supp(ps : {A,B}) + ∆f , ∀p ⊂ ps (5.10)
where f = slift, f = clift, f = sliftd or f = sliftc.
supp(ps : {B,C}) + ∆f , ∀p ⊂ ps (5.11)
where f = elift, f = eliftd or f = eliftc. Inference channels could appear in two different
cases: (a) between the pattern ps or one of its supersets (px s.t. ps ⊂ px), and (b) between
the pattern ps and one of its subsets (px s.t. px ⊂ ps). Case (a). Since F(D, σ) is k-
anonymous, we have supp(Cpxps ) ≥ k. Increasing the support of ps and its subsets by ∆f as
in Expressions (5.10-5.11) causes the value of supp(Cpxps ) to increase by ∆f , because only
the first term of the sum in Expression (5.1) used to compute supp(Cpxps ) is increased (the
support of ps). Hence, the support of C
px
ps stays above k. Case (b). Since F(D, σ) is k-
anonymous, we have supp(Cpspx) ≥ k. Increasing the support of ps and its subsets by ∆f
as in Expressions (5.10-5.11) means adding the same value ∆f to each term of the sum in
Expression (5.1) used to compute supp(Cpspx). Hence, this support of C
ps
px does not change.
Thus, the theorem holds.
Since using our anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods for making F(D, σ)
α-protective w.r.t. f cannot make F(D, σ) non-k-anonymous, a safe way to obtain an α-
protective k-anonymous F(D, σ) w.r.t. f is to apply anti-discrimination pattern sanitization
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methods to a k-anonymous version of F(D, σ), in order to turn α-discriminatory patterns
detected in that k-anonymous version into α-protective patterns w.r.t f . We propose Al-
gorithm 10 to obtain an α-protective k-anonymous version of an original frequent pattern
set w.r.t. to a discrimination measure f . There are two assumptions in this algorithm:
first, the class attribute is binary; second, protected groups DIb correspond to nominal at-
tributes. Given an original pattern set F(D, σ), denoted by FP for short, a discriminatory
threshold α, an anonymity threshold k, a discrimination measure f , protected groups DIb
and a class item C which denies some benefit, Algorithm 10 starts by obtaining FP ′, which
is a k-anonymous version of FP (Line 3). It uses Algorithm 3 in [5] to do this. Then, the al-
gorithm uses the DetDiscPatt function in Algorithm 6 to determine the subset DD which
contains α-discriminatory patterns in FP ′ (Line 4). As we showed in Theorem 2, given two
Algorithm 10 Anti-discrimination k-anonymous pattern sanitization
1: Inputs: Database D, FP := F(D,σ), k, DIb, discrimination measure f , α, C =class item with
negative decision value
2: Output: FP ′′: α-protective k-anonymous frequent pattern set
3: FP ′ ← PrivacyAdditiveSanitization(FP, k) //Algorithm 3 in [5]
4: DD ← Function DetDiscPatt(FP ′, D, DIb, f , α, C)
5: for all p ∈ DD do
6: Compute impact(p) = |{p′ : A′, B′, C} ∈ DD s.t. p′ ⊂ p|
7: end for
8: Sort DD by descending impact
9: FP ′′ ← Function AntiDiscPattSanit(FP ′, D, DD, DIb, f , α, C)
10: Output: FP ′′
α-discriminatory patterns p1 : {A,B,C} and p2 : {A′, B′, C}, where p2 ⊂ p1, making p1
α-protective w.r.t. f can make also p2 less discriminatory or even α-protective, depending
on the value of α and the support of patterns. This justifies why, among the patterns in
DD, Algorithm 10 transforms first those with maximum impact on making other patterns
α-protective w.r.t. f . For each pattern p ∈ DD, the number of patterns in DD which are
subsets of p is taken as the impact of p (Lines 4-7), that is impact(p). Then, the patterns in
DD will be made α-protective w.r.t. f by descending order of impact (Line 8). Thus, the
patterns with maximum impact(p) will be made α-protective first, with the aim of minimiz-
ing the pattern distortion. Finally, the algorithm uses the function AntiDiscPattSanit
in Algorithm 7 to make each pattern p in DD α-protective using anti-discrmination pattern
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sanitization methods w.r.t. f (Line 9).
5.4.2 Achieving an Unexplainable Discrimination and Privacy Protected
Pattern Set
In order to simultaneously achieve unexplainable discrimination and privacy awareness in
F(D, σ), we need to generate an unexplainable discrimination and privacy protected version
of F(D, σ):
Definition 23 (d-explainable α-protective k-anonymous pattern set). Given a collection of
frequent patterns F(D, σ), an anonymity threshold k, an explainable discrimination thresh-
old d, a discrimination threshold α, protected groups DIb, legally-grounded groups DIe, and
a discrimination measure f , F(D, σ) is d-explainable α-protective k-anonymous if it is both
k-anonymous and d-explainable α-protective w.r.t. DIb, DIe and f .
In order to generate a d-explainable α-protective k-anonymous version of F(D,σ), we
need to examine the following issues: (1) how making F(D,σ) k-anonymous impacts d-
explainable and d-unexplainable patterns in F(D,σ); (2) how making F(D,σ) d-explainable
α-protective w.r.t. f impacts the k-anonymity of F(D,σ). We study the first issue by
presenting two scenarios.
Table 5.4: Scenario 3: Examples of frequent patterns extracted from Table 5.1
Patterns Support
ps:{female, veterinarian} 34
p2 :{paid-delay, veterinarian, salary > 15000} 59
p1 :{female, veterinarian, No} 20
pn :{paid-delay, veterinarian, No} 37
pns :{paid-delay, veterinarian} 64
pd :{female, veterinarian, paid-delay} 31
Scenario 3. Table 5.4 illustrates an example of frequent patterns that come from the data
set in Table 5.1 with σ = 15. Let DIb :{Sex = female}, DIe :{Credit history = paid-delay},
f = slift, α = 1.25, k = 8 and d = 0.9. Suppose the PD pattern p1 in Table 5.4 is 1.25-
discriminatory (i.e. there is inferred discrimination against veterinarian women applicants).
However, pattern p1 is a 0.9-explainable pattern because both conditions of Definition 14
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are satisfied ( supp(pn)supp(pns) =
37
64 = 0.57 is higher than 0.9 · supp(p1)ps = 0.9 · 2034 = 0.53 and
supp(pd)
supp(ps)
= 3134 = 0.91 is higher than 0.9). Then, p1 is a d-explainable pattern w.r.t. pattern
pn (i.e. the inferred discrimination against veterinarian women applicants is explainable by
their delay in returning previous credits). On the other hand, although the support of each
pattern in the collection is higher than k, there is an inference channel between patterns
pns and p2; note that supp(pns) − supp(p2) = 64 − 59 = 5 is smaller than 8 (i.e. one can
infer the existence of only 5 veterinarians who are delayed in returning previous credits and
with salary no more than 15000 e). To block the inference channel between pns and p2, the
following privacy additive sanitization is performed:
supp(pns) + k, ∀p ⊆ pns (5.12)
After this transformation, the new support of pattern pns is 72. The new support value of
pattern pns changes the satisfaction of Condition 1 in Definition 14 in the following way:
supp(pn)
supp(pns)+k
= 3764+8 = 0.513 is less than 0.9 · supp(p1)ps = 0.9 · 2034 = 0.53. Then, in this scenario,
making the collection of patterns in Table 5.4 k-anonymous makes d-explainable pattern p1
d-unexplainable.
Table 5.5: Scenario 4: Examples of frequent patterns extracted from Table 5.1
Patterns Support
ps:{female, veterinarian} 30
p2 :{female, veterinarian, salary > 15000} 29
p1 :{female, veterinarian, No} 29
pn :{paid-delay, veterinarian, No} 23
pns :{paid-delay, veterinarian} 27
pd :{female, veterinarian, paid-delay} 30
Scenario 4. Table 5.5 illustrates an example of frequent patterns that come from the data
set in Table 5.1 with σ = 15. Let DIb : {Sex = female}, DIe :{Credit history = paid-
delay}, f = slift, α = 1.25, k = 2 and p = 0.9. Suppose the PD pattern p1 in Table
5.5 is 1.25-discriminatory (i.e. there is inferred discrimination against veterinarian women
applicants). Pattern p1 is d-unexplainable pattern w.r.t. pattern pn because Condition 1 of
Definition 14 does not satisfy ( supp(pn)supp(pns) =
23
27 = 0.85 is less than 0.9 · supp(p1)supp(ps) = 0.87) while
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Condition 2 of Definition 14 is satisfied (i.e. supp(pd)supp(ps) =
30
30 = 1 is higher than 0.9). Then, p1
is a d-unexplainable pattern (i.e. the inferred discrimination against veterinarian women
applicants is not explainable by their delay in returning previous credits). On the other
hand, although the support of each pattern in the collection is higher than k, there is an
inference channel between patterns ps and p2; note that supp(ps)− supp(p2) = 30− 29 = 1
is smaller than 2. To block the inference channel between ps and p2, privacy pattern
sanitization is performed according to Expression (5.9). After this transformation, the new
support value of pattern ps is 32. The new support value of pattern pns satisfies Condition
1 of Definition 14 ( supp(pn)supp(pns) =
23
27 = 0.85 is higher than 0.9 · supp(p1)supp(ps)+k = 0.815) while it
does not change the satisfaction of Condition 2 of Definition 14 ( supp(pd)supp(ps)+k =
30
32 = 0.93
is higher than 0.9). Thus, in this scenario, making the collection of patterns in Table 5.4
k-anonymous turns d-unexplainable pattern p1 into a d-explainable pattern.
To summarize, using a privacy pattern sanitization method for making F(D,σ) k-
anonymous can make F(D,σ) more or less d-explainable α-protective w.r.t. slift. We
also observe a similar behavior for alternative discrimination measures. Hence, what makes
sense is first to obtain a k-anonymous version of F(D,σ) and then look for d-unexplainable
patterns in it. After that, we use anti-discrimination pattern sanitization methods proposed
in Section 5.3.3 for making F(D,σ) d-explainable α-protective. According to Theorem 5,
these methods cannot make F(D,σ) non-k-anonymous as a result of their transforma-
tion. The above procedure (first dealing with k-anonymity and then with d-explainability
and α-protectiveness) is encoded in Algorithm 11. Given an original pattern set F(D, σ),
denoted by FP for short, a discriminatory threshold α, an anonymity threshold k, a dis-
crimination measure f , an explainable discrimination threshold d, protected groups DIb,
legally-grounded groups DIe, and a class item C which denies some benefit, Algorithm 11
starts by obtaining FP ′, which is a k-anonymous version of FP (Step 3). It calls Algorithm
3 in [5] to do this. Then, the algorithm uses the function DetUnExplainPatt in Algo-
rithm 8 to determine the subset Dbad which contains d-unexplainable patterns in FP ′ (Line
4). Then, the algorithm sorts Dbad by descending order of impact to transform first those
patterns in Dbad with maximum impact on making other patterns α-protective (Lines 4-8).
Finally, the algorithm uses the function UnExplainAntiDiscPattSanit in Algorithm 9
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to make each d-unexplainable pattern in FP ′ α-protective using anti-discrimination pattern
sanitization w.r.t. f (Line 9).
Algorithm 11 Unexplainable discrimination protected and anonymous pattern
sanitization
1: Inputs: FP := F(D,σ), k, DIb, DIe, explainable discrimination threshold d, discrimination
measure f , α, C =class item with negative decision value
2: Output: FP ′′: d-explainable α-protective k-anonymous frequent pattern set
3: FP ′ = PrivacyAdditiveSanitization(FP, k) //Algorithm 3 in [5]
4: Dbad → Function DetUnExplainPatt(FP ′, DIe, DIb, f , α, C)
5: for all p ∈ Dbad do
6: Compute impact(p) = |{p′ : A′, B′, C} ∈ Dbad s.t. p′ ⊂ p|
7: end for
8: Sort Dbad by descending impact
9: FP ′′ ← Function UnExplainAntiDiscPattSanit(FP ′, Dbad, DIb, f , α, C)
10: Output: FP ′′
5.5 Experiments
This section presents the experimental evaluation of the approaches we proposed in this
chapter. First, we describe the utility measures and then the empirical results. In the
sequel, FP denotes the set of frequent patterns extracted from database D by the Apriori
algorithm [2]; FP ′ denotes the k-anonymous version of FP obtained by the privacy pattern
sanitization method; FP ′′ denotes the α-protective k-anonymous version of FP obtained
by Algorithm 10, and FP∗ denotes the α-protective version of FP obtained by Algorithm
7. We also denote by T P any transformed pattern set, i.e., either FP ′, FP ′′ or FP∗.
We used the Adult and German credit datasets introduced in Section 4.9.1. We used the
“train” part of Adult dataset to obtain FP and any transformed pattern set T P For our
experiments with the Adult dataset, we set DIb : {Sex = female, Age = young} (cut-off for
Age = young: 30 years old). For our experiments with German credit dataset, we set DIb :
{Age = old, Foreign worker = yes} (cut-off for Age = old: 50 years old).
5.5.1 Utility Measures
To assess the information loss incurred to achieve privacy and anti-discrimination in frequent
pattern discovery, we use the following measures.
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• Patterns with changed support. Fraction of original frequent patterns in FP
which have their support changed in any transformed pattern set T P:
|{〈I, supp(I)〉 ∈ FP : suppFP(I) 6= suppT P(I)}|
|FP|
• Pattern distortion error. Average distortion w.r.t. the original support of frequent
patterns:
1
|FP| ·
∑
I∈FP
(
suppT P(I)− suppFP(I)
suppFP(I)
)
The purpose of these measures is assessing the distortion introduced when making FP α-
protective k-anonymous, in comparison with the distortion introduced by either making FP
α-protective or making FP k-anonymous, separately. The above measures are evaluated
considering T P = FP ′′, T P = FP ′ and T P = FP∗. In addition, we measure the impact
of our pattern sanitization methods for making FP k-anonymous, α-protective and α-
protective k-anonymous on the accuracy of a classifier using the CMAR (i.e. classification
based on multiple association rules) approach [57]. Below, we describe the process of our
evaluation:
1. The original data are first divided into training and testing sets, Dtrain and Dtest.
2. The original frequent patterns FP are extracted from the training set Dtrain by the
Apriori algorithm [2].
3. Patterns in T P which contain the class item are selected as a candidate patterns for
classification. They are donated by T Ps. Note that, T P can be FP, FP ′, FP∗ or
FP ′′.
4. To classify each new object (record) in Dtest, the subset of patterns matching the new
record in T Ps is found.
5. If all the patterns matching the new object have the same class item, then that class
value is assigned to the new record. If the patterns are not consistent in terms of class
items, the patterns are divided into groups according to class item values (e.g. denying
credit and accepting credit). Then, the effects of the groups should be compared to
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yield the strongest group. A strongest group is composed of a set of patterns highly
positively correlated and that have good support. To determine this, for each pattern
p : {X,C}, the value of maxχ2 is computed as follows:
maxχ2 = (min{supp(X), supp(C)} − supp(X)× supp(C)|Dtrain| )
2 × |Dtrain| × e (5.13)
where
e =
1
supp(X)× supp(C) +
1
supp(X)× (|Dtrain| − supp(C))+
1
(|Dtrain| − supp(X))× supp(C) +
1
(|Dtrain| − supp(X))(|Dtrain| − supp(C))
(5.14)
Then, for each group of patterns, the weightedχ2 measure of the group is computed2
as
∑ χ2×χ2
maxχ2
. The class item of the group with maximum weightedχ2 is assigned to
the new record.
6. After obtaining the predicted class item of each record in Dtest, the accuracy of the
classifier can be simply computed w.r.t. observed and predicted class items (i.e.
contingency table).
To measure the accuracy of a classifier based on a collection of frequent patterns, we perform
the above process considering T P = FP, T P = FP ′′, T P = FP ′ and T P = FP∗.
Finally, to measure the impact of making FP k-anonymous on discrimination, we use
the following measures, which are evaluated considering T P = FP ′. Discrimination
prevention degree (DPD). Percentage of α-discriminatory patterns obtained from FP
that are no longer α-discriminatory in the transformed patterns (T P). New (ghost)
discrimination degree (NDD). Percentage of α-discriminatory patterns obtained from
transformed patterns (T P) that were α-protective in FP.
5.5.2 Empirical Evaluation
We now discuss the experiments conducted on the Adult and German credit datasets,
for different values of α, k and σ, in terms of the defined utility measures. Note that
2For computing χ2 see http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/ frans/Notes/chiTesting.html
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Figure 5.1: Pattern distortion scores to make the Adult dataset k-anonymous
all the empirical results presented in the sequel are related to the worst-case scenario in
which the original patterns are made protected against both explainable and unexplainable
discrimination. In other words, we generate α-protective or α-protective k-anonymous
versions of the original pattern set.
5.5.2.1 Pattern Distortion
Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2 show pattern distortion scores observed after making FP k-anonymous
in Adult and German credit, respectively. We show the results for varying values of k and
the support σ. It can be seen that the percentage of patterns whose support has changed
(left charts of Fig. 5.1 and 5.2) and the average distortion introduced (right charts of Fig. 5.1
and 5.2) increase with larger k and with smaller support σ, due to the increasing number of
inference channels. Comparing the two datasets, pattern distortion scores in German credit
are higher than those in Adult, even taking the same values of k and σ. This is mainly due to
the substantial difference in the number of inference channels detected in the two datasets:
the maximum number of inference channels detected in Adult is 500, while in German credit
it is 2164. Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4 show pattern distortion scores observed after making FP
α-protective in Adult and German credit, respectively. We take f = slift and we show
the results for varying values of α and support σ. It can be seen that distortion scores
increase with smaller α and smaller σ, because the number of α-discriminatory patterns
increases. Also in this case the values of the distortion scores for Adult are less than for
German credit. We performed the same experiments for discrimination measures other than
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Figure 5.2: Pattern distortion scores to make the German credit dataset k-anonymous
slift and we observed a similar behavior. When comparing Figs. 5.1-5.2 and Figs. 5.3-
5.4, we observe that the percentage of patterns with changed support and the average
distortion introduced are higher after the application of privacy pattern sanitization in both
datasets. In other words, we observe that guaranteeing privacy produces more distortion
than guaranteeing anti-discrimination. This is due to the number of inference channels
detected in our experiment (for different values of k), which is higher than the number of
α-discriminatory patterns detected (for different values of α.) Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6 show
the pattern distortion scores observed after making FP α-protective k-anonymous in the
Adult and German credit datasets, respectively. We take f = slift and we show the results
for varying values of k, α and σ. Since the number of inference channels increases with k,
the number of α-discriminatory patterns increases as α becomes smaller, and both numbers
increase as σ becomes smaller, the percentage of patterns with modified support (left charts
of Fig. 5.5 and Fig. 5.6) and the average distortion introduced (right charts of Fig. 5.5 and
Fig. 5.6) have the same dependencies w.r.t. k, α and σ. We performed the same experiments
for other discrimination measures and we observed a similar behavior. Comparing the two
datasets, here we also observe that the values of the distortion scores for the Adult dataset
are less than for the German credit dataset.
If we compare Figs. 5.1-5.2 and Fig. 5.5-5.6, we observe only a marginal difference
between the distortion introduced when making FP α-protective k-anonymous, and the
distortion introduced when making it only k-anonymous. For instance, in the experiment
where we make Adult α-protective k-anonymous (left chart of Fig. 5.5) with minimum
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Figure 5.3: Pattern distortion scores to make the Adult dataset α-protective
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Figure 5.4: Pattern distortion scores to make the German dataset α-protective
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Figure 5.5: Pattern distortion scores to make the Adult dataset α-protective k-anonymous
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Figure 5.6: Pattern distortion scores to make the German dataset α-protective k-anonymous
support 10% and k = 5, the percentage of patterns with changed support is 42.1% (in the
worst case α = 1.2), while when making the pattern set k-anonymous (left chart of Fig. 5.1)
we get a value of 39.48%. In addition, the average distortion introduced (right chart of
Fig. 5.5) is 1.04% (in the worst case α = 1.2) to obtain an α-protective k-anonymous version
of original patterns, while it is 0.15% to obtain a k-anonymous version of it (right chart
of Fig. 5.1). As a consequence, we can (empirically) conclude that we provide protection
against both the privacy and discrimination threats with a marginally higher distortion
w.r.t. providing protection against the privacy threat only.
5.5.2.2 Preservation of the Classification Task
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show the accuracy of classifiers obtained from FP, FP ′, FP ′′ and FP∗ in
the Adult and German credit datasets for f = slift, σ = 10% and different values of α and
k. We do not observe a significant difference between the accuracy of the classifier obtained
from an α-protective k-anonymous version of the original pattern set and the accuracy of
the classifier obtained from either a k-anonymous or an α-protective version. In addition,
the accuracy of the classifier decreases with larger k and with smaller α. When comparing
the two datasets, we observe less accuracy for the German credit dataset; this is consistent
with the higher distortion observed above for this dataset. Note that the low values of
accuracy in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 are related to worst-case scenario (i.e. maximum value of k
and minimum value of α).
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Table 5.6: Adult dataset: accuracy of classifiers
k α FP FP ′ FP ′′ FP∗
5 1.2 0.744 0.763 0.724 0.691
5 1.5 0.744 0.763 0.752 0.739
50 1.2 0.744 0.751 0.682 0.691
50 1.5 0.744 0.751 0.746 0.739
Table 5.7: German dataset: accuracy of classifiers
k α FP FP ′ FP ′′ FP∗
3 1.2 0.7 0.645 0.582 0.572
3 1.8 0.7 0.645 0.624 0.615
10 1.2 0.7 0.583 0.561 0.572
10 1.8 0.7 0.583 0.605 0.615
5.5.2.3 Degree of Discrimination
Finally, Tables 5.8 show the discrimination degree measures (DPD and NDD) obtained
after applying privacy pattern sanitization to frequent patterns extracted from Adult and
German credit, respectively, for f = slift and different values of α, k and σ. As stated in
Section 5.4.1, applying privacy pattern sanitization can eliminate or create discrimination.
Tables 5.8 clearly highlight this fact: the values of DPD and NDP increase with k. This is
because more inference channels are detected for larger values of k and our method perturbs
the support of more patterns. As a consequence, the impact on anti-discrimination may
increase. Comparing the results obtained in the two datasets, we observe that in Adult
usually the value of NDD is higher than DPD, while in German credit it is the other way
round. This shows that in the Adult dataset the privacy pattern sanitization tends to make
FP less α-protective; in German credit the situation is reversed: the privacy pattern sani-
tization tends to make FP more α-protective (NDD = 0%). All empirical results presented
above are related to the worst-case scenario, i.e., we compared the utility of the original
pattern set with the utility of the patterns protected against both explainable and unex-
plainable discrimination (that is, the α-protective or α-protective k-anonymous versions
of the original pattern set). However, protecting the original pattern set against only un-
explainable discrimination (that is, generating d-explainable α-protective or d-explainable
α-protective k-anonymous versions) can lead to less or equal information loss and pattern
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Table 5.8: Discrimination utility measures after privacy pattern sanitization: Adult (top);
German credit (bottom)
 
 
 
 
α 
Support = 15%                                       Support = 20% 
K = 5 K = 10 K = 25 K = 50 K = 100 K = 5 K = 10 K = 25 K = 50 K = 100 
DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD 
1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.3 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 29.41 0 33.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1.4 0 0 0 0 0 12.5 0 12.5 0 30 0 0 0 33.33 0 40 0 40 0 0 
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 25 0 40 
1.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
α 
Support = 15%                                               Support = 20% 
K = 3 K = 5 K = 10 K = 15 K = 3 K = 5 K = 10 K = 15 
DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD DPD NDD 
1.2 0 0 9.8 0 54.9 0 82.35 0 0 0 0 0 16.67 0 58.33 0 
1.4 4.17 0 18.75 0 60.42 0 85.40 0 0 0 0 0 16.67 0 58.33 0 
1.6 8.51 0 31.91 0 80.85 0 87.23 0 0 0 0 0 16.67 0 58.33 0 
1.8 23.91 0 47.83 0 82.61 0        91.3 0 18.18 0 45.45 0 63.64 0 81.82 0 
2 25 0 50 0 86.11 0 94.44 0 25 0 25  0 62.5  0 87.5 0 
 
 
distortion. This is because pattern sanitization methods transform a smaller number of
patterns if the number of d-explainable patternsis greater than zero. Table 5.9 clearly high-
lights this fact. It shows the percentage of d-explainable patterns among α-discriminatory
ones obtained from the original pattern set and a k-anonymous version of it, for the Adult
and German credit datasets, α = 1.2, σ = 10%, f = slift and several values of d and
k. In this experiment, we assume that all the itemsets excluding the ones belonging to
PD attributes are legally grounded. We can observe that the percentage of d-explainable
Table 5.9: Percentage of d-explainable patterns detected in FP and FP ′
 
 
 
 
d 
Adult                                      German 
K = 5 K = 10 K = 25 K = 50 K = 100 K = 3 K = 5 K = 10 K = 15 
FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ FP FP’ 
0.85 70 85 70 70 70 70 70 65 70 30 62.47 2 62.47 2 62.47 2 62.47 2 
0.9 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 0 15 0 35.2 0 35.2 0 35.2 0 35.2 0 
0.95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
patterns decreases with larger d. In addition, as stated in Section 5.4.2, applying privacy
pattern transformation to make FP k-anonymous can make FP more or less d-explainable
α-protective.
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5.6 An Extension Based on Differential Privacy
In this section, we present how simultaneous anti-discrimination and privacy can be achieved
in frequent pattern discovery while satisfying differential privacy (instead of k-anonymity)
and α-protection. Differential privacy (see Definition 10) is composable according to the
following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Sequential composition, [17]). If there are M randomized algorithms A1, · · · ,AM ,
whose privacy guarantees are 1, · · · , M -differential privacy, respectively, then any function
g of them, g(A1, · · · ,AM ), is
∑M
i=1-differentially private.
We refer to  as the privacy budget of a privacy-aware data analysis algorithm. When
an algorithm involves multiple steps, each step uses a portion of  so that the sum of these
portions is no more than .
5.6.1 Differentially Private Frequent Pattern Set
As mentioned in Section 3.3.2, the authors in [55, 10] propose algorithms for publishing
frequent patterns while satisfying differential privacy. The notion of -differentially private
frequent pattern set can be defined as follows.
Definition 24 (-differentially private frequent pattern set). Given a collection of frequent
patterns F(D, σ) and a differential privacy budget , F(D, σ) is -differentially private if it
can be obtained using a randomized algorithm ALG satisfying -differential privacy.
Bhaskar et al. in [10] propose two algorithms for publishing differentially private frequent
patterns. Their approach falls in the post-processing category and it has two steps. In the
first step, one selects the K patterns to be released. In the second step, one releases the
support values of these patterns after adding noise to them. The privacy budget  is evenly
divided between the two steps. As explained in detail in [55], this approach works reasonably
well for small values of K; however, for larger values of K, the accuracy is poor. In the
sequel, we use the approach proposed in [55], called PrivBasis, which greatly outperforms
the proposal of Bhaskar et al.
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5.6.2 Achieving an Differentially Private Frequent Pattern Set
Li et al. in [55] recently have proposed the PrivBasis algorithm for publishing a differen-
tially private version the top K frequent patterns. If one desires to publish all patterns
with support above a given threshold σ, i.e. F(D, σ), one can first compute the value
K such that the K-th most frequent pattern has a support value ≥ σ and the K + 1-
th pattern has support < σ, and then use PrivBasis with parameter K. The approach
falls in the in-processing category and it uses a novel notion of basis sets. A σ-basis set
B = {B1, B2, ..., Bw}, where each Bi is a set of items, has the property that any pattern
with support value higher than σ is a subset of some basis Bi. The algorithm constructs
a basis set while satisfying differential privacy and uses this set to find the most frequent
patterns. The PrivBasis algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. Obtain λ, the number of unique items that are involved in the K most frequent
patterns.
2. Obtain F , the λ most frequent items among the set I of all items in D.
3. Obtain P , a set of the most frequent pairs of items among F .
4. Construct σ-basis set B = {B1, B2, ..., Bw}, using F and P .
5. Obtain noisy support values of patterns in candidate set C(B) =
⋃w
i=1{p|p ⊆ Bi};
one can then select the top K patterns from C(B).
The privacy budget  is divided among Steps 1, 2, 3, 5 above. Step 4 does not access the
dataset D, and only uses the outputs of earlier steps. Step 1 uses the exponential mechanism
to sample j from {1, 2, · · · ,K} with the utility function u(D, j) = (1 − |fK − fitemj |)|D|
where fK = σ is the support value of K-th most frequent pattern and fitemj is the
support value of the j-th most frequent item. That is, Step 1 chooses j such that the j-th
most frequent item has frequency closest to that of the K-th most frequent pattern. The
sensitivity of the above utility function is 1, because adding or removing a record can affect
fK by at most 1/|D| and fitemj by at most 1/|D|. Step 2 differentially privately selects the
λ most frequent items among the |I| items and Step 3 differentially privately selects a set
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of the most frequent pairs of items among λ2 patterns. Both steps use repeated sampling
without replacement, where each sampling step uses the exponential mechanism with the
support value of each pattern as its utility. Step 4 constructs B that covers all maximal
cliques in (F, P ) (see [55] for details). Step 5 computes the noisy support values of all
patterns in C(B) as follows. Each basis Bi algorithm divides all possible records into 2
|Bi|
mutually disjoint bins, one corresponding to each subset of Bi. For each pattern p ⊆ Bi,
the bin corresponding to p consists of all records that contain all items in p, but no item in
Bi\p. Given a basis set B, adding noise Lap(w/) to each bin count and outputting these
noisy counts satisfies -differential privacy. The array element b[i][p] stores the noisy count
of the bin corresponding to pattern p and basis Bi. For each basis Bi, adding or removing
a single record can affect the count of exactly one bin by exactly 1. Hence the sensitivity
of publishing all bin counts for one basis is 1; and the sensitivity of publishing counts for
all bases is w. From these noisy bin counts, one can recover the noisy support values of all
patterns in C(B) by summing up the respective noisy bin counts in b[i][p].
We note that due to the possibility of drawing a negative noise from the Laplace distri-
bution, PrivBasis can obtain noisy bin counts in b[i][p] which are negative. This can lead to
two problems: 1) some patterns could have negative support values; and 2) we can obtain a
collection of frequent patterns with contradictions among them. More specifically, a pattern
could have a noisy support value which is smaller than the noisy support values of its su-
perset patterns. In order to avoid the contradictions among the released patterns published
by PrivBasis, it is enough to post-process the noisy bin counts in b[i][p] by rounding each
count to nearest non-negative integer. This should be done after Line 11 of Algorithm 1
in [55]. Note that, as proven by Hay et al. [39], a post-processing of differentially private
results does non change the privacy guarantee. Hence, the algorithm PrivBasis will remain
differentially private by the above changes. In the following we use PrivBasis with the above
update. The problem of achieving consistency constraints among the noisy count values has
been also addressed in [39].
CHAPTER 5. DISCRIMINATION- AND PRIVACY-AWARE FP DISCOVERY 105
5.6.3 Achieving a Discrimination Protected and Differential Private Fre-
quent Pattern Set
Definition 25 (α-protective -differentially private frequent pattern set). Given a collec-
tion of frequent patterns F(D, σ), a differential privacy budget , a discriminatory thresh-
old α, protected groups DIb, and a discrimination measure f , F(D, σ) is α-protective -
differentially private if it is both -differentially private and α-protective w.r.t. f and DIb.
To simultaneously achieve anti-discrimination and differential privacy in frequent pat-
tern discovery, we need to generate an α-protective -differentially private version of F(D, σ).
To do so, first we need to examine how making F(D, σ) -differentially private impacts the
α-protectiveness of F(D, σ) w.r.t. f , where f is one of the measures from Definitions 3-5.
Theorem 6. The PrivBasis approach for making F(D, σ) -differential private can make
F(D, σ) more or less α-protective w.r.t. f and DIb.
Proof. The -differentially private version of F(D, σ), denoted by FPd for short, generated
by PrivBasis is an approximation of F(D, σ). As a side effect of this transformation due to
Laplacian or exponential mechanisms, FPd might contain patterns that are not in F(D, σ)
(i.e. ghost patterns) and might not contain patterns that are in F(D, σ) (i.e. missing
patterns). Moreover, for patterns that are in both F(D, σ) and FPd, FPd contains the noisy
new support values of original patterns in F(D, σ). Hence, making F(D, σ) -differentially
private can lead to different situations regarding the α-protectiveness of FPd w.r.t. f and
DIb. We list such situations below:
• There are α-discriminatory patterns in F(D, σ) w.r.t. f and DIb which are not in
FPd (i.e. missing patterns). In this situation, making F(D, σ) -differentially private
makes F(D, σ) more α-protective.
• There are α-discriminatory patterns in FPd w.r.t. f and DIb which are not in F(D, σ)
(i.e. ghost patterns). In this situation, making F(D, σ) -differentially private makes
F(D, σ) less α-protective.
• There are PD patterns (e.g. p : {A,B,C}) in both F(D, σ) and FPd that are α-
protective (resp. α-discriminatory) w.r.t. f and DIb in F(D, σ) and α-discriminatory
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(resp. α-protective) in FPd. It is because the new noisy support values of patterns
in FPd can increase (resp. decrease) the values of f(A,B → C). In this situation,
making F(D, σ) -differentially private makes F(D, σ) less (resp. more) α-protective.
Hence, the theorem holds.
Thus, similar to k-anonymity, achieving differential privacy in frequent pattern dis-
covery can achieve anti-discrimination or work against anti-discrimination. Hence, what
makes sense is first to obtain a ε-differentially private version of F(D,σ) and then deal
with discrimination. An interesting point is that, regardless of whether k-anonymity or ε-
differential privacy is used, achieving privacy impacts anti-discrimination similarly. Based
on this observation, we present Algorithm 12 to generate an α-protective -differentially
private version of an original pattern set w.r.t. f and DIb.
Algorithm 12 Anti-discrimination differentially private pattern sanitization
1: Inputs: Database D, K, items I, differential privacy budget , DIb, discrimination measure f ,
α, C =class item with negative decision value
2: Output: FP ′′: α-protective -differential private frequent pattern set
3: (FPd, b[i][p])← PrivBasis(D,I,K,) //Algorithm 3 in [55]
4: DD ← Function DetDiscPatt(FPd, b[i][p], DIb, f , α, C)
5: Lines 5-8 of Algorithm 10 to sort DD
6: FP ′′ ← Function AntiDiscPattSanit(FPd, b[i][p], DD, DIb, f , α, C)
7: Output: FP ′′
Theorem 7. Algorithm 12 is -differentially private.
Proof. The only part in Algorithm 12 that depends on the dataset is Step 3, which is -
differentially private because it uses PrivBasis. Starting from Step 4, the algorithm only
performs post-processing, and does not access D again. Indeed, in Step 4 the value of f
w.r.t. each PD pattern in FPd; in Step 6 the value of ∆f can be computed using the noisy
support values of patterns in FPd and the noisy bin counts in array b[i][p] (array b[i][p]
replaces parameter D in functions DetDiscPatt and AntiDiscPattSanit). Adding ∆f
to the noisy support values of respective patterns in Step 6 is post-processing of differentially
private results which remain private as proven in [39].
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Thus, α-protection in F(D, σ) can be achieved by anti-discrimination pattern saniti-
zation methods proposed in Section 5.3.3 without violating differential privacy, just as we
could do it without violating k-anonymity.
5.6.4 Discussion
In the previous sections, we showed that we can achieve simultaneous discrimination and
privacy protection in frequent pattern discovery satisfying differential privacy instead of
k-anonymity. Indeed, it turns out that k-anonymity and differential privacy are similarly
related to α-protection. In terms of privacy, using differential privacy seems preferable be-
cause it provides a worst-case privacy guarantee. In terms of data utility, the situation is
different. As we discussed in Section 5.6.2, if the approach proposed in [55] does not control
the generation of negative bin counts, it may result in negative support values and collec-
tions of frequent patterns with contradictions among them. These two problems, which are
avoided in the approach based on k-anonymity presented in Section 5.4, clearly have a neg-
ative impact on the utility of the published patterns. In Section 5.6.2 we propose a solution
to avoid these problems. Even if this solution avoids contradiction among the released pat-
terns, it does not eliminate the information loss. In fact, we observe that forcing negative
bin counts to zero could lead to suppressing some frequent patterns that without any sani-
tization would belong to the mining result. As a consequence, if we compare the approach
based on k-anonymity to the approach based on differential privacy in terms of Misses Cost
(MC), (i.e., the fraction of original frequent patterns which do not appear in the published
result), and Ghost Cost (GC) (i.e., the fraction of frequent patterns appearing in the pub-
lished result that are not in the original pattern set), we can argue that with k-anonymity
the values of MC and GC are zero, while with differential privacy they could be more than
zero. We can compare also the two methods in terms of pattern distortion (Section 5.5.1).
Our preliminary experiments seem to indicate that the value of pattern distortion scores
for the approach based on k-anonymity is less than for the approach based on differential
privacy; this is not surprising, because with the former approach only the support values of
subsets of original patterns are changed while with the latter approach, the support values
of all the patterns are changed. From the above preliminary considerations obtained by
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analyzing the behavior of the two approaches and their properties, we can conclude that, as
far as privacy is concerned, the differentially private approach is better than the approach
based on k-anonymity. On the other side, the method based on differential privacy seems
to preserve less data utility. Clearly, more extensive empirical work is needed that takes
into account other data utility measures (i.e. the accuracy of a classifier).
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated the problem of discrimination and privacy aware fre-
quent pattern discovery, i.e. the sanitization of the collection of patterns mined from a trans-
action database in such a way that neither privacy-violating nor discriminatory inferences
can be inferred on the released patterns. In particular, for each measure of discrimination
used in the legal literature we proposed a solution for obtaining a discrimination-free col-
lection of patterns. We also proposed an algorithm to take into account the legal concept of
genuine occupational requirement for making an original pattern set protected only against
unexplainable discrimination. We also found that our discrimination preventing transfor-
mations do not interfere with a privacy preserving sanitization based on k-anonymity, thus
accomplishing the task of combining the two and achieving a robust (and formal) notion
of fairness in the resulting pattern collection. Further, we have presented extensive em-
pirical results on the utility of the protected data. Specifically, we evaluate the distortion
introduced by our methods and its effects on classification. It turns out that the utility
loss caused by simultaneous anti-discrimination and privacy protection is only marginally
higher than the loss caused by each of those protections separately. This result supports
the practical deployment of our methods. Finally, we have discussed the possibility of using
our proposed framework while replacing k-anonymity with differential privacy. Although
our discrimination prevention method can be combined with the differentially private trans-
formations, we have argued that doing so can lead to more information loss in comparison
with the k-anonymity based approach.
Chapter 6
A Study on the Impact of Data
Anonymization on
Anti-discrimination
In the previous chapter, we studied the relation of PPDM and DPDM in the context of
knowledge publishing (post-processing approach). In this chapter, we study the relation
between data anonymization and anti-discrimination (pre-processing approach). We analyze
how different data anonymization techniques (e.g., generalization) have an impact on anti-
discrimination (e.g., discrimination prevention). When we anonymize the original data to
achieve the requirement of the privacy model (e.g., k-anonymity), what will happen to the
discriminatory bias contained in the original data? Our main motivation to do this study
is finding an answer for three important questions. First, can providing protection against
privacy attacks also achieve anti-discrimination in data publishing? Second, can we adapt
and use some of the data anonymization techniques (e.g., generalization) for discrimination
prevention? Third, can we design methods based on data anonymization to make the
original data protected against both privacy and discrimination risks?
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6.1 Non-discrimination Model
As mentioned in Chapter 2, civil rights laws [6, 22, 85] explicitly identify the attributes to be
protected against discrimination. For instance, U.S. federal laws [85] prohibit discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, marital status, age and pregnancy. In
our context, we consider these attributes as potentially discriminatory (PD) attributes. Let
DA be a set of PD attributes in data table D(A1, · · · , An) specified by law. Comparing
privacy legislation [21] and anti-discrimination legislation [22, 85], PD attributes can overlap
with QI attributes (e.g. Sex, Age, Marital status) and/or sensitive attributes (e.g. Religion
in some applications). A domain DAi is associated with each attribute Ai to indicate
the set of values that the attribute can assume. In previous works on anti-discrimination
[68, 69, 77, 43, 35, 36, 44, 97], as we consider in previous chapters, the authors propose
discrimination discovery and prevention techniques w.r.t. specific protected groups, e.g.
black and/or female poeple. However, this assumption fails to capture the various nuances of
discrimination since minority or disadvantaged groups can be different in different contexts.
For instance, in a neighborhood with almost all black people, whites are a minority and
may be discriminated. Then we consider Ai = q to be a PD item, for every q ∈ DAi ,
where Ai ∈ DA, e.g. Race = q is a PD item for any race q, where DA = {Race}. This
definition is also compatible with the law. For instance, the U.S. Equal Pay Act [85] states
that: “a selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths of the
rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded as evidence of adverse
impact”. An item Ai = q with q ∈ DAi is a PND item if Ai /∈ DA, e.g. Hours = 35 where
DA = {Race}.
Building on Definition 11 and considering the above fact, we introduce the notion of
α-protection for a data table.
Definition 26 (α-protective data table). Let D(A1, · · · , An) be a data table, DA a set of
PD attributes associated with it, and f be one of the measures from Fig. 2.1. D is said to
satisfy α-protection or to be α-protective w.r.t. DA and f if each PD frequent classification
rule c : A,B → C extracted from D is α-protective, where A is a PD itemset and B is a
PND itemset.
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Note that α-protection in D not only can prevent discrimination against the main pro-
tected groups w.r.t. DA (e.g., women) but also against any subsets of protected groups
w.r.t. A\DA (e.g., women who have a medium salary and/or work 36 hours per week).
Releasing an α-protective (unbiased) version of an original data table is desirable to prevent
discrimination with respect to DA. If the original data table is biased w.r.t. DA, it must
be modified before being published (i.e. pre-processed). The existing pre-processing dis-
crimination prevention methods are based on data perturbation, either by modifying class
attribute values [43, 35, 36, 60] or by modifying PD attribute values [35, 36] of the training
data. One of the drawbacks of these techniques is that they cannot be applied (are not
preferred) in countries where data perturbation is not legally accepted (preferred), while
generalization is allowed; e.g. this is the case in Sweden and other Nordic countries (see p.
24 of [82]). Hence, we focus here on generalization and suppression.
6.2 Data Anonymization Techniques and Anti-discrimination
In this section, we study how different generalization and suppression schemes have impact
on anti-discrimination. In other words, when we anonymize D to achieve the requirement
of the privacy model, e.g. k-anonymity, w.r.t. QI, what will happen to α-protection of D
w.r.t. DA? The problem could be investigated with respect to different possible relations
between PD attributes and other attributes (i.e. QI and sensitive attributes) in D. In this
context, we consider the general case where all attributes are QI expect for the class/decision
attribute. Then, each QI attribute can be PD or not. In summary, the following relations
are assumed: (1) QI∩C = ∅, (2) DA ⊆ QI. As mentioned in Section 6.1, PD attributes can
overlap with QI and/or sensitive and/or non-sensitive attributes. Considering all attributes
as QI such that DA ⊆ QI can cover all the above cases.
Example 8. Table 6.1 presents raw customer credit data, where each record represents a
customer’s specific information. Sex, Job, and Age can be taken as QI attributes. The class
attribute has two values, Yes and No, to indicate whether the customer has received credit
or not. Suppose the privacy model is k-anonymity and k = 2. Table 6.1 does not satisfy
2-anonymity w.r.t. QI = {Sex, Job,Age}.
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Table 6.1: Private data table with biased decision records
ID Sex Job Age Credit approved
1 Male Engineer 35 Yes
2 Male Engineer 38 Yes
3 Male Lawyer 38 No
4 Female Writer 30 No
5 Male Writer 30 Yes
6 Female Dancer 31 No
7 Female Dancer 32 Yes
Example 9. Continuing Example 8, suppose DA = {Sex}, α = 1.2 and f = slift. Table
6.1 does not satisfy 1.2-protection w.r.t. f and DA since for frequent PD rule c equal to
{Sex = female} → Credit approved = no we have slift(c) = 2/31/4 = 2.66. Then Table 6.1
is biased w.r.t. women.
6.2.1 Global Recoding Generalizations and Anti-discrimination
In this section, by presenting different scenarios, we will show that using global recoding
generalizations (i.e. full-domain generalization, subtree generalization and sibling general-
ization) to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI in DB can lead to different situations regarding
the α-protection of D w.r.t. DA.
Global recoding generalizations not offering α-protection. It can happen in different
scenarios. First, consider a data table D with the same attributes as the one in Table 6.1,
but many more records, and let DA = {Job} and QI = {Sex, Job,Age}. Suppose D is
biased with respect to dancers or a subgroup of dancers, e.g. dancers who are women (i.e.
D does not satisfy α-protection w.r.t. DA = {Job}). Generalizing all instances of 30, 31
and 32 values to the the same generalized value [30, 35) to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI
in D using full-domain generalization, subtree or sibling generalization cannot achieve α-
protection w.r.t. DA = {Job}, based on Definition 26. Second, consider a data table D with
the same attributes as the one in Table 6.1, but many more records, and let DA = {Job}
and QI = {Sex, Job,Age}. Suppose DB is biased with respect to dancers. Generalizing all
instances of Dancer and Writer values to the same generalized value Artist to achieve k-
anonymity in D w.r.t. QI using full-domain generalization or subtree generalization, might
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cause the Artist node to inherit the biased nature of Dancer. Then, this generalization
cannot achieve α-protection w.r.t. DA = {Job}. Third, consider a data table D with the
same attributes as the one in Table 6.1, but many more records, and let DA = {Age}
and QI = {Sex, Job,Age}. Suppose D is not biased (i.e. D is α-protective) with respect
to DA. It means that all PD frequent rules w.r.t. DA extracted from it are not α-
discriminatory. However, D might contain PD rules which are α-discriminatory and not
frequent, e.g. {Age = 30, Sex = Male} → Credit approved = no, {Age = 31, Sex =
Male} → Credit approved = no, {Age = 32, Sex = Male} → Credit approved = no.
Generalizing all instances of 30, 31 and 32 values to the same generalized value [30, 35)
to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI in D using full-domain generalization, subtree or sibling
generalization, can cause new frequent PD rules to appear, which might be α-discriminatory
and discrimination will show up after generalization, e.g. {Age = [30−35), Sex = Male} →
Credit approved = no.
Global recoding generalizations offering α-protection. Consider Table 6.1 and let DA =
{Sex} and QI = {Sex, Job,Age}. Suppose that Table 6.1 is biased with respect to women
or any subgroup of women, e.g. women who are 30 years old and/or who are dancers (i.e.
Table 6.1 does not satisfy α-protection w.r.t. DA = {Sex}). Generalizing all instances of
Female values to the same generalized value Any-sex to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t QI in
Table 6.1 can also achieve α-protection w.r.t. DA = {Sex}, based on Definition 26.
To Summarize, using global recoding generalizations to achieve the requirement of the
privacy model (i.e. k-anonymity), depending on the generalization, can make original data
less more or less protected against discrimination.
6.2.2 Local Recoding Generalizations and Anti-discrimination
In this section, by analyzing different scenarios, we will show how using local recoding
generalization, i.e. cell generalization, to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI in D, has an impact
on α-protection of D w.r.t. DA. As mentioned in Section 5.2, in contrast to global recoding
generalizations, in cell generalization some instances of a value may remain ungeneralized
while other instances are generalized.
Consider Table 6.1 and let DA = {Sex} and α = 1.2. Table 6.1 does not satisfy
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Table 6.2: Different types of cell generalization
ID Sex Job Age Credit approved
1 (1) Male ⇒ any-sex Engineer 35 Yes
2 Male Engineer 38 Yes
3 (2) Male ⇒ any-sex Lawyer 38 No
4 Female Writer 30 No
5 Male Writer 30 Yes
6 (3) Female ⇒ any-sex Dancer 31 No
7 (4) Female ⇒ any-sex Dancer 32 Yes
1.2-protection w.r.t. f = slift and DA, since for frequent PD rule c equal to {Sex =
female} → credit approved = no, by using the definitions of confidence and slift (Expres-
sions (2.1) and (2.2), resp.), we have slift(c) = supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) =
2/3
1/4 = 2.66. Table
6.1 neither satisfies 1.2-protection w.r.t. f = elift and DA, since for PD rule c, by us-
ing the definitions of confidence and elift 1 (Expressions (2.1) and (2.4), resp.), we have
elift(c) = supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(C)/|DB| =
2/3
3/7 = 1.55.
Generalizing some instances of Male and/or Female values to the same generalized value
Any-sex to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI = {Job, Sex,Age} in Table 6.1 using cell gener-
alization can lead to different impacts on 1.2-protection of Table 6.1 w.r.t. DA = {Sex}.
The impact depends on the value of class attribute (e.g. Yes or No) of each record in which
the value of PD attribute (e.g. Female or Male) is generalized. Table 6.2 shows four types
of cell generalization that can happen to achieve k-anonymity in Table 6.1 with numbers
(1), (2), (3) and (4). Below, we analyze the impact of each type on 1.2-protection of Table
6.1 w.r.t. DA.
• Type (1). Generalizing an instance of Male value to the generalized value Any-sex
while the value of Credit approved attribute in the record is Yes cannot make Table
6.1 more or less 1.2-protective w.r.t. f = elift but it can make Table 6.1 more 1.2-
protective w.r.t. f = slift. It is because this type of cell generalization cannot change
the value of elift(c) but it can decease the value of slift(c), which is in this example
slift(c) = 2/31/3 = 2. This type of cell generalization increases the denominator of
equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) while keeping the numerator unaltered.
1when B (PND itemset) in PD rule is empty, elift reduces to the standard lift [68]
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• Type (2). Generalizing an instance of Male value to the generalized value Any-sex
while the value of Credit approved attribute in the record is No cannot make Table
6.1 more or less 1.2-protective w.r.t. f = elift but it can make Table 6.1 less 1.2-
protective w.r.t. f = slift. It is because this type of cell generalization cannot
change the value of elift(c) but it can increase the value of slift(c). This type of cell
generalization decreases the denominator of equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) while keeping
the numerator unaltered.
• Type (3). Generalizing an instance of Female value to the generalized value Any-
sex while the value of Credit approved attribute for the record is No can make Table
6.1 more 1.2-protective w.r.t. f = elift since it can decrease the value of elift(c),
which is in this example elift(c) = 1/23/7 = 1.16. This type of cell generalization
decreases the numerator of equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(C)/|DB| while keeping the denominator
unaltered. In addition, this generalization can also make Table 6.1 more 1.2-protective
w.r.t. f = slift since it can decrease the value of slift(c), which is in this example
slift(c) = 1/21/4 = 2. This type of cell generalization decreases the numerator of
equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) while keeping the denominator unaltered.
• Type (4). Generalizing an instance of Female value to the generalized value Any-sex
while the value of Credit approved attribute for the record is Yes can make Table
6.1 less 1.2-protective w.r.t. both f = elift and f = slift since it can increase
the values of elift(c) and slift(c), which are in this example elift(c) = 2/23/7 = 2.33
and slift(c) = 2/21/4 = 4, respectively. This type of cell generalization increases the
numerator of equations supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(C)/|DB| and
supp(A,C)/supp(A)
supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) , respectively, while
keeping the denominators unaltered.
Summarizing, using cell generalization to achieve the requirement of privacy model (e.g.
k-anonymity), depend on how many records in each above types modified, can make original
data table less or more protected against discrimination. In addition, only the generalization
of type (3) can make the original data table α-protective w.r.t. both f = elift and f = slift
if enough number of records are modified. We can conclude that although cell generalization
leads to less data distortion than global recoding generalizations, it can have less positive
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impact on discrimination removal than global recoding generalizations.
6.2.3 Multidimensional Generalizations and Anti-discrimination
By presenting different scenarios, we also study the impact of using multidimensional gen-
eralizations to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI in D on α-protection of D w.r.t. DA and we
observe the similar trend as cell generalization. For the sake of brevity and due to similarity
with Section 6.2.2, we do not recall the details here.
6.2.4 Suppression and Anti-discrimination
In this section, by presenting different scenarios, we will show that using suppression
techniques (i.e. record suppression, value suppression and cell suppression) to achieve
k-anonymity w.r.t. QI in D can lead to different situations regarding the α-protection
of D w.r.t. DA. As shown in Section 6.2.2, Table 6.1 does not satisfy 1.2-protection
w.r.t. DA = {Sex} and both f = slift and f = elift, since for PD rule c equal to
{Sex = female} → credit approved = no we have slift(c) = 2.66 and elift(c) = 1.55.
Suppressing an entire record to achieve k-anonymity in Table 6.1 w.r.t. QI = {Job, Sex,Age}
using record suppression can lead to different impacts on the 1.2-protection of Table 6.1
w.r.t. DA = {Sex}. The impact depends on the value of PD attribute (e.g. Female or
Male) and the value of class attribute (e.g. Yes or No) in the suppressed record. Table 6.3
shows four types of record suppression which can happen to achieve k-anonymity w.r.t. QI
in Table 6.1 with numbers (1), (2), (3) and (4). Below, we analyze the impact of each type
on α-protection of Table 6.1 w.r.t. DA.
• Type (1). Suppressing an entire record with the value of Male in Sex attribute and
the value of Yes in Credit approved attribute can make Table 6.1 more 1.2-protective
w.r.t. f = elift since it can decrease the value of elift(c), which is in this example
elift(c) = 2/33/6 = 1.33. This type of record suppression increases the denominator of
equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(C)/|D| while keeping the numerator unaltered. In addition, this
suppression can also make Table 6.1 more 1.2-protective w.r.t. f = slift since it can
decease the value of slift(c), which is in this example slift(c) = 2/31/3 = 2. This type
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of record suppression increases the denominator of equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) while
keeping the numerator unaltered.
• Type (2). Suppressing an entire record with the value of Male in Sex attribute and
the value of No in Credit approved attribute can make Table 6.1 less 1.2-protective
w.r.t. both f = elift and f = slift since it can increase the values of elift(c)
and slift(c). This type of record suppression decreases the denominator of equations
supp(A,C)/supp(A)
supp(C)/|D| and
supp(A,C)/supp(A)
supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) , respectively, while keeping the numerators
unaltered.
• Type (3). Suppressing an entire record with the value of Female in Sex attribute and
the value of No in Credit approved attribute cannot make Table 6.1 more or less 1.2-
protective w.r.t. f = elift since it cannot change the value of elift(c) substantially,
which is in this example elift(c) = 1/22/6 = 1.5. This happen because this type of
record suppression decreases the numerator of equation supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(C)/|D| while also
decreasing its denominator. However, this type of record suppression can make Table
6.1 more 1.2-protective w.r.t. f = slift since it can decrease the value of slift(c),
which is in this example slift(c) = 1/21/4 = 2. This suppression decreases the numerator
of supp(A,C)/supp(A)supp(¬A,C)/supp(¬A) while keeping the denominator unaltered.
• Type (4). Suppressing an entire record with the value of Female in Sex attribute and
the value of Yes in Credit approved attribute can make Table 6.1 less 1.2-protective
w.r.t. both f = elift and f = slift since it can increase the value of elift(c) and
slift(c), which are in this example elift(c) = 2/23/6 = 2 and slift(c) =
2/2
1/4 = 4,
respectively.
To summarize, using record suppression depending on how many records in each of
the above types suppressed can make original data table more or less protected against
discrimination after achieving privacy protection. In addition, only record suppression of
type (1) can make original data table α-protective w.r.t. both f = elift and f = slift if a
sufficient number of records are suppressed.
As mentioned in Section 5.2, value suppression refers to suppressing every instance of
a given value in a data table. Then, depending on which attribute values are suppressed
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Table 6.3: Different types of record suppression
ID Sex Job Age Credit approved
1 (1) Male Engineer 35 Yes
2 Male Engineer 38 Yes
3 (2) Male Lawyer 38 No
4 Female Writer 30 No
5 Male Writer 30 Yes
6 (3) Female Dancer 31 No
7 (4) Female Dancer 32 Yes
Table 6.4: Summary of results
Data Anonymization techniques Achieve α-protection Against α-protection No impact
Global recoding generalizations X X X
Cell generalization/Cell suppression Type (1) X X
Cell generalization/Cell suppression Type (2) X X
Cell generalization/Cell suppression Type (3) X
Cell generalization/Cell suppression Type (4) X
Multidimensional generalization X X X
Record suppression Type (1) X
Record suppression Type (2) X
Record suppression Type (3) X X
Record suppression Type (4) X
Value suppression X X
after achieving privacy protection, value suppression can offer α-protection or not. Cell
suppression refers to suppressing some instances of a given value in a data table. Then,
similarly to cell generalization, depending on the values of suppressed cells and the class
values of respective records, cell suppression can make original data more or less protected
against discrimination. Thus, similarly to cell generalization, suppression techniques have
less positive impact on discrimination removal than global recoding generalizations. Finally,
Table 6.4 summarizes the results we obtained in this chapter.
6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the relation between data anonymization techniques
and anti-discrimination to answer an important question: how privacy protection via data
anonymization impacts the discriminatory bias contained in the original data. By pre-
senting and analyzing different scenarios, we learn that we cannot protect original data
CHAPTER 6. IMPACT OF ANONYMIZATION ON ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 119
against privacy attacks without taking into account anti-discrimination requirements (i.e.
α-protection). This happens because data anonymization techniques can work against anti-
discrimination. In addition, we exploit the fact that some data anonymization techniques
(e.g. specific full-domain generalization) can also protect data against discrimination. Thus,
we can adapt and use some of these techniques for discrimination prevention. Moreover,
by considering anti-discrimination requirements during anonymization, we can present so-
lutions to generate privacy- and discrimination-protected datasets. We also find that global
recoding generalizations have a more positive impact on discrimination removal than other
data anonymization techniques.
Chapter 7
Generalization-based Privacy
Preservation and Discrimination
Prevention in Data Publishing and
Mining
We observe that published data must be both privacy-preserving and unbiased regarding
discrimination. We present the first generalization-based approach to simultaneously offer
privacy preservation and discrimination prevention. We formally define the problem, give
an optimal algorithm to tackle it and evaluate the algorithm in terms of both general and
specific data analysis metrics. It turns out that the impact of our transformation on the
quality of data is the same or only slightly higher than the impact of achieving just privacy
preservation. In addition, we show how to extend our approach to different privacy models
and anti-discrimination legal concepts.
7.1 Introduction
Although PPDM and DPDM have different goals, they have some technical similarities.
Necessary steps of PPDM are: i) define the privacy model (e.g. k-anonymity); ii) apply
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a proper anonymization technique (e.g. generalization) to satisfy the requirements of the
privacy model; iii) measure data quality loss as a side effect of data distortion (the measure
can be general or tailored to specific data mining tasks). Similarly, necessary steps for
DPDM include: i) define the non-discrimination model according to the respective legal
concept (i.e. α-protection according to the legal concept of direct discrimination); ii) apply
a suitable data distortion method to satisfy the requirements of the non-discrimination
model; iii) measure data quality loss as in the case of DPDM.
7.1.1 Motivating Example
Table 7.1 presents raw customer credit data, where each record represents a customer’s
specific information. Sex, Race, and working hours named Hours can be taken as QI at-
tributes. The class attribute has two values, Yes and No, to indicate whether the customer
has received credit. Assume that Salary is a sensitive/private attribute and groups of Sex
and Race attributes are protected. The credit giver wants to publish a privacy-preserving
and non-discriminating version of Table 7.1. To do that, she needs to eliminate two types
of threats against her customers:
• Privacy threat, e.g., record linkage: If a record in the table is so specific that only a few
customers match it, releasing the data may allow determining the customer’s identity
(record linkage attack) and hence the salary of that identified customer. Suppose
that the adversary knows that the target identified customer is white and his working
hours are 40. In Table 7.1, record ID = 1 is the only one matching that customer, so
the customer’s salary becomes known.
• Discrimination threat: If credit has been denied to most female customers, releasing
the data may lead to making biased decisions against them when these data are
used for extracting decision patterns/rules as part of the automated decision making.
Suppose that the minimum support (ms) required to extract a classification rule from
the data set in Table 7.1 is that the rule be satisfied by at least 30% of the records. This
would allow extracting the classification rule r : Sex = female→ Credit approved =
no from these data. Clearly, using such a rule for credit scoring is discriminatory
against female customers.
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Table 7.1: Private data set with biased decision records
ID Sex Race Hours Salary Credit approved
1 Male White 40 High Yes
2 Male Asian-Pac 50 Medium Yes
3 Male Black 35 Medium No
4 Female Black 35 Medium No
5 Male White 37 Medium Yes
6 Female Amer-Indian 37 Medium Yes
7 Female White 35 Medium No
8 Male Black 35 High Yes
9 Female White 35 Low No
10 Male White 50 High Yes
7.1.2 Contributions
We argue that both threats above must be addressed at the same time, since providing
protection against only one of them might not guarantee protection against the other. An
important question is how we can provide protection against both privacy and discrimi-
nation risks without one type of protection working against the other and with minimum
impact on data quality. In this chapter, we investigate for the first time the problem of
discrimination- and privacy-aware data publishing, i.e. transforming the data, instead of
patterns, in order to simultaneously fulfill privacy preservation and discrimination preven-
tion. Our approach falls into the pre-processing category: it sanitizes the data before they
are used in data mining tasks rather than sanitizing the knowledge patterns extracted by
data mining tasks (post-processing). Very often, knowledge publishing (publishing the san-
itized patterns) is not enough for the users or researchers, who want to be able to mine
the data themselves. This gives researchers greater flexibility in performing the required
data analyses. We introduce an anti-discrimination model that can cover every possible
nuance of discrimination w.r.t. multiple attributes, not only for specific protected groups
within one attribute. We show that generalization can be used for discrimination preven-
tion. Moreover, generalization not only can make the original data privacy protected but
can also simultaneously make the original data both discrimination and privacy protected.
We present an optimal algorithm that can cover different legally grounded measures of dis-
crimination to obtain all full-domain generalizations whereby the data is discrimination and
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privacy protected. The “minimal” generalization (i.e., the one incurring the least informa-
tion loss according to some criterion) can then be chosen. In addition, we evaluate the
performance of the proposed approach and the data quality loss incurred as a side effect
of the data generalization needed to achieve both discrimination and privacy protection.
We compare this quality loss with the one incurred to achieve privacy protection only. Fi-
nally, we present how our approach can be extended to satisfy different privacy models and
anti-discrimination legal concepts.
7.2 Privacy Model
As described in Chapter 3.2.2, to prevent record linkage attacks through quasi-identifiers,
Samarati and Sweeney [79, 83] proposed the notion of k-anonymity. A data table satisfying
this requirement is called k-anonymous. The total number of tuples in D for each sequence
of values in D[QI] is called frequency set. Let Di and Dj be two domains. If the values of
Dj are the generalization of the values in domain Di, we denote Di ≤D Dj . A many-to-one
value generalization function γ : Di → Dj is associated with every Di, Dj with Di ≤D Dj .
Generalization is based on a domain generalization hierarchy and a corresponding value
generalization hierarchy on the values in the domains. A domain generalization hierarchy
is defined to be a set of domains that is totally ordered by the relationship ≤D. We can
consider the hierarchy as a chain of nodes, and if there is an edge from Di to Dj , it means
that Dj is the direct generalization of Di. Let Domi be a set of domains in a domain gen-
eralization hierarchy of a quasi-identifier attribute Qi ∈ QI. For every Di, Dj , Dk ∈ Domi
if Di ≤D Dj and Dj ≤D Dk, then Di ≤D Dk. In this case, domain Dk is an implied gener-
alization of Di. The maximal element of Domi is a singleton, which means that all values
in each domain can be eventually generalized to a single value. Figure 7.1 left shows possi-
ble domain generalization hierarchies for the Race, Sex and Hours attributes in Table 7.1.
Value generalization functions associated with the domain generalization hierarchy induce
a corresponding value-level tree, in which edges are denoted by γ, i.e direct value general-
ization, and paths are denoted by γ+, i.e. implied value generalization. Figure 7.1 right
shows a value generalization hierarchy with each value in the Race, Sex and Hours domains,
e.g. Colored = γ(black) and Any-race ∈ γ+(black). For a QI = {Q1, · · · , Qn} consist-
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R2
R1
R0
={Any race}
={White, Colored}
={White, Black, Asian-P, Amer-I}
Any-race
White
White
Coloured
Black Asian-P Amer-I
S1
S0
={Any sex}
={Male, Female}
Any-sex
Female Male
H2
H1
H0
={Any hour}
={[1,40),[40-100)}
={35, 37, 40, 50}
Any-hour [1, 100)
[1, 40)
35 37
[40− 100)
40 50
Figure 7.1: An example of domain (left) and value (right) generalization hierarchies of Race,
Sex and Hours attributes
ing of multiple attributes, each with its own domain, the domain generalization hierarchies
of the individual attributes Dom1, · · · ,Domn can be combined to form a multi-attribute
generalization lattice. Each vertex of a lattice is a domain tuple DT = 〈N1, · · · , Nn〉 such
that Ni ∈ Domi, for i = 1, · · · , n, representing a multi-attribute domain generalization. An
example for Sex and Race attributes is presented in Figure 7.2.
Definition 27 (Full-domain generalization). Let D be a data table having a quasi-identifier
QI = {Q1, · · · , Qn} with corresponding domain generalization hierarchies Dom1, · · · ,Domn.
A full-domain generalization can be defined by a domain tuple DT = 〈N1, · · · , Nn〉 with
Ni ∈ Domi, for every i = 1, · · · , n. A full-domain generalization with respect to DT maps
each value q ∈ DQi to some a ∈ DNi such that a = q, a = γ(q) or a ∈ γ+(q).
For example, consider Figure 7.1 right and assume that values 40 and 50 of Hours are
generalized to [40 − 100); then 35 and 37 must be generalized to [1, 40). A full-domain
generalization w.r.t. domain tuple DT is k-anonymous if it yields k-anonymity for D with
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〈S0, R0〉
〈S1, R0〉 〈S0, R1〉
〈S1, R1〉 〈S0, R2〉
〈S1, R2〉
Figure 7.2: Generalization lattice for the Race and Sex attributes
respect to QI. As introduced in Section 3.3.1, in the literature, different generalization-
based algorithms have been proposed to k-anonymize a data table. They are optimal
[78, 51, 8] or minimal [42, 29, 90]. Although minimal algorithms are in general more
efficient than optimal ones, we choose an optimal algorithm (i.e. Incognito [51]) because,
in this first work about combining privacy preservation and discrimination prevention in
data publishing, it allows us to study the worst-case toll on efficiency of achieving both
properties. Incognito is a well-known suite of optimal bottom-up generalization algorithms
to generate all possible k-anonymous full-domain generalizations . In comparison with other
optimal algorithms, Incognito is more scalable and practical for larger data sets and more
suitable for categorical attributes. Incognito is based on two main properties satisfied for
k-anonymity:
• Subset property. If D is k-anonymous with respect to QI, then it is k-anonymous
with respect to any subset of attributes in QI (the converse property does not hold
in general).
• Generalization property. Let P and Q be nodes in the generalization lattice of
D such that DP ≤D DQ. If DB is k-anonymous with respect to P , then DB is also
k-anonymous with respect to Q (monotonicity of generalization).
Example 10. Continuing the motivating example (Section 7.1.1), consider Table 7.1 and
suppose QI = {Race, Sex} and k = 3. Consider the generalization lattice over QI attributes
in Fig. 7.2. Incognito finds that Table 7.1 is 3-anonymous with respect to domain tuples
〈S1, R1〉, 〈S0, R2〉 and 〈S1, R2〉.
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7.3 Non-discrimination Model
We use the measure presented in Section 6.1 (see Definition 26).
7.4 Simultaneous Privacy Preservation and Discrimination
Prevention
We want to obtain anonymized data tables that are protected against record linkage and also
free from discrimination, more specifically α-protective k-anonymous data tables defined as
follows.
Definition 28 (α-protective k-anonymous data table). Let D(A1, · · · , An) be a data table,
QI = {Q1, · · · , Qm} a quasi-identifier, DA a set of PD attributes, k an anonymity threshold,
and α a discrimination threshold. D is α-protective k-anonymous if it is both k-anonymous
and α-protective with respect to QI and DA, respectively.
We focus on the problem of producing a version of D that is α-protective k-anonymous
with respect to QI and DA. The problem could be investigated with respect to different
possible relations between categories of attributes in D. k-Anonymity uses quasi-identifiers
for re-identification, so we take the worst case for privacy in which all attributes are QI
except the class/decision attribute. On the other hand, each QI attribute can be PD or
not. In summary, the following relations are assumed: (1) QI∩C = ∅, (2) DA ⊆ QI. Taking
the largest possible QI makes sense indeed. The more attributes are included in QI, the
more protection k-anonymity provides and, in general, the more information loss it causes.
Thus, we test our proposal in the worst-case privacy scenario. On the discrimination side,
as explained in Section 7.4.2, the more attributes are included in QI, the more protection
is provided by α-protection.
7.4.1 The Generalization-based Approach
To design a method, we need to consider the impact of data generalization on discrimination.
Definition 29. Let D be a data table having a quasi-identifier QI = {Q1, · · · , Qn} with
corresponding domain generalization hierarchies Dom1, · · · , Domn. Let DA be a set of PD
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attributes associated with D. Each node N in Domi is said to be PD if Domi corresponds
to one of the attributes in DA and N is not the singleton of Domi. Otherwise node N is
said to be PND.
Definition 29 states that not only ungeneralized nodes of PD attributes are PD but also
the generalized nodes of these domains are PD. For example, in South Africa, about 80%
of the population is Black, 9% White, 9% Colored and 2% Asian. Generalizing the Race
attribute in a census of the South African population to {White, Non-White} causes the
Non-White node to inherit the PD nature of Black, Colored and Asian. We consider the
singleton nodes as PND because generalizing all instances of all values of a domain to single
value is PND, e.g. generalizing all instances of male and female values to any-sex is PND.
Example 11. Continuing the motivating example, consider DA = {Race, Sex} and Fig-
ure 7.1 left. Based on Definition 29, in the domain generalization hierarchy of Race, Sex
and Hours, R0, R1, S0 are PD nodes, whereas R2, S1, H0, H1 and H2 are PND nodes.
When we generalize data (i.e. full-domain generalization) can we achieve α-protection?
By presenting two main scenarios we show that the answer can be yes or no depending on
the generalization:
• When the original data table D is biased versus some protected groups w.r.t. DA
and f (i.e., there is at least a frequent rule c : A → C such that f(c) ≥ α, where A
is PD itemset w.r.t. DA), a full-domain generalization can make D α-protective if it
includes the generalization of the respective protected groups (i.e. A).
• When the original data table D is biased versus a subset of the protected groups w.r.t.
DA (i.e., there is at least a frequent rule c : A,B → C such that f(c) ≥ α, where A
is a PD itemset and B is PND itemset w.r.t. DA), a full-domain generalization can
make D α-protective if any of the following holds: (1) it includes the generalization
of the respective protected groups (i.e. A); (2) it includes the generalization of the
attributes which define the respective subsets of the protected groups (i.e. B); (3) it
includes both (1) and (2).
Then, given the generalization lattice of D over QI, where DA ⊆ QI, there are some
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candidate nodes for which D is α-protective (i.e., α-protective full-domain generalizations).
Thus, we observe the following.
Observation 1. k-Anonymity and α-protection can be achieved simultaneously in D by
means of full-domain generalization.
Example 12. Continuing Example 10, suppose f = elift and consider the generalization
lattice over QI attributes in Fig. 7.2. Among three 3-anonymous full-domain generaliza-
tions, only 〈S1, R1〉 and 〈S1, R2〉 are also 1.2-protective with respect to DA = {Sex}.
Our task is to obtain α-protective k-anonymous full-domain generalizations. The naive
approach is the sequential way: first, obtain k-anonymous full-domain generalizations and
then restrict to the subset of these that are α-protective. Although this would solve the
problem, it is a very expensive solution: discrimination should be measured for each k-
anonymous full-domain generalization to determine whether it is α-protective. In the next
section we present a more efficient algorithm that takes advantage of the common properties
of α-protection and k-anonymity.
7.4.2 The Algorithm
In this section, we present an optimal algorithm for obtaining all possible full-domain gen-
eralizations with which D is α-protective k-anonymous.
7.4.2.1 Foundations
Observation 2 (Subset property of α-protection). From Definition 26, observe that if D
is α-protective with respect to DA, it is α-protective w.r.t. any subset of attributes in DA.
The converse property does not hold in general.
For example, if Table 7.1 is 1.2-protective w.r.t DA = {Sex,Race}, Table 7.1 must
also be 1.2-protective w.r.t. DA = {Sex} and DA = {Race}. Otherwise put, if Table
7.1 is not 1.2-protective w.r.t. DA = {Sex} or it is not 1.2 protective w.r.t. DA =
{Race}, it cannot be 1.2-protective w.r.t. DA = {Sex,Race}. This is in correspondence
with the subset property of k-anonymity. Thus, α-protection w.r.t. all strict subsets of
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DA is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for α-protection w.r.t. DA. Then, given
generalization hierarchies over QI, the generalizations that are not α-protective w.r.t. a
subset DA′ of DA can be discarded along with all their descendants in the hierarchy.
To prove the generalization property of α-protection, we need a preliminary well-known
mathematical result, stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let x1, · · · , xn, y1, · · · , yn be positive integers and let x = x1 + · · · + xn and
y = y1 + · · ·+ yn. Then
min
1≤i≤n
{
xi
yi
}
≤ x
y
≤ max
1≤i≤n
{
xi
yi
}
.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that x1y1 ≤ · · · ≤ xnyn . Then
x
y
=
y1
y
x1
y1
+ · · ·+ yn
y
xn
yn
≤
(
y1
y
+ · · ·+ yn
y
)
xn
yn
≤ xn
yn
.
The other inequality is proven analogously.
Proposition 1 (Generalization property of α-protection). Let D be a data table and P and
Q be nodes in the generalization lattice of DA with DP ≤D DQ. If D is α-protective w.r.t.
to P considering minimum support ms = 1 and discrimination measure elift or clift, then
D is also α-protective w.r.t. to Q.
Proof. Let A1, . . . , An and A be itemsets in P and Q, respectively, such that {A1, . . . , An} =
γ−1(A). That is, A is the generalization of {A1, . . . , An}. Let B be an itemset from
attributes in QI \DA, and C a decision item. For simplicity, assume that supp(Ai, B) > 0
for i = 1, . . . , n. According to Section 6.1, for the PD rule c : A,B → C,
elift(c) =
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(B,C)
supp(B)
and clift(c) =
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
supp(X,B,C)
supp(X,B)
,
where X is the most favored itemset in Q with respect to B and C. Since supp(A,B) =∑
i supp(A
i, B), and supp(A,B,C) =
∑
i supp(A
i, B,C), by Lemma 4 we obtain that
supp(A,B,C)
supp(A,B)
≤ max
i
supp(Ai, B,C)
supp(Ai, B)
.
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Hence if none of the rules Ai, B → C are α-discriminatory with respect to the measure
elift, then the rule A,B → C is not α-discriminatory. Now we consider the measure clift.
Let Y be the most favored itemset in P with respect to the itemsets B and the item C. By
following an analogous argument, we obtain that
supp(X,B,C)
supp(X,B)
≥ supp(Y,B,C)
supp(Y,B)
.
Therefore if none of the rules Ai, B → C are α-discriminatory with respect to the measure
clift, then c is not α-discriminatory.
For example, considering DA = {Race} and f = elift or f = clift, based on the gen-
eralization property of k-anonymity, if Table 7.1 is 3-anonymous w.r.t. 〈R0, H0〉, it must
be also 3-anonymous w.r.t. 〈R1, H0〉 and 〈R0, H1〉. However, based on the generalization
property of α-protection, if Table 7.1 is 1.2-protective w.r.t. 〈R0, H0〉, it must be also 1.2-
protective w.r.t. 〈R1, H0〉, which contains the generalization of the attributes in DA, but
not necessarily w.r.t. 〈R0, H1〉 (the latter generalization is for an attribute not in DA).
Thus, we notice that the generalization property of α-protection is weaker than the general-
ization property of k-anonymity, because the former is only guaranteed for generalizations
of attributes in DA ⊆ QI, whereas the latter holds for generalizations of any attribute
in QI. Moreover, the generalization property has a limitation. Based on Definition 26, a
data table is α-protective w.r.t. DA if all PD frequent rules extracted from the data table
are not α-discriminatory w.r.t. DA. Hence, a data table might contain PD rules which
are not α-protective and not frequent, e.g. Age=25, City=NYC → Credit=no, Age=27,
City=NYC → Credit=no, Age=28, City=NYC → Credit=no, where DA = {Age}. How-
ever, after generalization, frequent PD rules can appear which might be α-discriminatory
and discrimination will show up, e.g. Age=[25-30], City=NYC → Credit=no. This is
why the generalization property of α-protection requires that α-protection w.r.t. P hold
for all PD rules, frequent and infrequent (this explains the condition ms = 1 in Proposi-
tion 1). The next property allows improving the efficiency of the algorithm for obtaining
α-protective k-anonymous data tables by means of full-domain generalizations. Its proof is
straightforward.
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Proposition 2 (Roll-up property of α-protection). Let D be a data table with records in a
domain tuple DT , let DT ′ be a domain tuple with DT ≤D DT ′, and let γ : DT → DT ′ be
the associated generalization function. The support of an itemset X in DT ′ is the sum of
the supports of the itemsets in γ−1(X).
7.4.2.2 Overview
We take Incognito as an optimal anonymization algorithm based on the above properties
and extend it to generate the set of all possible α-protective k-anonymous full-domain
generalizations of D. Based on the subset property for α-protection and k-anonymity, the
algorithm, named α-protective Incognito, begins by checking single-attribute subsets of QI,
and then iterates by checking k-anonymity and α-protection with respect to increasingly
larger subsets, in a manner reminiscent of [2]. Consider a graph of candidate multi-attribute
generalizations (nodes) constructed from a subset of QI of size i. Denote this subset by
Ci. The set of direct multi-attribute generalization relationships (edges) connecting these
nodes is denoted by Ei. The i-th iteration of α-protective Incognito performs a search
that determines first the k-anonymity status and second the α-protection status of table D
with respect to each candidate generalization in Ci. This is accomplished using a modified
bottom-up breadth-first search, beginning at each node in the graph that is not the direct
generalization of some other node. A modified breadth-first search over the graph yields
the set of multi-attribute generalizations of size i with respect to which D is α-protective
k-anonymous (denoted by Si). After obtaining the entire Si, the algorithm constructs the
set of candidate nodes of size i+ 1 (Ci+1), and the edges connecting them (Ei+1) using the
subset property.
7.4.2.3 Description
Algorithm 13 describes α-protective Incognito. In the i-th iteration, the algorithm de-
termines the k-anonymity status of D with respect to each node in Ci by computing the
frequency set in one of the following ways: if the node is root, the frequency set is computed
using D. Otherwise, for non-root nodes, the frequency set is computed using all parents’
frequency sets. This is based on the roll-up property for k-anonymity. If D is k-anonymous
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with respect to the attributes of the node, the algorithm performs two actions. First, it
marks all direct generalizations of the node as k-anonymous. This is based on the gener-
alization property for k-anonymity: these generalizations need not be checked anymore for
k-anonymity in the subsequent search iterations. Second, if the node contains at least one
PD attribute and i ≤ τ (where τ is the discrimination granularity level, see definition fur-
ther below), the algorithm determines the α-protection status of D by computing function
Check α-protection(i, node) (see Algorithm 14). If D is α-protective w.r.t. the attributes of
the node, the algorithm marks as α-protective k-anonymous all direct generalizations of the
node which are α-protective according to the generalization property of α-protection. The
algorithm will not check them anymore for α-protection in the subsequent search iterations.
Finally, the algorithm constructs Ci+1 and Ei+1 by considering only nodes in Ci that are
marked as α-protective k-anonymous.
The discrimination granularity level τ ≤ |QI| is one of the inputs of α-protective Incog-
nito. The larger τ , the more protection regarding discrimination will be achieved. The
reason is that, if the algorithm can check the status of α-protection in D w.r.t. nodes which
contain more attributes (i.e., finer-grained subsets of protected groups), then more possi-
ble local niches of discrimination in D are discovered. However, a greater τ leads to more
computation by α-protective Incognito, because α-protection of D should be checked in
more iterations. In fact, by setting τ < |QI|, we can provide a trade-off between efficiency
and discrimination protection. As mentioned above, Algorithm 14 implements the Check
α-protection(i, node) function to check the α-protection of D with respect to the attributes
of the node. To do it in an efficient way, first the algorithm generates the set of l-itemsets
of attributes of node with their support values, denoted by Il, and the set of (l+1)-itemsets
of attributes of node and class attribute, with their support values, denoted by Il+1, where
l = i is the number of items in the itemset. In SQL language, Il and Il+1 is obtained from
D by issuing a suitable query. This computation is only necessary for root nodes in each
iteration; for non-root nodes, Il and Il+1 are obtained from Il and Il+1 of parent nodes based
on the roll-up property of α-protection. Then, PD classification rules (i.e. PDgroups) with
the required values to compute each f in Figure 2.1 (i.e. n1, a1, n2 and a2) are obtained
by scanning Il+1. During the scan of Il+1, PD classification rules A,B → C (i.e. PDgroups)
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are obtained with the respective values a1 = supp(A,B,C), n1 = supp(A,B) (note that
supp(A,B) is in Il), a2 = supp(¬A,B,C) (obtained from Il+1), and n2 = supp(¬A,B) (ob-
tained from Il). By relaxing τ we can limit the maximum number of itemsets in Il and Il+1
that are generated during the execution of α-protective Incognito. After obtaining PDgroups
with the values a1, a2, n1 and n2, Algorithm 14 computes the function Measure disc (α,
ms, f) (see Algorithm 15). This function takes f as a parameter and is based on the gen-
eralization property of α-protection. If f = slift or f = olift and if there exists at least
one frequent group A,B → C in PDgroups with slift(A,B → C) ≥ α, then MR = case1
(i.e. D is not α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node). Otherwise, MR = case2 (i.e. D is
α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node). If f = elift or f = clift, the generalization prop-
erty of α-protection is satisfied, so if there exists at least one frequent group A,B → C in
PDgroups with elift(A,B → C) ≥ α, then MR = case1. Otherwise if there exists at least
one infrequent group A,B → C in PDgroups with elift(A,B → C) ≥ α, then MR = case2.
Otherwise if all groups in PDgroups, frequent and infrequent, have elift(A,B → C) < α,
MR = case3. It is worth mentioning that in the i-th iteration of α-protective Incognito, for
each node in Ci, first k-anonymity will be checked and then α-protection. This is because
the algorithm only checks α-protection for the nodes that contain at least one PD attribute,
while k-anonymity is checked for all nodes. Moreover, in some iterations, the algorithm does
not check α-protection if τ < |QI|.
Example 13. Consider Table 7.1 and suppose that QI = {Sex,Race} and Credit approved
are the only attributes in the data table, and DA = {Gender}, k = 3 and α = 1.2. The
first iteration of Incognito (Figure 7.3 up-left) finds that Table 7.1 is not 3-anonymous
w.r.t. 〈R0〉. The second iteration of Incognito performs a breadth-first search to determine
the k-anonymity status of Table 7.1 w.r.t. 2-attribute generalizations of 〈Sex,Race〉 by
considering all the 1-attribute generalizations of the first iteration except 〈R0〉. Incognito
(Figure 7.3 down-left) finds that Table 7.1 is not 3-anonymous w.r.t. 〈S0, R1〉, while other
generalizations are 3-anonymous. The first iteration of α-protective Incognito (Figure 7.3
up-right) finds that Table 7.1 is not 3-anonymous w.r.t. 〈R0〉 and Table 7.1 is not 1.2-
protective w.r.t. 〈S0〉. The second iteration of α-protective Incognito performs a breadth-first
search to determine the k-anonymity and α-protection status of Table 7.1 w.r.t. 2-attribute
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Iteration 1
〈S0〉
〈S1〉
〈R0〉
〈R1〉
〈R2〉
Incognito
〈S1〉
〈S0〉 〈R0〉
〈R1〉
〈R2〉
α-protective Incognito
Iteration 2
〈S1, R2〉
〈S1, R1〉 〈S0, R2〉
〈S0, R1〉
〈S1, R2〉
〈S1, R1〉
Incognito α-protective Incognito
Figure 7.3: The candidate 1- and 2-attribute generalization of Table 7.1 by Incognito(left)
and α-protective Incognito (right)
generalizations of 〈Sex,Race〉 by considering all the 1-attribute generalizations of the first
iteration except 〈R0〉 and 〈S0〉. α-protective Incognito (Figure 7.3 down-right) finds that
Table 7.1 is 3-anonymous and 1.2-protective w.r.t. both 〈S1, R1〉 and 〈S1, R2〉.
7.5 Experiments
Our first objective is to evaluate the performance of α-protective Incognito (Algorithm 13)
and compare it with Incognito. Our second objective is to evaluate the quality of unbiased
anonymous data output by α-protective Incognito, compared to that of the anonymous
data output by plain Incognito, using both general and specific data analysis metrics. We
implemented all algorithms using Java and IBM DB2. All experiments were performed on
an Intel Core i5 CPU with 4 GB of RAM. The software included windows 7 Home Edition
and DB2 Express Version 9.7. We considered different values of f , DA, k, α and τ in our
experiments.
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7.5.1 Dataset
In our experiments, we used the Adult data set introduced in Section 4.9.1. We ran exper-
iments on the training set of the Adult dataset. We used the same 8 categorical attributes
used in [29], shown in Table 7.2, and obtained their generalization hierarchies from the
authors of [29]. For our experiments, we set ms = 5% and 8 attributes in Table 7.2
as QI, and DA1 = {Race,Gender,Marital status}, DA2 = {Race,Marital status} and
DA3 = {Race,Gender}. The smaller ms, the more computation and the more discrimina-
tion discovery. In this way, we considered a very demanding scenario in terms of privacy
(all 8 attributes were QI) and anti-discrimination (small ms).
Table 7.2: Description of the Adult data set
Attribute #Distinct values #Levels of hierarchies
Education 16 5
Marital status 7 4
Native country 40 5
Occupation 14 3
Race 5 3
Relationship 6 3
Sex 2 2
Work-class 8 5
7.5.2 Performance
Figure 7.4 reports the execution time of α-protective Incognito, for different values of τ ,
DA, f , k in comparison with Incognito. We observe that for both algorithms, as the size
of k increases, the performance of algorithms improves. This is mainly because, as the
size of k increases, more generalizations are pruned as part of smaller subsets, and less
execution time is needed. Moreover, we observe that Incognito is faster than α-protective
Incognito only if the value of τ is very high (i.e. τ = 6 or τ = 8). By decreasing the
value of τ , α-protective Incognito runs even faster than Incognito. The explanation is that,
with α-protective Incognito, more generalizations are pruned as part of smaller subsets
by checking both k-anonymity and α-protection, and less execution time is needed. The
difference between the performance of the two algorithms gets smaller when k increases.
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Figure 7.4: Performance of Incognito and α-protective Incognito for several values of k, τ ,
f and DA. Unless otherwise specified, f = slift , DA = DA1 and τ = 4.
In addition, because of the generalization property of α-protection with respect to elift,
α-protective Incognito is faster for f = elift than for f = slift. However, this difference
is not substantial since, as we mentioned in Section 7.4.2, α-protection should consider all
frequent and infrequent PD rules. In summary, since α-protective Incognito provides extra
protection (i.e. against discrimination) in comparison with Incognito, the cost is sometimes
a longer execution time, specifically when the value of τ is very high, near to |QI|. When
τ is small, α-protective Incognito can even be faster than Incognito. Hence, given that
discrimination discovery is an intrinsically expensive task, our solution is optimal and offers
reasonable performance for off-line application.
7.5.3 Data Quality
Privacy preservation and discrimination prevention are one side of the problem we tackle.
The other side is retaining information so that the published data remain practically useful.
Data quality can be measured in general or with respect to a specific data analysis task
(e.g. classification). First, we evaluate the data quality of the protected data obtained by α-
protective Incognito and Incognito using as general metrics the generalization height [51, 78]
and discernibility [8]. The generalization height (GH) is the height of an anonymized data
table in the generalization lattice. Intuitively, it corresponds to the number of generalization
steps that were performed. The discernibility metric charges a penalty to each record for
being indistinguishable from other records. For each record in equivalence QI class qid, the
penalty is |DB[qid]|. Thus, the discernibility cost is equivalent to the sum of the |DB[qid]|2.
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We define the discernibility ratio (DR) as DR=
∑
qid |DB[qid]|2
|DB|2 . Note that: i) 0 ≤ DR ≤ 1;
ii) lower DR and GH mean higher data quality. From the list of full-domain generalizations
obtained from Incognito and α-protective Incognito, respectively, we compute the minimal
full-domain generalization w.r.t. both GH and DR for each algorithm and compare them.
Second, we measure the data quality of the anonymous data obtained by α-protective
Incognito and Incognito for a classification task using the classification metric CM from
[42]. CM charges a penalty for each record generalized to a qid group in which the record’s
class is not the majority class. Lower CM means higher data quality. From the list of full-
domain generalizations obtained from Incognito and α-protective Incognito, respectively,
we compute the minimal full-domain generalization w.r.t. CM for each algorithm and we
compare them. In addition, to evaluate the impact of our transformations on the accuracy
of a classification task, we first obtain the minimal full-domain generalization w.r.t. CM to
anonymize the training set. Then, the same generalization is applied to the testing set to
produce a generalized testing set. Next, we build a classifier on the anonymized training
set and measure the classification accuracy (CA) on the generalized records of the testing
set. For classification models we use the well-known decision tree classifier J48 from the
Weka software package [92]. We also measure the classification accuracy on the original
data without anonymization. The difference represents the cost in terms of classification
accuracy for achieving either both privacy preservation and discrimination prevention or
privacy preservation only. Fig. 7.5 summarizes the data quality results using general metrics
for different values of k, DA and α, where f = slift. We found that the data quality of
k-anonymous tables (i.e. in terms of GH and DR) without α-protection is equal or slightly
better than the quality of k-anonymous tables with α-protection. This is because the α-
protection k-anonymity requirement provides extra protection (i.e., against discrimination)
at the cost of some data quality loss when DA and k are large and α is small. As k
increases, more generalizations are needed to achieve k-anonymity, which increases GH and
DR. We performed the same experiment for other values of f , and we observed a similar
trend (details omitted due to lack of space).
The left chart of Fig. 7.6 summarizes the data quality results using the classification
metric (CM) for different values of k, DA and α, where f = slift. We found that the data
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Figure 7.5: General data quality metrics. Left, generalization height (GH). Right, discerni-
bility ratio (DR). Results are given for k-anonymity (I); and α-protection k-anonymity with
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Figure 7.6: Data quality for classification analysis Left, classification metric (CM). Right,
classification accuracy, in percentage (CA). Results are given for the original data (0); k-
anonymity (I); and α-protection k-anonymity with DA3, α = 1.2 (II); DA3, α = 1.6 (III);
DA1, α = 1.2 (IV); DA1, α = 1.6 (V). In all cases f = slift.
quality of k-anonymous tables (i.e. in terms of CM) without α-protection is equal or slightly
better than the quality of k-anonymous tables with α-protection. This is because the α-
protection k-anonymity requirement provides extra protection (i.e., against discrimination)
at the cost of some data quality loss when DA and k are large. The right chart of Fig.
7.6 summarizes the impact of achieving k-anonymity or α-protection k-anonymity on the
percentage classification accuracy (CA) of J48 for different values of k, DA and α, where
f = slift. We observe a similar trend as for CM. The accuracies of J48 using k-anonymous
tables without α-protection are equal or slightly better than the accuracies of J48 using
k-anonymous tables with α-protection.
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7.6 Extensions
We consider here alternative privacy models and anti-discrimination requirements.
7.6.1 Alternative Privacy Models
7.6.1.1 Attribute Disclosure
In contrast to k-anonymity, the privacy models in attribute linkage assume the existence of
sensitive attributes in D such that QI ∩ S = ∅. As shown in [61, 56], by using full-domain
generalizations over QI, we can obtain data tables protected against attribute disclosure.
Considering attribute disclosure risks, we focus on the problem of producing an anonymized
version of D which is protected against attribute disclosure and free from discrimination
(e.g., α-protective l-diverse data table). We study this problem considering the following
possible relations between QI, DA and S:
• DA ⊆ QI: It is possible that the original data are biased in the subsets of the
protected groups which are defined by sensitive attributes (e.g. women who have
medium salary). In this case, only full-domain generalizations which include the
generalization of protected groups values can make D α-protective. This is because
the generalization is only performed over QI attributes.
• DA ⊆ S: A full-domain generalization over QI can make the original data α-protective
only ifD is biased in the subsets of protected groups which are defined by QI attributes.
In other scenarios, i.e., when data is biased versus some protected groups or subsets of
protected groups which are defined by sensitive attributes, full-domain generalizations
over QI cannot make D α-protective. One possible solution is to generalize attributes
which are both sensitive and PD (e.g., Religion in some applications), even if they are
not in QI.
Observation 3. If DA ⊆ QI, l-diversity/t-closeness and α-protection can be achieved
simultaneously in D by means of full-domain generalization.
Since the subset and generalization properties are also satisfied for l-diversity and t-closeness,
to obtain all full-domain generalizations with which data is α-protective and protected
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against attribute disclosure, we take α-protective Incognito and make the following changes:
1) every time a data table is tested for k-anonymity, it is also tested for l-diversity or t-
closeness; 2) every time a data table is tested for α-protection, it is tested w.r.t. attributes of
node and sensitive attributes. This can be done by simply updating the Check α-protection
function. Just as the data quality of k-anonymous data tables without l-diversity or t-
closeness is slightly better than the quality of k-anonymous data tables with l-diversity or
t-closeness, we expect a similar slight quality loss when adding l-diversity or t-closeness to
k-anonymity α-protection.
7.6.1.2 Differential Privacy
We define a differential private data table as an anonymized data table generated by a
function (algorithm) which is differentially private. The general structure of differentially
private data release approaches is to first build a contingency table of the original raw
data over the database domain. After that, noise is added to each frequency count in
the contingency table to satisfy differential privacy. However, as mentioned in [65], these
approaches are not suitable for high-dimensional data with a large domain because when the
added noise is relatively large compared to the count, the utility of the data is significantly
decreased. In [65], a generalization-based algorithm for differentially private data release
is presented. It first probabilistically generates a generalized contingency table and then
adds noise to the counts. Thanks to generalization, the count of each partition is typically
much larger than the added noise. In this way, generalization helps to achieve a differential
private version of D with higher data utility. Considering the differential privacy model, we
focus on the problem of producing an anonymized version of D which is differentially private
and free from discrimination with respect to DA. Since the differentially private version of
D is an approximation of D generated at random, we have the following observation.
Observation 4. Making original data table D differentially private using Laplace noise
addition can make D more or less α-protective w.r.t. DA and f .
Given the above observation and the fact that generalization can help to achieve differ-
ential privacy with higher data quality, we propose to obtain a noisy generalized contingency
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table of B which is also α-protective. To do this, one solution is to add uncertainty to an al-
gorithm that generates all possible full-domain generalizations with which D is α-protective.
As shown in [65], for higher values of the privacy budget, the quality of differentially pri-
vate data tables is higher than the quality of k-anonymous data tables, while for smaller
value of the privacy budget it is the other way round. Therefore, we expect that differen-
tial privacy plus discrimination prevention will compare similarly to the k-anonymity plus
discrimination prevention presented in the previous sections of this chapter.
7.6.2 Alternative Anti-discrimination Legal Concepts
Unlike privacy legislation, anti-discrimination legislation is very sparse and includes different
legal concepts, e.g. direct and indirect discrimination and the so-called genuine occupational
requirement.
7.6.2.1 Indirect Discrimination
Indirect discrimination occurs when the input does not contain PD attributes, but dis-
criminatory decisions against protected groups might be indirectly made because of the
availability of some background knowledge; for example, discrimination against black peo-
ple might occur if the input data contain Zipcode as attribute (but not Race) and one knows
that the specific zipcode is mostly inhabited by black people 1 (i.e., there is high correla-
tion between Zipcode and Race attributes). Then, if the protected groups do not exist in
the original data table or have been removed from it due to privacy or anti-discrimination
constraints, indirect discrimination still remains possible. Given DA, we define background
knowledge as the correlation between DA and PND attributes which are in D:
BK = {Ai → Ax|Ai ∈ A, Ai is PND and Ax ∈ DA}
Given BK, we define IA as a set of PND attributes in D which are highly correlated to
DA, determined according to BK. Building on Definition 11, we introduce the notion of
non-redlining α-protection for a data table.
1http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0385:EN:Not
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Definition 30 (Non-redlining α-protected data table). Given D(A1, · · · , An), DA, f and
BK, D is said to satisfy non-redlining α-protection or to be non-redlining α-protective w.r.t.
DA and f if each PND frequent classification rule c : D,B → C extracted from D is α-
protective, where D is a PND itemset of IA attributes and B is a PND itemset of A\IA
attributes.
Given DA and BK, releasing a non-redlining α-protective version of an original table
is desirable to prevent indirect discrimination against protected groups w.r.t. DA. Since
indirect discrimination against protected groups originates from the correlation between
DA and IA attributes, a natural countermeasure is to diminish this correlation. Then,
an anonymized version of original data table protected against indirect discrimination (i.e.
non-redlining α-protective) can be generated by generalizing IA attributes. As an example,
generalizing all instances of 47677, 47602 and 47678 zipcode values to the same generalized
value 467** can prevent indirect discrimination against black people living in the 47602
neighborhood.
Observation 5. If IA ⊆ QI, non-redlining α-protection can be achieved in D by means of
full-domain generalization.
Consequently, non-redlining α-protection can be achieved with each of the above men-
tioned privacy models based on full-domain generalization of D (e.g. k-anonymity), as long
as IA ⊆ QI. Fortunately, the subset and generalization properties satisfied by α-protection
are also satisfied by non-redlining α-protection. Hence, in order to obtain all possible full-
domain generalizations with which D is indirect discrimination and privacy protected, we
take α-protective Incognito and make the following changes: 1) add BK as the input of the
algorithm and determine IA w.r.t. BK, where PD attributes are removed from D; 2) every
time a data table is tested for α-protection, test it for non-redlining α-protection instead.
Considering the above changes, when combining indirect discrimination prevention and pri-
vacy protection, we expect similar data quality and algorithm performance as we had when
combining direct discrimination prevention and privacy protection.
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7.6.2.2 Genuine occupational requirement
The legal concept of genuine occupational requirement refers to detecting that part of the
discrimination which may be explained by other attributes [97], named legally grounded at-
tributes; e.g., denying credit to women may be explainable if most of them have low salary
or delay in returning previous credits. Whether low salary or delay in returning previous
credits is an acceptable legitimate argument to deny credit is for the law to determine.
Given a set LA of legally grounded attributes in D, there are some works which attempt to
cater technically to them in the anti-discrimination protection [60, 97, 20]. The general idea
is to prevent only unexplainable (bad) discrimination. Loung et al. [60] propose a variant
of the k-nearest neighbor (k-NN) classification which labels each record in a data table as
discriminated or not. A record t is discriminated if: i) it has a negative decision value in
its class attribute; and ii) the difference between the proportions of k-nearest neighbors of
t w.r.t. LA whose decision value is the same of t and belong to the same protected-by-law
groups as t and the ones that do not belong to the same protected groups as t is greater than
the discrimination threshold. This implies that the negative decision for t is not explainable
on the basis of the legally grounded attributes, but it is biased by group membership. We
say that a data table is protected only against unexplainable discrimination w.r.t. DA and
LA if the number of records labeled as discriminated is zero (or near zero). An anonymized
version of an original data table which is protected against unexplainable discrimination
can be generated by generalizing LA and/or DA attributes. Given a discriminated record,
generalizing LA and/or DA attributes can decrease the difference between the two above
mentioned proportions. Hence, an anonymized version of original data table which is pro-
tected against unexplainable discrimination and privacy protected can be obtained using
full-domain generalization over QI attributes as long as DA ⊆ QI and LA ⊆ QI.
7.7 Conclusions
We have investigated the problem of discrimination- and privacy-aware data publishing and
analysis, i.e., distorting an original data set in such a way that neither privacy-violating nor
discriminatory inferences can be made on the released data sets. To study the impact of data
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generalization (i.e. full-domain generalization) on discrimination prevention, we applied
generalization not only for making the original data privacy-protected but also for making
them protected against discrimination. We found that a subset of k-anonymous full-domain
generalizations with the same or slightly higher data distortion than the rest (in terms of
general and specific data analysis metrics) are also α-protective. Hence, k-anonymity and
α-protection can be combined to attain privacy protection and discrimination prevention
in the published data set. We have adapted to α-protection two well-known properties of
k-anonymity, namely the subset and the generalization properties. This has allowed us to
propose an α-protective version of Incognito, which can take as parameters several legally
grounded measures of discrimination and generate privacy- and discrimination-protected
full-domain generalizations. We have evaluated the quality of data output by this algorithm,
as well as its execution time. Both turn out to be nearly as good as for the case of the
plain Incognito, so the toll paid to obtain α-protection is very reasonable. Finally, we have
sketched how our approach can be extended to satisfy alternative privacy guarantees or
anti-discrimination legal constraints.
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Algorithm 13 α-protective Incognito
Input: Original data table D, a set QI = {Q1, · · · , Qn} of quasi-identifier attributes, a set of domain
generalization hierarchies Dom1, · · · , Domn, a set of PD attributes DA, α, f , k, C={Class item},
ms=minimum support, τ ≤ |QI|
Output: The set of α-protective k-anonymous full-domain generalizations
1: C1={Nodes in the domain generalization hierarchies of attributes in QI}
2: CPD = {∀C ∈ C1 s.t. C is PD}
3: E1={Edges in the domain generalization hierarchies of attributes in QI}
4: queue=an empty queue
5: for i = 1 to n do
6: //Ci and Ei define a graph of generalizations
7: Si=copy of Ci
8: {roots}={all nodes ∈ Ci with no edge ∈ Ei directed to them}
9: Insert {roots} into queue, keeping queue sorted by height
10: while queue is not empty do
11: node = Remove first item from queue
12: if node is not marked as k-anonymous or α-protective k-anonymous then
13: if node is a root then
14: frequencySet= Compute the frequency set of D w.r.t. attributes of node using D.
15: else
16: frequencySet= Compute the frequency set of D w.r.t. attributes of node using the parents’
frequency sets.
17: end if
18: Use frequencySet to check k-anonymity w.r.t. attributes of node
19: if D is k-anonymous w.r.t. attributes of node then
20: Mark all direct generalizations of node as k-anonymous
21: if ∃N ∈ CPD s.t. N ⊆ node and i ≤ τ then
22: if node is a root then
23: MR= Check α-protection(i, node) of D w.r.t. attributes of node using D.
24: else
25: MR= Check α-protection(i, node) of D w.r.t. attributes of node using parents’ Il
and Il+1
26: end if
27: Use MR to check α-protection w.r.t. attributes of node
28: if MR = case3 then
29: Mark all direct generalizations of node that contain the generalization of N as k-
anonymous α-protective
30: else if MR = case1 then
31: Delete node from Si
32: Insert direct generalizations of node into queue, keeping queue ordered by height
33: end if
34: end if
35: else
36: Steps 31-32
37: end if
38: else if node is marked as k-anonymous then
39: Steps 21-36
40: end if
41: end while
42: Ci+1, Ei+1 = GraphGeneration(Si, Ei)
43: end for
44: Return projection of attributes of Sn onto D and Dom1, ..., Domn
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Algorithm 14 Check α-protection (i, node)
1: l = i
2: Il={l-itemsets containing attributes of node}
3: Il+1={(l + 1)-itemsets containing attributes of node and class item C}
4: for each R ∈ Il+1 do
5: X = R\C
6: a1 = supp(R)
7: n1 = supp(X) // X found in Il
8: A=largest subset of X containing protected groups w.r.t. DA
9: T = R\A
10: Z = ¬A ∪ T
11: a2 = supp(Z) // Obtained from Il+1
12: n2 = supp(Z\C) // Obtained from Il
13: Add R : A,B → C to PDgroups with values a1, n1, a2 and n2
14: end for
15: Return MR=Measure disc(α, ms, f)
Algorithm 15 Measure disc(α, ms, f)
1: if f = slift or olift then
2: if ∃ a group (A,B → C) in PDgroup which is frequent w.r.t. ms and α-discriminatory w.r.t. f then
3: Return MR = Case1 // D is not α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node
4: else
5: Return MR = Case2 // D is α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node
6: end if
7: end if
8: if f = elift or clift then
9: if ∃ a group (A,B → C) in PDgroup which is frequent w.r.t. ms and α-discriminatory w.r.t. f then
10: Return MR = Case1 // D is not α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node
11: else if ∃ a group (A,B → C) in PDgroup which is infrequent w.r.t. ms and α-discriminatory w.r.t.
f then
12: Return MR = Case2 // D is α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node
13: else if f = clift and ∃ a group (A,B → C) in PDgroup which is infrequent w.r.t. ms whose
confidence is lower than the confidence of the most favored item considered in the computation of
clift then
14: Return MR = Case2 // D is α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node
15: else
16: Return MR = Case3 // D is α-protective w.r.t. attributes of node and subsets of its general-
izations
17: end if
18: end if
Chapter 8
Conclusions
In the information society, massive and automated data collection occurs as a consequence
of the ubiquitous digital traces we all generate in our daily life. The availability of such
wealth of data makes its publication and analysis highly desirable for a variety of purposes,
including policy making, planning, marketing, research, etc. Yet, the real and obvious bene-
fits of data analysis and publishing have a dual, darker side. There are at least two potential
threats for individuals whose information is published: privacy invasion and potential dis-
crimination. Privacy invasion occurs when the values of published sensitive attributes can
be linked to specific individuals (or companies). Discrimination is unfair or unequal treat-
ment of people based on membership to a category, group or minority, without regard to
individual characteristics.
On the legal side, parallel to the development of privacy legislation, anti-discrimination
legislation has undergone a remarkable expansion, and it now prohibits discrimination
against protected groups on the grounds of race, color, religion, nationality, sex, marital
status, age and pregnancy, and in a number of settings, like credit and insurance, personnel
selection and wages, and access to public services. On the technology side, efforts at guar-
anteeing privacy have led to developing privacy preserving data mining (PPDM) and efforts
at fighting discrimination have led to developing anti-discrimination techniques in data min-
ing. Some proposals are oriented to the discovery and measurement of discrimination, while
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others deal with preventing data mining (DPDM) from becoming itself a source of discrim-
ination, due to automated decision making based on discriminatory models extracted from
inherently biased datasets.
However, up to now, PPDM and DPDM have been studied in isolation. Is it sufficient to
focus on one and ignore the other? Is it sufficient to guarantee data privacy while allowing
automated discovery of discriminatory profiles/models? In this thesis, we argue that the
answer is no. If there is a chance to create a trustworthy technology for knowledge discovery
and deployment, it is with a holistic approach which faces both privacy and discrimination
threats (risks). We explore the relationship between PPDM and DPDM in both contexts
of data and knowledge publishing. We design holistic approaches capable of addressing
both threats together in significant data mining processes. This thesis is the first work
inscribing simultaneously privacy and anti-discrimination with a by design approach in
data publishing and mining. It is a first example of a more comprehensive set of ethical
values that is inscribed into the analytical process.
8.1 Contributions
In more detail, our contributions are:
1. We develop a new pre-processing discrimination prevention methodology including
different data transformation methods that can prevent direct discrimination, indi-
rect discrimination or both of them at the same time. To attain this objective, the
first step is to measure discrimination and identify categories and groups of individ-
uals that have been directly and/or indirectly discriminated in the decision-making
processes; the second step is to transform data in the proper way to remove all those
discriminatory biases. Finally, discrimination-free data models can be produced from
the transformed dataset without seriously damaging data quality. The experimental
results reported demonstrate that the proposed techniques are quite successful in both
goals of removing discrimination and preserving data quality.
2. We have investigated the problem of discrimination and privacy aware frequent pattern
discovery, i.e. the sanitization of the collection of patterns mined from a transaction
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database in such a way that neither privacy-violating nor discriminatory inferences
can be inferred on the released patterns. We found that our discrimination preventing
transformations do not interfere with a privacy preserving sanitization based on k-
anonymity, thus accomplishing the task of combining the two and achieving a robust
(and formal) notion of fairness in the resulting pattern collection. Further, we have
presented extensive empirical results on the utility of the protected data. Specifically,
we evaluate the distortion introduced by our methods and its effects on classifica-
tion. It turns out that the utility loss caused by simultaneous anti-discrimination and
privacy protection is only marginally higher than the loss caused by each of those
protections separately. This result supports the practical deployment of our methods.
Moreover, we have discussed the possibility of using our proposed framework while
replacing k-anonymity with differential privacy.
3. We have investigated the relation between data anonymization techniques and anti-
discrimination to answer an important question: how privacy protection via data
anonymization impacts the discriminatory bias contained in the original data. By
presenting and analyzing different scenarios, we learn that we cannot protect original
data against privacy attacks without taking into account anti-discrimination require-
ments (i.e. α-protection). This happens because data anonymization techniques
can work against anti-discrimination. In addition, we exploit the fact that some
data anonymization techniques (e.g. specific full-domain generalization) can also pro-
tect data against discrimination. Thus, we can adapt and use some of these tech-
niques for discrimination prevention. Moreover, by considering anti-discrimination
requirements during anonymization, we can present solutions to generate privacy- and
discrimination-protected datasets. We also find that global recoding generalizations
have a more positive impact on discrimination removal than other data anonymization
techniques.
4. We have investigated the problem of discrimination- and privacy-aware data pub-
lishing and mining, i.e., distorting an original data set in such a way that neither
privacy-violating nor discriminatory inferences can be made on the released data sets.
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To study the impact of data generalization (i.e. full-domain generalization) on dis-
crimination prevention, we applied generalization not only for making the original
data privacy-protected but also for making them protected against discrimination.
We found that a subset of k-anonymous full-domain generalizations with the same
or slightly higher data distortion than the rest (in terms of general and specific data
analysis metrics) are also α-protective. Hence, k-anonymity and α-protection can
be combined to attain privacy protection and discrimination prevention in the pub-
lished data set. We have adapted to α-protection two well-known properties of k-
anonymity, namely the subset and the generalization properties. This has allowed us
to propose an α-protective version of Incognito, which can take as parameters several
legally grounded measures of discrimination and generate privacy- and discrimination-
protected full-domain generalizations. We have evaluated the quality of data output
by the proposed algorithm, as well as its execution time. Both turn out to be nearly
as good as for the case of the plain Incognito, so the toll paid to obtain α-protection
is very reasonable.
8.2 Publications
The main publications supporting the content of this thesis are the following:
• Sara Hajian, Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Antoni Mart´ınez-Balleste´. Discrimination
prevention in data mining for intrusion and crime detection. In IEEE Symposium on
Computational Intelligence in Cyber Security-CICS 2011, pp. 47-54, 2011.
• Sara Hajian, Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Antoni Mart´ınez-Balleste´. Rule protection for
indirect discrimination prevention in data mining. In Modeling Decisions for Artificial
Intelligence-MDAI 2011, LNCS 6820, pp. 211-222. Springer, 2011.
• Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Anti-discrimination and privacy protection
in released data sets. In Joint Eurostat/UNECE Work Session on Statistical Data
Confidentiality 2011, Tarragona, Catalonia, Oct. 26-28, 2011.
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• Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. A methodology for direct and indirect dis-
crimination prevention in data mining. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data
Engineering, to appear (available on-line from 22 March 2012).
• Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Antoni Mart´ınez-Balleste´. Antidiscrim-
inacio´n en la deteccio´n de delitos e intrusiones. Actas de la XII Reunio´n Espan˜ola
sobre Criptolog´ıa y Seguridad de la Informacio´n RECSI-2012.
• Sara Hajian, Anna Monreale, Dino Pedreschi, Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Fosca Gian-
notti. Injecting discrimination and privacy awareness into pattern discovery. In 2012
IEEE 12th International Conference on Data Mining Workshops, pp. 360-369. IEEE
Computer Society, 2012.
• Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. A study on the impact of data anonymization
on anti-discrimination. In 2012 IEEE 12th International Conference on Data Mining
Workshops, pp. 352-359. IEEE Computer Society, 2012.
• Sara Hajian and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Direct and Indirect Discrimination Preven-
tion Methods. In Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society 2013. pp.
241-254.
Submitted articles that are still pending acceptance:
• Sara Hajian, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, Anna Monreale, Dino Pedreschi and Fosca Gian-
notti. Discrimination- and Privacy-aware Frequent Pattern Discovery.
• Sara Hajian, Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Oriol Farra`s. Generalization-based Privacy
Preservation and Discrimination Prevention in Data Publishing and Mining.
8.3 Future Work
This thesis is the first one addressing in depth the problem of providing protection against
both privacy and discrimination threats in data mining, and it opens several future research
avenues:
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• Explore the relationship between discrimination prevention and privacy preservation
in data mining considering alternative data anonymization techniques, other than
those studied in this thesis.
• Propose new measures and techniques for measuring and preventing indirect discrim-
ination. This will require to further study the legal literature on discrimination.
• Improve the existing algorithms to achieve better utility and performance.
• Empirically compare the proposed approaches based on differential privacy with the
proposed approaches based on k-anonymity in terms of different data utility measures.
• Extend the existing approaches and algorithms to other data mining tasks.
• Make the algorithms and analyses applicable to a variety of input data.
• Present real case studies in the context of discrimination discovery and prevention in
data mining.
• Study the problem of on-line discrimination prevention. In the on-line case, the pro-
tection should be performed at the very time of a service request.
• Extend concepts and methods to the analysis of discrimination in social network data.
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